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1.
We study the evolution of an economy where agents who are heterogeneous with respect to risk attitudes can either earn a certain income or enter a risky rent-seeking contest. We assume that agents behave rationally given their preferences, but that the population distribution of preferences evolves over time in response to material payoffs. We show that, in particular, initial distributions with full support converge to stationary states where all types are still present. Although rents are perfectly dissipated in material terms at a steady state, efficiency is greater than if everybody had been risk neutral, since risk lovers specialize in rent seeking.  相似文献   
2.
The leading political–economy–of–trade models are virtually silent on two fundamental questions raised by Rodrik in 1995. Why are trade policies systematically biased against trade? And why are tariffs rather than more efficient production subsidies adopted to redistribute income? This paper shows that systematic political grass–root support for trade–restricting and inefficient tariffs emerges when the government has a revenue goal and collecting taxes is costly. Even if no tax instrument enjoys an advantage with respect to collection costs and the factor ownership distribution is unbiased, more people support tariffs than import or production subsidies. More generally, the presence of tax–collection costs creates a grass–root support bias for taxes over subsidies as instruments to redistribute income.  相似文献   
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There are two important rules to patent races: minimal accomplishment necessary to receive the patent and the allocation of the innovation benefits. We study the optimal combination of these rules. A planner, who cannot distinguish between competing firms in a multistage innovation race, chooses the patent rules by maximizing either consumer or social surplus. We show that efficiency cost of prizes is a key consideration. Races are undesirable only when efficiency costs are low, firms are similar, and social surplus is maximized. Otherwise, the optimal policy involves a race of nontrivial duration to spur innovation and filter out inferior innovators.  相似文献   
5.
With a combined career of over 60 years in oncology nursing, the authors reflect on the critical elements in the question, "How can we afford to die?" Three high-profile patient scenarios in three different decades promised to improve use of advance directives but did not. Recent societal events, including the debates about health care reform, have brought attention again to end-of-life issues and care. Quickly approaching a "perfect storm" of an aging population, an inefficient and costly illness-oriented health care system, and health care profession shortages, the United States will not be able to afford delivering futile interventions. Nurses, who are consistently seen as the most trusted professionals, must take action in strategies the authors present.  相似文献   
6.
Karl Aiginger 《Empirica》1981,8(2):263-275
Zusammenfassung Feldstein lenkt die Aufmerksamkeit von Politik und Ökonomie auf die Erhöhung der Steuerbelastung für die Unternehmungen, die bei Inflation durch die Abschreibung zu historischen Kosten (bei gleichem Steuertarif) entsteht. Er errechnet eine Formel für die Extrasteuer je Prozentpunkt Inflation, in der ein bestimmter effektiver Steuersatz eine Rolle (als Konstante) spielt. Dieser soll die Wirkung der weltweit üblichen Systeme der Investitionsbegünstigung (z. B. vorzeitige Abschreibung) berücksichtigen. Eine weitere Betrachtung dieser Systeme scheint dann nicht nötig, weil sie schon vor der Inflation geschaffen wurden. Tatsächlich hängt aber die Höhe des sogenannten effektiven Steuersatzes selbst von der Inflation ab. Der Wert der vorzeitigen Abschreibung steigt in der Inflation und wirkt der Steuererhöhung entgegen. Im Extremfall einer sofortigen vollen Abschreibung wird die Extrasteuer Null.Die stärkere Vorteilhaftigkeit der vorzeitigen Abschreibung in der Inflation (verglichen mit der Normalabschreibung zu historischen Kosten) läßt eine stärkere Ausnutzung der vorzeitigen Abschreibung im inflationären Fall erwarten. Gründe gegen die volle Ausnutzung dieser Begünstigung (fehlende Gewinne, Informationskosten) bei stabiler und inflationärer Preisentwicklung werden diskutiert.  相似文献   
7.
Book reviews     
Book reviewed in this article: The Decline of Trade Union Organisation, P.B. Beaumont Improving Industrial Relations – the Advisory Role of ACAS, Eric Armstrong and Rosemary Lucas The State of the Unions, Barrie Sherman The Trade Unions and the Labour Party, Andrew J. Taylor New Technology at Work, Arthur Francis Dictionnaire Canadiert des Relations du Travail, Gérard Dion Socialist Enterprise: Reclaiming the Economy, Diana Gilhespy, Ken Jones, Tony Manwaring, Henry Neuburger, Adam Sharpies  相似文献   
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We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin utility and (ii) minimax regret. The equilibrium price under either criterion is lower then in the absence of uncertainty. The concern for robustness leads the seller to concede a larger information rent to all buyers with values below the optimal price without uncertainty.  相似文献   
10.
Retailers are now implementing the types of formal marketing planning programs that have long characterized consumer goods firms. The functional marketing plans that are developed tend to be a year or less in duration. The primary responsibility for developing the plans resides with the general merchandise manager. The planning efforts of the retailing executive, in spite of their short term nature, do reflect an awareness of the importance of understanding the strengths and weaknesses of competitors and of the need to spell out issues involving profit planning, sales promotion planning, merchandise addition/deletion decisions, and issues involving inventory/physical distribution. A variety of marketing plans are developed. Separate plans are developed by merchandise lines in many organizations. The authors wish to express their appreciation to The Conference Board for permission to use the questionnaire, with modifications, underlying research for The Marketing Plan, Report No. 801, The Conference Board, 1981, as the basis for formulating the questionnaire used in this research  相似文献   
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