Strategic Regulation Policy in the Internet

Some countries are importers while others are exporters of global backbone connectivity. At the same time, input components such as local access are non-traded. This paper analyzes a non-cooperative regulatory game between importing and exporting countries, assuming that the prices of both traded and non-traded inputs can be regulated. We show that exporting countries choose a more restrictive regulation of non-traded goods than importing countries do. We further show that a requirement of international non-discrimination may hurt importing countries, and give firms producing traded inputs incentives to invest in quality degradation.     

Knowledge flows through social networks in a cluster: Comparing university and industry links

Knowledge spillovers from a university to the local industry play an important role in high-technology clusters, but we know little about these spillovers. This paper examines empirically the extent of informal contacts between employees in firms and local university researchers in a wireless communications cluster. Furthermore, it analyses the features of an engineer who acquires knowledge from these informal contacts. The university–industry contacts are compared to results for informal contacts between employees in firms. The research shows that the interfirm informal contacts are more numerous than university informal contacts. Likewise, knowledge is more frequently acquired from engineers in other firms than through university–industry contacts. However, not all engineers in the cluster have informal contacts or acquire knowledge through these. Engineers who have participated in formal projects with university researchers and engineers who are educated at the local university have a higher likelihood of acquiring knowledge from informal contacts with university researchers.     

Entry may increase network providers’ profit

In this paper the incentives for platform sponsors to open up their networks for independent rivals is analyzed. It is shown that open access may increase the platform sponsors’ profit levels and enhance quality improving investments. In addition, it is shown that a commitment to allow entry reduces the difference between ex ante and ex post compatibility incentives.     

FLOWS OF THE PACIFIC: ASIAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS THROUGH TRANQUILITY AND TURBULENCE

Using the longest data set on foreign exchange (FX) order flow to date, along with the broadest coverage of currencies to date, we examine the effect of FX order flow on exchange rates across small and large currencies, currencies with floating or fixed regimes, and across both tranquil and turbulent periods. Over our 15 years of data for 11 Asian and Australasian currencies, we find that order flow has a potentially strong impact on all exchange rates in the sample. The effect is strongest on floating exchange rates, both economically and statistically, but is sizeable also on the other exchange rates, especially during periods of turbulence. By creating a measure of regional order flow, we show that all exchange rates depreciate as flows are moved out of Asia/Australasia and into US dollars. This is true both across regimes and if their own flow is not included in the structure of the regional flow.     

The cointegrated vector autoregressive model with general deterministic terms

In the cointegrated vector autoregression (CVAR) literature, deterministic terms have until now been analyzed on a case-by-case, or as-needed basis. We give a comprehensive unified treatment of deterministic terms in the additive model $X_t=\gamma Z_t+Y_t$, where $Z_t$ belongs to a large class of deterministic regressors and $Y_t$ is a zero-mean CVAR. We suggest an extended model that can be estimated by reduced rank regression, and give a condition for when the additive and extended models are asymptotically equivalent, as well as an algorithm for deriving the additive model parameters from the extended model parameters. We derive asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood estimators and discuss tests for rank and tests on the deterministic terms. In particular, we give conditions under which the estimators are asymptotically (mixed) Gaussian, such that associated tests are ${\chi }^2$-distributed.     

Going Through Hell: Increased Work Effort in the Aftermath of Terrorism in Norway*

I analyze how sickness‐absence behavior in Norwegian municipalities was affected by exposure to the terrorist attack in Norway in 2011. The main finding is that in municipalities from which a resident was killed in the attack, sickness absence declined by 4 percent compared with municipalities without victims. The effect is precise, stable, and persistent. The results do not seem to be driven by changing labor market composition. The effect is found also in neighboring municipalities and is larger for people close to the age of the victims.     

Customer ignorance, price-cap regulation, and rent-seeking in mobile roaming

Mobile phone usage when traveling abroad is expensive. Although the network connection switches frequently between available networks, the choice of network is largely independent of wholesale prices. As a consequence, we show that wholesale prices are strategic substitutes. The recent European price-cap regulation forces firms to reduce wholesale and retail roaming prices, but does not solve the underlying problem. There may thus be a permanent need for regulation analogous to what we have for domestic call termination. Furthermore, we show that there is a risk that wholesale price-cap regulation stimulates wasteful rent-seeking activity.     

Portfolio optimization under model uncertainty and BSDE games

We consider robust optimal portfolio problems for markets modeled by (possibly non-Markovian) Itô–Lévy processes. Mathematically, the situation can be described as a stochastic differential game, where one of the players (the agent) is trying to find the portfolio that maximizes the utility of her terminal wealth, while the other player (“the market”) is controlling some of the unknown parameters of the market (e.g., the underlying probability measure, representing a model uncertainty problem) and is trying to minimize this maximal utility of the agent. This leads to a worst case scenario control problem for the agent. In the Markovian case, such problems can be studied using the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs (HJBI) equation, but these methods do not work in the non-Markovian case. We approach the problem by transforming it into a stochastic differential game for backward stochastic differential equations (a BSDE game). Using comparison theorems for BSDEs with jumps we arrive at criteria for the solution of such games in the form of a kind of non-Markovian analogue of the HJBI equation. The results are illustrated by examples.