Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Assessing Applied Protection across the World*

This paper presents MAcMap–HS‐6, a database providing a consistent, ad valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six‐digit level of the Harmonized System (5111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. We describe the methodology used to compute and aggregate an ad valorem equivalent of applied protection. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, while acknowledging structural differences in export specialization. The resulting quantitative assessment is illustrated by giving an overview of applied protection across the world in 2001, in terms of average as well as distribution.     

Customs Union and Gains from Trade Under Imperfect Competition: Variation of a Kemp-Wan Theme

In a world where firms are oligopolists, is it possible to create a customs union that raises the welfare of member countries without hurting non-member countries? We give sufficient conditions for an affirmative answer.     

The Regulation of Predatory Firms

This article investigates the issue of predation by a regulated firm. Since it has private information, a regulated firm obtains higher rents in case of successful predation: the fewer the competitors, the higher the marginal social value of the regulated firm's effort and the higher the informational rents. Both principals (the investor of a "target" firm and the regulator) have to provide some incentives to prevent predation: the investor has to reduce the sensitivity of refinancing to predation; the regulator has to lower the gain of successful predation. It is shown that there is a trade-off between the power of the regulatory incentive scheme and the regulated firm's incentives to prey. In addition, as deterring predation is costly, the investor and the regulator compete when offering contracts: each wants to free-ride on the other. Hence, predation may occur in equilibrium although it makes both principals worse off.     

The Regulation of Predatory Firms

This article investigates the issue ofpredation by a regulated firm. Since it has private information, a regulated firm obtains higher rents in case of successful predation: the fewer the competitors, the higher the marginal social value of the regulated firm's effort and the higher the informational rents. Both principals (the investor of a "target" firm and the regulator) have to provide some incentives to prevent predation: the investor has to reduce the sensitivity of refinancing to predation; the regulator has to lower the gain of successful predation. It is shown that there is a trade-off between the power of the regulatory incentive scheme and the regulated firm's incentives to prey. In addition, as deterring predation is costly, the investor and the regulator compete when offering contracts: each wants to free-ride on the other. Hence, predation may occur in equilibrium although it makes both principals worse off.     

Weather Index Drought Insurance: An Ex Ante Evaluation for Millet Growers in Niger

In the Sudano-Sahelian region, which includes South Niger, the inter-annual variability of the rainy season is high and irrigation is limited. As a consequence, bad rainy seasons have a massive impact on crop yield and regularly result in food crises. Traditional insurance policies based on crop damage assessment are not available because of asymmetric information and high transaction costs compared to the value of production. We assess the risk mitigation capacity of an alternative form of insurance which has been implemented at a large scale in India since 2003: insurance based on a weather index. We compare the efficiency of various weather indices to increase the expected utility of a representative risk-averse farmer. We show the importance of using plot-level yield data rather than village averages, which bias results due to the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. We also illustrate the need for out-of-sample estimations in order to avoid overfitting. Even with the appropriate index and assuming substantial risk aversion, we find a limited gain of implementing insurance, which roughly corresponds to, or slightly exceeds, the cost observed in India for implementing such insurance policies. However, when we separately treat the plots with and without fertilisers separately, we see that the benefit of insurance is slightly higher in the former case. This suggests that insurance policies may slightly increase the use of risk-increasing inputs such as fertilisers and improved cultivars, and hence improve average yields, which remain very low in the region.     

Innovation and finance: a stock flow consistent analysis of great surges of development

The present work aims at contributing to the recent stream of literature which attempts to link the Neo-Schumpeterian/Evolutionary and the Post-Keynesian theory. The paper adopts the Post-Keynesian Stock Flow Consistent modeling approach to analyze the process of development triggered by the emergence of a new-innovative productive sector into the economic system. The model depicts a multi-sectorial economy composed of consumption and capital goods industries, a banking sector and two households sectors: capitalists and wage earners. Furthermore, it provides an explicit representation of the stock market. In line with the Schumpeterian tradition, our work highlights the cyclical nature of the development process and stresses the relevance of the finance-innovation nexus, analyzing the feed-back effects between the real and financial sides of the economic system. In this way we aim at setting the basis of a comprehensive and coherent framework to study the relationship between technological change, demand and finance along the structural change process triggered by technological innovation.     

Optimal monetary policy and economic growth

A question at the center of many analyses of optimal monetary policy is, why do central banks never implement the Friedman rule? To the list of answers to this question, we add neoclassical production (specifically, the Tobin effect) as one possible explanation. To that end, we study an overlapping generations economy with capital where limited communication and stochastic relocation create an endogenous transactions role for fiat money. We assume a production function with a knowledge externality (Romer style) that nests economies with endogenous growth (AK form) and those with no long-run growth (the Diamond model). The Tobin effect is shown to be always operative. Under CRRA preferences, a mild degree of social increasing returns is sufficient (but not necessary) for some positive inflation to dominate zero inflation and for the Friedman rule to be sub-optimal, irrespective of the degree of risk aversion.     

The biological hypothesis in cliometrics of growth: a methodological critique of Fogel (post 1982) and Ashraf & Galor (2013)

The resort to biological “analogies”, “metaphors” and “concepts” is an important aspect of the history of the relationships between economics and biology and has long been greatly controversial. This controversy continues today in the most recent work of three cliometricians, i.e. Fogel (post 1982) and Ashraf and Galor (2013). We focus on the theories of historical growth relying on biological explanations which have been formulated by these economists, from the specific angle of biological reductionism. We propose a methodological critique of their use of biological variables as determinants of the historical dynamics of economic growth. Based upon the transposition to the field of economics of Ernst Mayr’s distinction between functional and evolutionary biology and his definitions of reductionism, we argue that despite some similarities, the questions raised by Fogel’s and Ashraf & Galor’s theories are of distinct nature. Nonetheless, we stress the need for a careful examination of the biological mechanisms supporting these researches.     

The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of economic decision

Modern economic theory ignores the influence of emotions on decision-making. Emerging neuroscience evidence suggests that sound and rational decision making, in fact, depends on prior accurate emotional processing. The somatic marker hypothesis provides a systems-level neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for decision-making and its influence by emotion. The key idea of this hypothesis is that decision-making is a process that is influenced by marker signals that arise in bioregulatory processes, including those that express themselves in emotions and feelings. This influence can occur at multiple levels of operation, some of which occur consciously, and some of which occur non-consciously. Here we review studies that confirm various predictions from the hypothesis, and propose a neural model for economic decision, in which emotions are a major factor in the interaction between environmental conditions and human decision processes, with these emotional systems providing valuable implicit or explicit knowledge for making fast and advantageous decisions.