Persistent mispricing in a recently opened emerging index futures market: Arbitrageurs invited

The purpose of this study is to analyze the persistent, typically negative, mispricing in the new stock index futures market in Turkey, which has amounted to 5–8%, several multiples of transaction costs. The observations suggest that it is the outcome of a combination of practical difficulties of shorting in the spot stock market, behavioral effects, and insufficient arbitrage. The magnitude of the mispricing and the absence of arbitrage make behavioral effects more visible and provide a unique opportunity to examine extant behavioral hypotheses. Results confirm effects such as disposition and/or conservatism with the mispricing negatively related to past returns, but unrelated to future returns. Finally, an orderly weakening of the negative relation to past returns and behavioral effects is observed, suggesting that such effects will diminish as the market matures. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:218–243, 2009     

When Do Outsider CEOs Generate Strategic Change? The Enabling Role of Corporate Stability

When academic researchers, business commentators, and boards of directors have debated the merits of hiring new CEOs from outside the firm, the implicit or explicit assumption typically made is that outsider CEOs will provide an advantage in achieving strategic change. In this study, we challenge this assumption by employing a duality perspective on stability/change, and we provide an original conceptual framework to posit that it is the presence of corporate stability (ordinary succession, a long‐tenured predecessor CEO, and good firm performance) that allows outsider CEOs to generate a greater degree of post‐succession strategic change. We use extensive longitudinal data from US airline and chemical industries between 1972 and 2010 to test our hypotheses, and we discuss how our supportive findings challenge long‐standing assumptions regarding the outsider succession–strategic change relationship, and we advocate embracing the non‐intiutive notion that stable (unstable) conditions can be enablers (barriers) of strategic change for outsider CEOs.     

Informal Institutional Arrangements in Credit,Land Markets and Infrastructure Delivery in Trinidad

Informal institutional arrangements, permeating both formal and informal housing settlements, allow markets to function in developing countries. Yet their economic, social and policy impacts are largely unexamined. Insights from the new institutional economics literature are used to show the significance of informal institutional arrangements in credit, land markets and infrastructure delivery. The analysis is grounded in the experience of Trinidad and Tobago, with empirical information drawn from fieldwork research done in 1993 and 1997. Research findings show that informal institutions of cooperation (e.g. sou‐sou, CBOs) support transactions by reducing transaction costs, by lowering risk and by providing mechanisms to cope with uncertainty. They are therefore used instead of formal institutions. Policy‐makers should expect intense utilization of such locally designed institutions that use social capital in the process of land and housing market reform in developing countries. Ce sont les arrangements institutionnels informels, organisent l'habitat officiel et officieux, qui donnent aux marchés la possibilité de fonctionner dans les pays en voie de développement. Néanmoins leur impact économique, social et politique n'ont généralement pas été examinés. J'utilise des outils provenant des travaux sur l'économie neo‐institutionaliste pour démontrer la signification des arrangements institutionnels officieux pour le crédit, les marchés agraires et la distribution des infrastructures. L'analyse est basée sur l'expérience de Trinidad et Tobago, et l'information empirique provient d'une recherche de terrain faite entre 1993 et 1997. Les résultats montrent que les institutions officieuses de coopération (par exemple sou‐sou, CBOs) supportent les transactions en réduisant leurs coûts, en abaissant les risques, et en fournissant des mécanismes pour faire face à l'incertitude. Elles sont donc utilisées à la place des institutions officielles. Les politiciens peuvent s'attendre à une utilisation intense de telles institutions désignées localement et qui utilisent le capital social dans le processus de réformes du marché agraire et du logement dans les pays en voie de développement.     

Financialization and Vested Interests: Self-Regulation vs. Financial Stability as a Public Good

I propose an institutionalist analysis of financialization through the lens of Thorstein Veblen, built on some peculiar characteristics of money and related financial instruments in a market-based capitalist economy. Following the case of the overcapitalization of farmlands, studied by Veblen (1919), I argue that modern capitalism is a financialized society dominated by vested interests that rely on financial liberalization-led speculative overcapitalization, often leading to a perverse accumulation process and resulting in systemic catastrophes. Consequently, one of the major constituent institutions of liberal finance, market-dependent selfregulation, proves unable to deal with society-level issues like financial stability. This latter issue must be handled at a systemic level, as a public good. Therefore, specific public regulation and action mechanisms must be designed to maintain society (and dominant vested-interests) within some viability limits to ensure a smooth functioning of the economy.     

The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce two new axioms; favoring higher ranks and rank-respecting invariance. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it favors higher ranks and satisfies consistency, resource monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance. In environments where each type of object has exactly one unit, as in house allocation, a characterization is given by favoring higher ranks, individual rationality, population monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance.     

Stabilizing Endogenous Instability: Proposals for An Institutionalist Reform of Financial Regulation

A major and persistent question behind economic theories and related policies is whether the market can self-regulate without any restrictive exogenous intervention or whether regular and binding public regulation is necessary for ensuring the reproduction of the economic system in a sustainable way over time. This article considers this question with regard to the working of financial markets in a liberalized environment. Drawing upon an institutionalist stance, the article shows why the operation of a financialized capitalist economy usually leads to systemic imbalances and crises. The article then suggests an alternative framework for a consistent financial regulation that could prevent market actors from developing short-sighted strategies and gambling on macro stability.     

Privatization Policy and Enterprise Performance: the case of Ireland

Abstract Compared to other industrialized economies Ireland has been slow to privatize state‐owed enterprises. The first divestitures in 1991 failed to trigger a systematic programme of sell‐offs due to fears of job losses in an economy characterized by low rates of growth and high levels of unemployment. Where subsequent sales occurred they took place on a pragmatic and case‐by‐case basis with the reasons for privatization varying across companies. Some of the earlier sales took place because the enterprises were financially unviable whereas more recent sales can be attributed to the influence of EU policy on competition and restrictions on state aids. Since the privatization of the state telecommunications company in 1999 there has been a significant increase in privatization activity and most of the remaining public enterprises are candidates for divestiture. By 2001 total revenues amounted to €8.1 bn (9 per cent of GNP for 2001). A consistent justification for privatization has been that a change in ownership will lead to improved performance. The analysis in this paper fails to support this argument. At this early stage of the programe the experience has been for cost‐cutting measures to lead to improved performance prior to privatization with little evidence of continued improvements after divestiture .     

Restructuring of the Hungarian Electricity Industry

Restructuring the monopolistic, state-owned, obsolete and polluting utility industries of post-socialist economies poses a challenge for the utility deregulation wave travelling around the world. Utility restructuring in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region is unique from several perspectives, including the domination of foreign capital vs. national resources as the only feasible vehicle for a drastic change in the industry and the ambitious goals of harmonisation with the EU liberalisation schedule to accelerate accession. It is also widely expected that deregulation will help bring down world-record high energy intensities in these economies. Hungary has been the pioneer among economies in transition in unbundling, deregulating and privatising the utility industries and taking the first steps towards EU-conforming market liberalisation within less than half a decade. The first stages of privatisation and restructuring have been declared a success story in the Western media. However, what is a success story from a foreign perspective may be seen differently from other viewpoints. The article describes the process of utility restructuring in Hungary and examines its impact from the economic, environmental and policy perspectives. The article also compares the pioneer Hungarian deregulation with other CEE countries' restructuring of their energy sectors. However, the lessons to be learned from the Hungarian electricity industry restructuring are not only vital for other economies in transition but are often universally applicable.     

WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE DECLINE IN CRIME?*

In this article we analyze recent trends in aggregate property crime rates in the United States. We propose a dynamic equilibrium model that guides our quantitative investigation of the major determinants of observed patterns of crime. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: First, the model is capable of reproducing the drop in crime between 1980 and 1996. Second, the most important factors that account for the observed decline in property crime are the higher apprehension probability, the stronger economy, and the aging of the population. Third, the effect of unemployment on crime is negligible. Fourth, the increased inequality prevented an even larger decline in crime. Overall, our analysis can account for the behavior of the time series of property crime rates over the past quarter century.