Money and capital

The effects of money (anticipated inflation) on capital formation is a classic issue in macroeconomics. Previous papers adopt reduced-form approaches, putting money in the utility function, or imposing cash in advance, but using otherwise frictionless models. We follow instead a literature that tries to be explicit about the frictions making money essential. This introduces new elements, including a two-sector structure with centralized and decentralized markets, stochastic trading opportunities, and bargaining. These elements matter quantitatively and numerical results differ from findings in the reduced-form literature. The analysis also reduces a gap between microfounded monetary economics and mainstream macro.     

Efficiency and risk in commercial banking: empirical evidence from East Asian countries

This paper analyses the effects of off-balance sheet (OBS) activities and various types of risks on the cost and profit efficiencies of banks in seven East Asian countries between 2001 and 2008. Cost and profit efficiency scores are estimated using the data envelopment analysis approach. The results of this analysis are then used to identify the impact of OBS activities and risk exposures on cost and profit efficiencies using a Tobit regression. Bank insolvency risk (as measured by z-scores) is positively related to profit efficiency, while interest sensitivity, size, equity to total assets and OBS exposures all impact on cost efficiency. The analysis of the impact of input and output slacks illustrates that in around 1 in 5 cases banks’ cost efficiency can be improved by adjusting the former variables, whereas in only around 1 in 100 cases a similar outcome is possible for profit efficiency.     

Are asset price guarantees useful for preventing Sudden Stops?: A quantitative investigation of the globalization hazard-moral hazard tradeoff

An implication of the globalization hazard hypothesis is that ‘Sudden Stops’ caused by global financial frictions could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees create a tradeoff, however, because they weaken globalization hazard while creating international moral hazard. We study this tradeoff using a quantitative, equilibrium asset-pricing model. Without guarantees, margin calls and trading costs cause Sudden Stops driven by a Fisherian deflation. Price guarantees prevent this deflation by propping up foreign demand for assets. The effectiveness of price guarantees, their distortions on asset markets, and their welfare implications depend critically on whether the guarantees are contingent on debt levels and on the price elasticity of foreign demand for domestic assets.     

Precautionary demand for foreign assets in Sudden Stop economies: An assessment of the New Mercantilism

Financial globalization had a rocky start in emerging economies hit by Sudden Stops. Foreign reserves have grown very rapidly since then, as if those countries were practicing a New Mercantilism that views foreign reserves as a war chest for defense against Sudden Stops. This paper conducts a quantitative assessment of this argument using a stochastic intertemporal equilibrium framework in which precautionary foreign asset demand is driven by output variability, financial globalization, and Sudden Stop risk. In this framework, credit constraints produce endogenous Sudden Stops. We find that financial globalization and Sudden Stop risk can explain the surge in reserves but output variability cannot. These results hold using the intertemporal preferences of the Bewley–Aiyagari–Hugget precautionary savings model or the Uzawa–Epstein setup with endogenous impatience.