In and out of everyday life through film experiences: an analysis of two social spaces as leisure frames

The new information and communication technologies have made it possible to view films in different spaces. Using the symbolic interactionist framework as a frame of analysis, we interpret the meaning of the two experiences of viewing technology-mediated films in the home and in the cinema. We conducted field research during the first half of 2009, digitally recording 16 interviews with research participants living in Barcelona (Spain). The interviews were transcribed verbatim with the help of voice-recognition software. Reports from our research participants indicate that individuals considered only the cinema experience to be a true leisure activity, while the home experience was interpreted as a routine recreational activity. Therefore, the meanings of the film-viewing activity were associated with the symbolic properties of the frames of interpretation. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for the home as a unified centre where shared meanings are co-produced by family members.     

The hard shadow of the Greek economy: new estimates of the size of the underground economy and its fiscal impact

This article presents new estimates of the Greek underground economy and explores the link between the underground economy and aggregate debt. We show that the Greek underground economy has been underestimated heavily and has been on a rising trend again since Greece adopted the Euro. We also present evidence that the size of the underground economy is positively related to the debt-to-GDP ratio, implying that fighting the underground economy is also conducive to financial and macroeconomic stability. Our results suggest that for our sample of 11 EMU member countries, the loss of the inflation tax as an economic policy instrument had drastic consequences. While the underground economy did not have a statistically significant impact on aggregate debt before the introduction of the Euro, it has pushed up the debt-to-GDP ratio in our sample since.     

Size and scope of the underground economy in Germany

The objective of this paper is to improve estimations of the size and scope of the underground economy by introducing a new approach that combines the advantages of the two most commonly used approaches, i.e. currency demand and multiple indicators, multiple causes (MIMIC). The new approach is applied to Germany. Among other things, it is shown that the approach yields improved estimation results. Some policy perspectives are discussed in the concluding section.     

Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy

We lay out a small open economy version of the Calvo sticky price model, and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap. We use the resulting framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rule-based policy regimes for the small open economy: domestic inflation and CPI-based Taylor rules, and an exchange rate peg. We show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail. We also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy, and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules.     

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient families of rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. Rules in the two families are in addition envy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (a) the family of constrained equal losses rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrained equal awards rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy envy-freeness on awards.     

A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement

This paper analyzes agreements between governments that determine the division of policy-making power between central and regional governments. Our analysis demonstrates that initial circumstances and political risks affect the degree of centralization that will be adopted, and that asymmetric forms of federalism are often consequences of ongoing negotiations between regional and central governments over the assignment of policy-making authority. We analyze three settings where gains from constitutional exchange may exist: (i) the under-centralized state, (ii) the over-centralized state, and (iii) the constitutional convention. In each case, an asymmetric form of federalism is the predicted outcome, although the degree of asymmetry differs according to starting point. Modern and historical examples are used to illustrate the relevance of our analysis.     

ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS

We consider strategy‐proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops‐onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single‐peakedness (referred to as semilattice single‐peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single‐peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well‐known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy‐proof rules are admissible are semilattice single‐peaked domains.     

Portfolio choice, attention allocation, and price comovement

This paper models the attention allocation of portfolio investors. Investors choose the composition of their information subject to an information flow constraint. Given their expected investment strategy in the next period, which is to hold a diversified portfolio, in equilibrium investors choose to observe one linear combination of asset payoffs as a private signal. When investors use this private signal to update information about two assets, changes in one asset affect both asset prices and may lead to asset price comovement. The model also has implications for the transmission of volatility shocks between two assets.     

Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study

Motivated by problems of coordination failure in organizations, we examine how overcoming coordination failure and maintaining coordination depend on the ability of individuals to observe others’ choices. Subjects’ payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels in a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which usually yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all individuals in their experimental group (full feedback) or observe only the minimum effort (limited feedback). We find three primary results: (1) When starting from coordination failure the use of full feedback improves subjects’ ability to overcome coordination failure, (2) When starting with good coordination the use of full feedback has no effect on subjects’ ability to avoid slipping into coordination failure, and (3) History-dependence, defined as dependence of current effort levels on past incentives, is strengthened by the use of full feedback. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C92, D23, J31, L23, M52