A TEST OF EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION IN THE NBA

This paper presents a test of an important implication of Becker's theory of employer discrimination: when institutional change enhances labor mobility, employer discrimination falls because it becomes more costly for employers to indulge tastes for discrimination. The test case is the National Basketball Association (NBA). This paper specifically addresses the following question about the NBA: why did black/white player salary differentials vanish by the early 1990s? Previous studies claim that NBA wage gaps in the 1980s are attributable to customer discrimination and monopsonistic wage discrimination. This study argues that employer discrimination was an important source of those gaps and that one reason they vanished was because reduced monopsony power eradicated employer discrimination. Monopsony power fell because the 1988 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement and the entry of four new teams in the league enhanced player mobility and increased the amount of labor market competition. Using data for the 1985-86 and 1990-91 seasons, employer discrimination was proxied by the race of the team's general manager. Empirical results strongly suggest that a major reason the NBA wage gap vanished in the later period was because of a reduction in employers' ability to discriminate. This is in contrast to earlier literature on the NBA, which has tended to emphasize the role of customer discrimination. (JEL J71)     

INTER-COUNTRY AND INTERREGIONAL COMPARISONS OF INEQUALITY AND POVERTY

Review of Smeeding, T., O'Higgins, M., and Rainwater, L. (Ed.), Poverty, Inequality and Income Distribution in Comparative Perspective
Borooah, V. K., McGregor, P. P. L., and McKee, P. M., Regional Income Inequality und Poverty in the United Kingdom     

Interindustry Wage Differentials and Unobserved Ability: Siblings Evidence from Five Countries

We examine the role of unobserved ability in explaining interindustry wage differentials. By using data on brothers, we account for unmeasured abilities shared by siblings. The data came from four Nordic countries and the United States. In the Nordic countries, only a moderate proportion of the variability in industry wages can be attributed to unobserved ability, while unmeasured factors explain as much as half of the U.S. industry‐wage variation. Accounting for such differences, we show that the U.S. interindustry wage dispersion is similar with that in the Nordic countries.     

The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis

We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower‐level management and non‐chief executive officer (non‐CEO) higher‐level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks’ CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non‐CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk‐taking channel of lower‐level managers.     

Information Revelation in Decentralized Markets

How does information get revealed in decentralized markets? We test several hypotheses inspired by recent dealer‐network theory. To do so, we construct an empirical map of information revelation where two dealers are connected based on the synchronicity of their quote changes. The tests, based on the euro to Swiss franc spot rate (EUR/CHF) quote data including the 2015 crash, largely support theory: strongly connected (i.e., central) dealers are more informed. Connections are weaker when there is less to be learned. The crash serves to identify how a network forms when dealers are transitioned from no‐learning to learning, that is, from a fixed to a floating rate.     

Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions

We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bank‐specific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bank‐specific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.     

THE REGULATION OF MIGRATION IN A TRANSITION ECONOMY: CHINA'S HUKOU SYSTEM

Unlike most countries, China regulates internal migration. Access to public schools, health services, low‐cost housing, and attractive jobs by those who do not have local registration (Hukou) is often limited. Coincident with the deepening of economic reforms, Hukou has gradually been relaxed since the 1980s, contributing to a migration surge. In this study of interprovincial Chinese migration, we address two questions. First, what is a sensible way of incorporating Hukou into theoretical and empirical models of migration in China? Second, to what extent has Hukou influenced the scale and structure of migration? We incorporate two different measures of Hukou into a modified gravity model nuanced to fit the Chinese case: (1) the migrant's perceived probability of securing Hukou and (2) the perceived joint probability of securing Hukou and a job available only to a registered person. Our tests include a much wider variety of controls especially important for the Chinese case. Using census data for 1985–90, 1995–2000, and 2000–05, we find that migration is very sensitive to Hukou, with the greatest sensitivity occurring during the middle period. (JEL J61)     

Genetic Variation in Financial Decision‐Making

Individuals differ in how they construct their investment portfolios, yet empirical models of portfolio risk typically account only for a small portion of the cross‐sectional variance. This paper asks whether genetic variation can explain some of these individual differences. Following a major pension reform Swedish adults had to form a portfolio from a large menu of funds. We match data on these investment decisions with the Swedish Twin Registry and find that approximately 25% of individual variation in portfolio risk is due to genetic variation. We also find that these results extend to several other aspects of financial decision‐making.