Spatial Cournot Competition among Multi-Plant Firms in a Circular City

We characterize equilibrium plant locations for a spatial multi-plant Cournot oligopoly in a circular city. Previous work demonstrates that for a two-plant duopoly, all four plants are equally spaced. We establish that the equilibrium location pattern is unique if there are two firms with an equal number of plants. In most other scenarios, multiple equilibria arise. Next, we endogenously determine both the number of plants per firm and plant locations for a duopoly. It is shown that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium may not be unique, and for identical set-up costs, the firms may choose different numbers of plants.     

REGIME DEPENDENT EFFECT OF OUTPUT GROWTH ON OUTPUT GROWTH UNCERTAINTY: EVIDENCE FROM OECD COUNTRIES

This paper studies the impact of output growth on output growth uncertainty by considering two important issues hitherto not properly and adequately addressed to in the existing empirical studies specifying this relationship. These are: (i) the possible existence of a threshold level of output growth, and the consequent identification of two regimes characterized by high and low output growth, and (ii) whether or not the coefficient capturing the causal link is different in these two output growth states. This paper proposes a regime switching model to study this asymmetric effect for 16 OECD countries. Based on monthly time‐series observations, our results strongly support that the impact varies significantly between the two output growth regimes with the coefficient in the high growth regime being negative for majority of the countries.     

Optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing of an investment

Corporate investment is an important determinant of economic well-being. The existing literature identifies optimal investment size and timing without the possibility of debt financing, as well as the effect of debt financing on investment timing without the option to choose investment size. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing for an investment when the firm controls all three decisions (as it usually does in practice). The investment size and investment trigger are generally positively related: when investment is delayed (accelerated) it is larger (smaller) in size, thus the overall effect on investment is ambiguous. However, when tax rate or bankruptcy cost is increased, the trigger rises and size falls, hence the effect on investment is unambiguously negative. The effect of debt financing on investment depends on the amount of debt used; with the optimal amount of debt, investment is delayed relative to the no-debt case, and this delay can be economically significant; however, the investment, when eventually made, will be larger in size. Overall, it is not appropriate to ignore either the firm’s ability to choose investment size or its option to use debt financing, when modeling the investment decision.     

Managerial compensation and the underinvestment problem

This paper studies the effect of managerial compensation terms on the well-known “underinvestment” incentive. We extend the Mauer and Ott (2000) real-option model of corporate expansion, and show that, when the manager maximizes the value of his compensation package (rather than equity value), the underinvestment problem can be substantially mitigated. Further, by designing an appropriate compensation contract, it is possible to eliminate the underinvestment incentive altogether. This managerial contract, consisting of fixed salary and equity ownership, is explicitly derived in the model. The equity ownership level is found to be an increasing function of the manager's fixed salary and the company's earnings growth rate, and a decreasing function of leverage ratio, earnings volatility, tax rate, bankruptcy costs, and the manager's severance pay at bankruptcy.     

Technological Diffusion: Alternative Theories and Historical Evidence

This paper presents an interpretive survey of the neoclassical and evolutionary approaches to modeling the process of technological diffusion, with an orientation that is distinct in two important respects from existing surveys. First, the present survey is designed to provide a comparative overview of the alternative approaches within a unified framework of analysis. The objective is to bring out the areas of convergence as well as divergence between the approaches, and address the issue of whether the approaches could be considered as complementary rather than as alternatives. Second, the survey attempts to link the theoretical methodologies to the variety of empirical and historical evidence, and evaluate how the theories best fit the evidence on the dynamics of the technological diffusion process.     

Can tax convexity be ignored in corporate financing decisions?

The standard modeling practice in corporate finance has been to assume a linear tax schedule. This paper extends the structural contingent-claim model of corporate finance to incorporate a more realistic convex tax schedule. It is shown that tax convexity raises the optimal default boundary and thus increases the likelihood of default, and also reduces the optimal leverage ratio. While the former effect seems insignificant in general, the effect of tax convexity on the optimal leverage ratio can be quantitatively significant. We conclude that tax convexity should not be ignored in corporate financing decisions, and theoretical models should use a convex tax schedule instead of a linear one. Thus, the short answer to the question in the title is “No”.     

Empirical Evidence on Corporate Risk‐Shifting

We study empirically whether nonfinancial firms’ behavior is consistent with systematic risk‐shifting. We compare firms’ operating risk before and after a debt issue, under the assumption that if there is any risk‐shifting it is most likely to occur right after a debt issue. We document a significant increase in firms’ operating risk, even after adjusting for industry influences. The risk‐shifting is higher for firms with no subsequent debt issues, and for firms with lower credit ratings. Other determinants are earnings volatility, size of debt issue, and whether the bond is callable.     

Do the English Legal Origin Countries have More Dispersed Share Ownership and More Developed Financial Systems?

The essence of the legal origin hypothesis is that a country with an English legal origin provides better investor and creditor protection and experiences greater financial development; financial institutions and stock markets flourish, the general public participate more in financing investment projects of companies and so shareholding is less concentrated. The present paper examines this hypothesis on the basis of a cross‐country study of 85 countries. We find no evidence of more dispersed share ownership in the English law countries than in other countries with different legal origins irrespective of whether we adjust for the existence of transitional economies and less developed countries in the sample. Using three indicators of development of banking and other credit institutions and four indicators of stock market developments, we also find no evidence of more developed financial systems in the English law countries. As expected, there is some evidence of lower financial development in the less developed countries and transitional countries. It is not the English law heritage but the security of persons and goods that appears to explain the cross‐country variations in financial development.     

Multiple board appointments and firm performance in emerging economies: Evidence from India

This paper extends the literature on multiple directorships, busy directors and firm performance by providing evidence from an emerging economy, India, where the incidence of multiple directorships is high. Using a sample of 500 large firms and a measure of “busyness” that is more general in its applicability, we find multiple directorships by independent directors to correlate positively with firm value. Independent directors with multiple positions are also found to attend more board meetings and are more likely to be present in a company's annual general meeting. These findings are largely in contrast to the existing evidence from the US studies and lend support to the “quality hypothesis” that busy outside directors are likely to be better directors, and the “resource dependency hypothesis” that multiple directors may be better networked thereby helping the company to establish more linkages with its external environment. Multiple directorships by inside directors are, however, negatively related to firm performance. Our results suggest that the institutional specificities of emerging economies like India could work in favor of sustaining high levels of multiple directorships for independent directors without necessarily impairing the quality of corporate governance.