A Re-Examination of Financial Analysts' Differential Earnings Forecast Accuracy*

Abstract. This research re-examines whether there are differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts through a comparison of their annual earnings per share forecasts. The comparison of analyst forecast accuracy is made on both an ex post (within sample) and an ex ante (out of sample) basis. Early examinations of this issue by Richards (1976), Brown and Rozeff (1980), O'Brien (1987), Coggin and Hunter (1989), O'Brien (1990), and Butler and Lang (1991) were ex post and suggest the absence of analysts who can provide relatively more accurate forecasts over multiple years. Contrary to the results of prior research and consistent with the belief in the popular press, we document that differences do exist in financial analysts' ex post forecast accuracy. We show that the previous studies failed to find differences in forecast accuracy due to inadequate (or no) control for differences in the recency of forecasts issued by the analysts. It has been well documented in the literature that forecast recency is positively related to forecast accuracy (Crichfield, Dyckman, and Lakonishok 1978; O'Brien 1988; Brown 1991). Thus, failure to control for forecast recency may reduce the power of tests, making it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no differences in forecast accuracy even if they do exist. In our analysis, we control for the differences in recency of analysts' forecasts using two different approaches. First, we use an estimated generalized least squares estimation procedure that captures the recency-induced effects in the residuals of the model. Second, we use a matched-pair design whereby we measure the relative forecast accuracy of an analyst by comparing his/her forecast error to the forecast error of another randomly selected analyst making forecasts for the same firm in the same year on or around the same date. Using both approaches, we find that differential forecast accuracy does exist amongst analysts, especially in samples with minimum forecast horizons of five and 60 trading days. We show that these differences are not attributable to differences in the forecast issuance frequency of the financial analysts. In sum, after controlling for firm, year, forecast recency, and forecast issuance frequency of individual analysts, the analyst effect persists. To validate our findings, we examine whether the differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts persist in holdout periods. Analysts were assigned a “superior” (“inferior”) status for a firm-year in the estimation sample using percentile rankings on the distribution of absolute forecast errors for that firm-year. We use estimation samples of one- to four-year duration, and consider two different definitions of analyst forecast superiority. Analysts were classified as firm-specific “superior” if they maintained a “superior” status in every year of the estimation sample. Furthermore, they were classified as industry-specific “superior” if they were deemed firm-specific “superior” with respect to at least two firms and firm-specific “inferior” with respect to no firm in that industry. Using either definition, we find that analysts classified as “superior” in estimation samples generally remain superior in holdout periods. In contrast, we find that analysts identified as “inferior” in estimation samples do not remain inferior in holdout periods. Our results suggest that some analysts' earnings forecasts should be weighted higher than others when formulating composite earnings expectations. This suggestion is predicated on the assumption that capital markets distinguish between analysts who are ex ante superior, and that they utilize this information when formulating stock prices. Our study provides an ex ante framework for identifying those analysts who appear to be superior. When constructing weighted forecasts, a one-year estimation period should be used because we obtain the strongest results of persistence in this case.     

Performance Measures and Cost Containment in the New Zealand Health Sector: A Case of Iatrogenic Disorder

An iatrogenic disorder is the name given to a disease or illness that is actually created by medical interventions. This paper suggests an analogous disorder caused by accounting interventions. Attempts to introduce greater accountability and associated accounting technology can lead to disorder, the treatment for which is often prescribed as more of what caused the problem. The example illustrated in this paper is that of the New Zealand public health system. Policies introduced by well-meaning politicians and bureaucrats have created the opposite condition to that desired. Until an iatrogenic disorder is recognised, it is hard to see an appropriate solution.     

Common Divisors,Payout Persistence,and Return Predictability

In the finance and accounting literature, the use of a common divisor in the dependent and independent variables of ordinary least‐squares regressions is commonplace. What goes less recognized, however, is that their use induces spurious correlation between the regression variables and invalidates standard testing procedures. This paper analyses the common divisor problem by outlining analytical results concerning the expected R² and providing a simulation procedure that generates test statistics from which critical values can be drawn. To illustrate the procedure, we re‐investigate payout yield return predictability findings that have appeared in the literature and show that the results are spurious.     

A Consumer Perspective of the Investment Services Market

Some thirty million American consumers pursue their financial objectives through individual participation in the stock market. They clearly view the stock market as a savings alternative which offers at least normal returns to persons outside the circle of professional investors. In the absence of data reflecting the performance of personal portfolios it is difficult to assess the validity of this view. However, as an initial step this paper evaluates the performance of the market servicing individual investors. The evidence indicates that noninstitutional investors have reason to question stock brokerage pricing, service and sales practices. Moreover on the basis of more than 1,000 sampled investment recommendations, it appears that investment publications directed at individual investors have failed to identify superior investment alternatives.     

The Information Content of Mutual Fund Print Advertising

The mutual fund industry has experienced tremendous growth in recent years. During this time period mutual funds have become somewhat of a commodity with many funds using advertising to attract investors. The current study uses content analysis to determine the informational content of fund advertising. The results indicate that while the average number of informational cues increased during the time period 1979 to 1989, there was no significant increase in the information content of mutual fund advertising between 1989 and 1999. Relatively few funds include information such as loads, 12b‐1 fees, and expense ratios in their advertisements, and fund ads rarely discuss risk.     

Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?

This paper examines the power of statistical tests commonly used to evaluate the efficiency of speculative markets. It shows that these tests have very low power. Market valuations can differ substantially and persistently from the rational expectation of the present value of cash flows without leaving statistically discernible traces in the pattern of ex-post returns. This observation implies that speculation is unlikely to ensure rational valuations, since similar problems of identification plague both financial economists and would be speculators.     

Judging the probability of a contingent loss: An empirical study*

Abstract. This paper reports the results of research in which experienced auditors interpreted the criteria of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (SFAS 5): Accounting for Contingencies. The research focuses on two issues: (1) the nature and degree of consensus in the auditors' interpretations, and (2) the extent to which these interpretations depend upon the type of contingent loss. Forty-five experienced auditors (managers, principals, and partners) from “Big 8” CPA firms responded to a research instrument that elicited their interpretation of SFAS 5 probability criteria. Our analysis focuses upon the thresholds between the “remote” and “reasonably possible” criteria and between the “reasonably possible” and “probable” criteria. Our results indicate: (1) threshold means of 0.16 and 0.68, respectively; (2) more auditor consensus for the first threshold than for the second; (3) the first threshold was significantly lower than indicated by previous research; and (4) the thresholds were generally not dependent upon the type of contingent loss.