Competitive effects of Basel II on US bank credit card lending

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers.     

Race,revenues, and college basketball

Customer discrimination may result in racial differences in the marginal revenue products generated by workers. College basketball data allow for direct comparisons of the racial differences in the marginal revenues generated by players. This article compares the revenue generating potential of the top black and white college basketball players. A highly skilled white college player generates over $100,000 in per game revenues as compared to around $30,000 for a black player of equal talent, providing a strong incentive for colleges to discriminate against recruiting black student-athletes.     

Globalization with a human face

This paper has six parts. The first part defines globalization. The second discusses globalization eras. The third discusses the irreversibility and inevitability of globalization. The fourth section discusses the benefits and costs of globalization. The fifth section asks what is to be done. The sixth section contains my conclusions.     

Law,values and economic thought: Notes for a research agenda

This essay suggests that law, economic thought and moral/religious values may be related in ways that condition how each functions. It sketches the potential value of investigating this triad by looking at two patterns of interaction and locating each in a specific narrative context taken from the development of competition law in Europe. In one, law functions as a transforming bridge between religious/moral values and economic thought, while in the other the three domains of thought and discourse combine to create structural synergies that dialectically influence each in return.     

Buchanan clubs

This article evaluates the contribution of James M. Buchanan’s theory of clubs. At the outset, the article distinguishes club goods from pure public goods. Next, the article distills the basic mathematical structure of Buchanan’s treatment of clubs. This is followed by some key variants of Buchanan clubs. More general formulations of club theory are also addressed. To demonstrate the wide-ranging importance of Buchanan clubs, the article indicates varied applications of club theory. The article’s message is that club theory remains highly relevant today.     

Comparing Sunspot Equilibrium And Lottery Equilibrium Allocations: The Finite Case*

Sunspot equilibrium and lottery equilibrium are two stochastic solution concepts for nonstochastic economies. We compare these concepts in a class of completely finite, (possibly) nonconvex exchange economies with perfect markets, which requires extending the lottery model to the finite case. Every equilibrium allocation of our lottery model is also a sunspot equilibrium allocation. The converse is almost always true. There are exceptions, however: For some economies, there exist sunspot equilibrium allocations with no lottery equilibrium counterpart.     

Institutions and concentration

In a new dataset of 1.3 million firms from over 100 countries, I establish a number of regularities in cross-country differences in economic concentration. Concentration of sales and employment is substantially higher in smaller countries and in less-developed countries; these two factors alone explain roughly half the cross-country variation in concentration. Nevertheless, a number of institutional factors offer additional explanatory power for concentration. Concentration is higher in countries with higher entry costs for new firms, in countries with weaker antitrust policy, in countries with less financial development, in countries with weaker rule of law, and in countries with more burdensome regulation. Weak institutions are associated with higher concentration especially in industries that do not have naturally high levels of concentration. In addition, the relationships between institutions and concentration are more pronounced in nontradable and investment-intensive industries, suggesting that natural barriers to competition facilitate the monopolization of sectors especially when institutions are weak.