Large shareholders and disclosure strategies: Evidence from IPO lockup expirations

We examine the effect of large shareholders? ex ante selling incentives on firms? voluntary disclosure choices in the setting of IPO lockup expirations. We find evidence that managers delay disclosures of bad news, not for their own benefit, but to enable influential pre-IPO shareholders to sell their shares at more favorable prices. Delays are more pronounced when aggregate selling incentives are greater, when uncertainty is high, and when venture capitalists, influential investors with strong selling incentives, own more shares. Simultaneously, managers? disclosure decisions reflect litigation concerns; no significant delays occur when litigation risk is high or when managers trade themselves.     

Analyst reputation and the issuance of disaggregated earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S

Although sell-side analysts privately forecast revenues and expenses when producing earnings forecasts, not all analysts choose to provide I/B/E/S with earnings forecasts disaggregated into revenues and expenses. We investigate the role of reputation in explaining this decision. We find that analysts without established reputations are more likely than reputable analysts to issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S, consistent with I/B/E/S exposure benefits accruing to analysts seeking to establish a reputation. Among less reputable analysts, those with high ability are more likely to disaggregate, consistent with this group reaping greater benefits from the exposure I/B/E/S provides. Additional tests support our primary hypotheses. Among less reputable analysts, those who disaggregate are more (less) likely to be promoted (demoted or terminated). The stock market responds similarly, with more weight assigned to earnings forecast revisions provided by analysts who disaggregate their earnings forecasts.     

Store-evoked affect, personalities, and consumer emotional attachments to brands

This research examines how store-evoked affect, human personality, and brand personality influence consumers' emotional attachments to brands. A field study (in wine tasting rooms) demonstrates that satisfaction mediates the effects of store-evoked pleasure and arousal on brand attachments, which further affects brand loyalty and willingness to pay a price premium. Attachment is consistently stronger in positive affective environments (i.e., when pleasure, arousal, and satisfaction are high) and when the brand possesses positive dimensions of brand personality. These effects are stronger for consumers scoring high (rather than low) on extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness and weaker for individuals scoring high on neuroticism. A follow-up experiment (in juice bars) supports the findings of the field study and provides further insight into the three-way interaction between store-evoked affect, brand personality, and consumer personality.     

When and why do IPO firms manage earnings?

There is significant disagreement about whether, when, and why IPO firms manage earnings. We precisely identify the timing and motives behind earnings management by IPO firms. The period around an IPO is characterized by two events: the IPO itself and the lockup expiration. Both the raising of capital at the IPO and the exit by pre-IPO shareholders at lockup expiration create incentives for firms to manage earnings. To disentangle the effect of these events, we examine quarterly, rather than annual, abnormal accruals. We find no evidence of income-increasing earnings management before the IPO. However, IPO firms exhibit positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration. Positive abnormal accruals are concentrated in less scrutinized firms and firms with high selling by pre-IPO shareholders. Moreover, we find that these accruals subsequently reverse and that such reversals contribute to long-run IPO underperformance.     

Shareholder Empowerment and Board of Directors Effectiveness*

We develop a model to examine implications of empowering shareholders to replace directors. We find that shareholder empowerment functions as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can weaken ineffective boards' incentive to hold on to their position. On the other hand, it can induce both effective and ineffective boards to behave strategically to avoid a potential dismissal. As a result, empowerment does not necessarily increase firm value; in some cases, empowerment exacerbates the agency problem it is intended to address. Giving shareholders the power to set board compensation (have a “say on pay”) can mitigate these problems. However, even when empowerment benefits (harms) the shareholders, firm value may decrease (increase). Finally, we discuss empirical and policy implications of the main findings.     

Why are recommendations optimistic? Evidence from analysts’ coverage initiations

We examine the long-term stock performance of analyst recommendations and the properties of accompanied earnings forecasts for initiations and non-initiations to evaluate the reporting, selection, and processing explanations for analyst optimism. We find that Strong Buy and, to a lesser degree, Buy initiation recommendations underperform their non-initiation counterparts after controlling for analyst, brokerage, and firm characteristics associated with the initiation decision and expected long-term stock returns. Yet, earnings forecasts accompanying Strong Buy and Buy initiation recommendations are less optimistic and more accurate than those accompanying non-initiation recommendations. Our findings suggest that conflicts of interest (that is, the reporting explanation) are the dominant source for favorable recommendations.     

Differential Market Reactions to Revenue and Expense Surprises

This study investigates investors' reactions to revenue and expense surprises around preliminary earnings announcements. Results show that investors value more highly a dollar of revenue surprise than a dollar of expense surprise. Results further show that these differential market reactions to revenue and expense surprises vary systematically for growth versus value firms and depend on (a) the proportion of variable to total costs, (b) the relative persistence of sales and expenses, and (c) the proportion of operating to total expenses. Results highlight the importance of interpreting the earnings surprise in the context of its sources—e.g. surprise in revenues or in total expenses.     

Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating

We study whether outside directors are held accountable for poor monitoring of executive compensation by examining the reputation penalties to directors of firms involved in the option backdating (BD) scandal of 2006–2007. We find that, at firms involved in BD, significant penalties accrued to compensation committee members (particularly those who served during the BD period) both in terms of votes withheld when up for election and in terms of turnover, especially in more severe cases of BD. However, directors of BD firms did not suffer similar penalties at non-BD firms, raising the question of whether reputation penalties for poor oversight of executive pay are large enough to affect the ex ante incentives of directors.     

Discussion of “How disclosure quality affects the level of information asymmetry”

Brown and Hillegeist (2007) examine how disclosure quality relates to information asymmetry. Specifically, the authors show that the negative association between the overall quality of a firm’s disclosures and the average level of information asymmetry is primarily driven by the negative association between disclosure quality and the frequency of information events. My discussion focuses on issues surrounding proxies for information asymmetry and disclosure quality the authors use. I also suggest some venues for future research.     

Board of directors' responsiveness to shareholders: Evidence from shareholder proposals

In recent years boards have become significantly more likely to implement non-binding, majority-vote (MV) shareholder proposals. Using a sample of 620 MV proposals between 1997 and 2004, we find that shareholder pressure (e.g., the voting outcome and the influence of the proponent) and the type of proposals are the main determinants of the implementation decision, while traditional governance indicators do not seem to affect the decision. We then examine the labor market consequences of the implementation decision for outside directors and find that directors implementing MV shareholder proposals experience a one-fifth reduction in the likelihood of losing their board seat as well as other directorships.