A Model of Elitist Qualification

This paper deals with the collective qualification of members of society as belonging to a certain category or group based on a fixed attribute. Our model contains three main features: the existence of individual gradual opinions, the notion of elitism (only the opinions of certain individuals are taken into account to delineate the reference group), and the idea of sequentiality (elites are successively created by using the previous elites’ opinions on a social decision scheme). The main results of the paper characterize when this sequential procedure converges for some intuitive ways of aggregating individual opinions. Finally, we analyze the role of convergence for two extra basic properties (symmetry and contractiveness) that elitist rules should possess.     

Marx's Theory of Ground Rent: A Critical Assessment

This critical essay provides the reader with an up-to-date assessmentof Marx's relatively neglected theory of absolute ground rentby bringing together in a coherent manner his scattered observationsand arguments contained primarily in Capital, Vol. III and Theoriesof Surplus Value, Vol. II. It also reviews the extant secondaryliterature which suggests that within Marx's theory of rentis an embryonic theory of monopoly from which scholars can drawimportant insights into the history of economic thought andthe workings of mature capitalism. The paper is organized asfollows. After an introductory section, Section II providesthe reader with an overview of Marx's theory of differentialrent and compares it to that of Ricardo, particularly Marx'sdiscussion of differential rent II and whether nature is productiveof exchange value. Section III discusses Marx's theory of absoluterent in light of recent criticisms by prominent scholars andsuggests that what determines whether rent is paid on the marginalland is not technical backwardness or lower productivity oflabor per se, but a social relation, viz., the monopoly createdby the private ownership of land. The last section summarizesthe main arguments and suggests some avenues for future research.     

Central bank haircut policy

We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral. Setting a haircut therefore involves balancing the trade-off between relaxing the liquidity constraints of agents on one hand, and increasing potential inflation risk and distorting the portfolio choices of agents on the other. We argue that the optimal haircut is higher when the central bank is unable to lend exclusively to agents who actually need liquidity. Finally, for a temporary surprise drop in the haircut, the central bank can be more aggressive than when setting a permanent level of the haircut.     

Dynamic Financial System: Complexity,Fragility and Regulatory Principles

A financial system improves the allocation of real resources and enhances the performance of the production economy, but these benefits are offset in part by the risk of financial distress and the associated deadweight loss resulting from bankruptcy costs. We argue that “tiers” of financial claims increase complexity and fragility of the financial network. In equilibrium, the financial system grows relative to the real economy as the allocation of funds and risks becomes more sophisticated and as more financial claims are tiered. Growth is limited by the risk of a tiered, complex financial network and by the need to set aside additional capital as the financial sector grows. We discuss several sources of fragility in the financial system. We propose that regulators should limit the breaks in the system and do more to improve the resiliency of the network and less on individual issues that are only symptoms of fundamental problems of a network. We advocate a market based system of regulation in which market participants regulate each other, to a degree. In order for this to be feasible, the financial network must be organized according to three principles: trading transparency, competitive markets and competitive regulators, and incentive alignment of participants. Insofar as these regulatory approaches are successful in limiting network fragility, capital requirements can be reduced. Regulators should keep in mind this tradeoff between capital and regulation. With regard to regulatory policy, regulators should let the three principles be their guide in adapting to the evolving financial system rather than implementing narrowly conceived regulations that are quickly outmoded.     

Competent jerks, lovable fools, and the formation of social networks

When looking for help with a task at work, people turn to those best able to do the job. Right? Wrong. New research shows that work partners tend to be chosen not for ability but for likability. Drawing from their study encompassing 10,000 work relationships in five organizations, the authors have classified work partners into four archetypes: the competent jerk, who knows a lot but is unpleasant; the lovable fool, who doesn't know much but is a delight; the lovable star, who's both smart and likable; and the incompetent jerk, who.. .well, that's self-explanatory. Of course, everybody wants to work with the lovable star, and nobody wants to work with the incompetent jerk. More interesting is that people prefer the lovable fool over the competent jerk. That has big implications for every organization, as both of these types often represent missed opportunities. Because they are liked by a disproportionate number of people, lovable fools can bridge gaps between diverse groups that might not otherwise interact. But their networking skills are often developed at the expense of job performance, which can make these employees underappreciated and vulnerable to downsizing. To get the most out of them, managers need to protect them and put them in positions that don't waste their bridge-building talents. As for the competent jerks, too often their expertise goes untapped by people who just can't put up with them. But many can be socialized through coaching or by being made accountable for bad behavior. Others may need to display their competence in more isolated settings. Intriguingly, managers aren't limited to leveraging people that others like and changing those that others loathe. They also can create situations in which people are more apt to like one another, whatever their individual qualities.     

A Sufficient Condition for Generalized Lorenz Order

In this paper, a sufficient condition for non-negative random variables to be ordered in the Generalized Lorenz sense is presented. This condition does not involve inverse distribution functions. Applications of this result to several income distribution models are given. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D36, D69.