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排序方式: 共有776条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Robin Johnson 《Economic Affairs》2003,23(1):27-32
Institutional economics has some useful things to say about government policy-forming processes. It focuses attention on the structural components of government institutions which shape the direction of policy formation and its delivery. In this article, the author discusses how institutional models of government decision-making may be adapted to parliamentary systems of government. This approach has some merit because it rescues analysis of government processes from models based on the US constitutional system. 相似文献
2.
Robin Jenks 《Economic Affairs》1992,12(5):48-49
Why is it so difficult to get a taxi in London? Robin Jenks is confident that without regulation the service would be greatly improved. Is it really necessary for taxi drivers to have ‘The Knowledge’? 相似文献
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Derek Matthews 《Accounting, Business & Financial History》2002,12(1):113-129
This methodological article discusses the first project in accounting history to use the postal questionnaire as a research tool. The historical context was the changing nature of the company audit in Britain, and this article outlines the process by which the questionnaire was devised, the stages through which the project developed, the data that were collected, and how these were analysed and interpreted. A significant innovation was to sample, in equal proportions, accountants who qualified in each decade from the 1920s and 1930s down to the 1980s, and direct the questioning toward their early training and careers, thereby generating historical trends in the responses. Some of the results of the survey are given here by way of illustrating the weaknesses and strengths/costs and benefits of the technique in comparison with oral history and traditional documentary sources. 相似文献
5.
Robin Hanson 《Economics of Governance》2005,6(2):139-157
Compared with non-union workers, union workers take more of their compensation in the form of insurance. This may be because unions choose democratically, and democratic choice mitigates adverse selection in group insurance. Relative to individually-purchased insurance, we show that group insurance chosen by an ideal profit-maximizing employer can be worse for every employee, while group insurance chosen democratically can be much better. The reason is that democracy can fail to represent the preferences of almost half the group.Received: January 2003, Accepted: September 2004, JEL Classification:
J51, D82, G22 相似文献
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The paper considers what can be inferred about experimental subjects’ time preferences for consumption from responses to laboratory
tasks involving tradeoffs between sums of money at different dates, if subjects can reschedule consumption spending relative
to income in external capital markets. It distinguishes three approaches identifiable in the literature: the straightforward
view; the separation view; and the censored data view. It shows that none of these is fully satisfactory and discusses the
resulting implications for intertemporal decision-making experiments.
JEL Classification C90, C91, D90, D91, D11, D12 相似文献
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Jeffrey?P.?CarpenterEmail author Peter?Hans?Matthews Okomboli?Ong’ong’a 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2004,14(4):407-429
Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification:
C91, C92, D64, H41
Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953). 相似文献