Tariffs, licensing and market structure

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124].     

An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.     

The Asymptotic Optimality of Residual Income Maximization

Residual income subtracts from operating income an interest charge for invested capital. Residual income can be calculated each period from current accounting information, unlike discounted cash flow (DCF), which requires the knowledge of future cash flows. This paper provides a normative justification for residual-income maximization by showing that if investment decisions are made myopically each period to maximize residual income, the resulting path asymptotically maximizes discounted cash flow. Thus, under the assumptions of the model, residual-income maximization is a heuristic that leads to the long-run DCF-optimum.     

Toward a rapprochement between the two basic paradigms of educational research

Whereas the natural-science approach has promoted the application of the hypothetico-deductive paradigm, the humanistic approach has encouraged educational researchers to employ the interpretive/symbolic paradigm. These two paradigms are contrasting in their ontology, epistomology, human model and methodology. After comparing the perspectives of the above two approaches to educational research, some justifications have been offered for the utilization of symbolic/interpretive paradigm by emphasizing the need for naturalistic observations, qualitative data, semiotical analysis and intuitive inferences for gaining a better understanding of the teaching-learning process as also the social reality in which it takes place. Although the unification of the two approaches seems antithetical, still there are many empirical instances of the fusion between the two in the areas of perception, learning, remembering, creativity and classroom behaviour. The advantages in the integration of the two paradigms may be seen in the light of the changing conceptions of the world and models of man. For enriching educational research, we need both analytical and synthetic orientations, micro and macro data, statistical and clinical predictions, deductive and inductive inferences, as well as theoretic objectivity and practical valuations. The unification is expected to pave the way for more precision, objectivity as also synthesis in understanding different educational phenomena.     

On efficiency of the ratio estimator

Summary The exact mean square error for the ratio estimator of a finite population total based on simple random sampling without replacement is shown to have an expected value less than that of the variance of the ratio estimator based on Midzuno’s scheme, under a usual super-population model.     

The effects of merchandise coordination and juxtaposition on consumers’ product evaluation and purchase intention in store-based retailing

Many retailers attempt to juxtapose and coordinate complementary products in their stores on the basis of key attributes because good coordination of complementary items can provide consumers with relevant information for their evaluation of individual products. In addition, the aesthetic appeal and the social impression that good coordination offers can be transferred to the products themselves. On the basis of these theories, the authors test the effects of merchandise coordination and juxtaposition (vs. separation) on consumer behavior using actual clothing items as stimuli in a laboratory setting. The authors find that coordination affects consumers’ evaluation of and purchase intention toward a target item only when the item is juxtaposed with a complementary item. This effect can be explained by the aesthetic response of consumers to and their social impression of a grouping of the items. Furthermore, in comparison with displaying the two items separately, juxtaposing them in a poorly coordinated manner appears to depress the target item's evaluation, though juxtaposing them in a well-coordinated manner does not seem to improve the evaluation.