CAREER CONCERNS,MATCHING, AND OPTIMAL DISCLOSURE POLICY*

Raiders may suffer from information disadvantage since the current employer is often better informed about his workers' quality. When workers have career concerns and matching influences productivity, the initial employer can strategically disclose information to influence incentives and matching efficiency. Long‐term complete contracts induce full disclosure when raiders are perfectly competitive. The optimal short‐term contract induces full disclosure if raiders are perfectly competitive, and the workers are risk neutral and are not liquidity constrained. These conditions are not only sufficient but also “almost necessary” for full disclosure. Partial disclosure may be optimal if any of these conditions is relaxed.     

PARETO HONOURING POVERTY REDUCTION

Policy reforms often pit the poor against the poor by triggering a fall in poverty for some but an increase in poverty for others. Aggregated national measures gloss over these fine patterns and pronounce ‘a reduction in poverty’– is such aggregation across poor individuals ethically permissible? Addressing this type of aggregation is a hard issue. This paper has made an attempt in that direction by outlining an axiomatically grounded aggregate measure of such gains or losses, duly giving more importance to the losses to a poor compared to the gains of another poor.     

Host-country policy – commitment or no-commitment: a theoretical analysis

This paper develops a model of foreign entry strategy and examines welfare of the host-country under two situations - (i) where host-country government commits to the tax policy, (ii) where host-country government does not commit to the tax policy. It turns out that under the non-committed government policy the foreign firm does not prefer to hold equity share in the domestic project. The host-country welfare, however, is more under the committed government policy than the non-committed government policy when the foreign firm has sufficiently higher bargaining power. The possibility of technology choice by the foreign firm reduces the range of bargaining power of the foreign firm over which the host-country welfare is more under the committed policy compared to the non-committed policy.     

Understanding offshoring: A research framework based on disintegration, location and externalization advantages

We present an analytical framework explaining offshoring in this paper. We address the question: why do firms offshore their business functions? Given the growing prevalence of offshoring as a dominant business practice in the world of global business, this question merits further research attention. We propose that firms embark on offshoring when they perceive three sets of interrelated advantages: disintegration advantages (D), location-specific resourcing advantages (L) and externalization advantages (E). Theories from multiple disciplines form the foundation of Disintegration–Location–Externalization (DLE) framework. Implications for managers, government policy makers and recommendations for future research are explored.     

Epistemic communities and the global alliance against tobacco marketing

The World Health Organization's (WHO's) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is a major blow to the worldwide expansion strategies and marketing practices of transnational tobacco companies. As expected, the industry vehemently opposed the treaty, lobbying instead for voluntary agreements and regulation by the market. However, in spite of bitter and persistent opposition by the tobacco industry, the FCTC was adopted by WHO. If the tobacco industry “lost” its battle to prevent FCTC from being institutionalized, who “won” and how? Our research suggests that the efforts of the epistemic community—a like‐minded network of professionals whose authoritative claim to consensual knowledge provides them with a unique source of power in public policy decision making—won the battle by being able to better convince the decision makers as to the needs of the FCTC by relying on, and successfully disseminating, its knowledge, expertise, and ideas. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Two-period supply chain coordination strategies with ambidextrous sustainable innovations

This study considers a manufacturer with ambidextrous sustainable innovation capability selling products in environmentally conscious market through an independent retailer in a two-period game setting. We design a two-period game theoretic and dyadic supply chain (SC) model considering exploitative and exploratory nature of environmental innovations. We study five different contract types, namely, wholesale price contract, vertical Nash game structure, cost sharing contract, revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract. We demonstrate the impact of market sensitivity towards sustainable innovation and cost parameters on optimal level of decision parameters. The equilibrium results reveal that a suitably designed two-part tariff contract can be used to achieve coordination in a fragmented SC. The equilibrium results assist managers to optimise the SC based on the two-period contract model. The results obtained in this study can help the decision-makers to take decisions on investment in the ambidextrous sustainable innovation under different types of contract structures.     

Welfare Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: Cost Saving vs. Signaling

We compare the effects of two types of foreign direct investment (FDI) (viz., FDI for trade cost saving and FDI for signaling foreign cost of production) on consumer surplus, profit of the host-country firm and host-country welfare. We show that the effects are dramatically different. If the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, FDI (compared to export) always makes the consumers better off and the host-country producer worse off, while the effect on host-country welfare is ambiguous. However, if the FDI is to signal the foreign cost of production, FDI (compared to export) always makes the host-country producer better off and increases host-country welfare, while it makes the consumers almost always worse off.     

The welfare effects of entry: the role of the input market

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in the final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between the firms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market increases welfare. If the input market is not very concentrated, entry in the final goods market may reduce welfare if the entrant is moderately cost inefficient. Hence, entry in the final goods market is more desirable if (1) the input market is very concentrated or (2) the cost difference between the incumbents and the entrant is either very small or very large. It follows from our analysis that entry increases the profits of the incumbent final goods producers if their marginal costs are sufficiently lower than the entrant’s marginal cost.     

Mean square error estimation in multi-stage sampling

Summary: Suppose for a homogeneous linear unbiased function of the sampled first stage unit (fsu)-values taken as an estimator of a survey population total, the sampling variance is expressed as a homogeneous quadratic function of the fsu-values. When the fsu-values are not ascertainable but unbiased estimators for them are separately available through sampling in later stages and substituted into the estimator, Raj (1968) gave a simple variance estimator formula for this multi-stage estimator of the population total. He requires that the variances of the estimated fsu-values in sampling at later stages and their unbiased estimators are available in certain `simple forms'. For the same set-up Rao (1975) derived an alternative variance estimator when the later stage sampling variances have more ‘complex forms’. Here we pursue with Raj's (1968) simple forms to derive a few alternative variance and mean square error estimators when the condition of homogeneity or unbiasedness in the original estimator of the total is relaxed and the variance of the original estimator is not expressed as a quadratic form.  We illustrate a particular three-stage sampling strategy and present a simulation-based numerical exercise showing the relative efficacies of two alternative variance estimators. Received: 19 February 1999     

Undesirable competition

We show that the entry of private profit-maximising firms makes the consumers worse off compared to having a nationalised monopoly. Such entry increases the nationalised firm’s profit, industry profit, and social welfare, at the expense of the consumers. Our result is important for competition policy.