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The house money effect predicts that individuals show increased risk-seeking behavior in the presence of prior windfall gains. Although the effect’s existence is widely accepted, experimental studies that compare individuals’ risk-taking behavior using house money to individuals’ risk-taking behavior using their own money produce contradictory results. This experimental field study analyzes the gambling behavior of 917 casino customers who face real losses. We find that customers who received free play at the entrance showed not higher but significantly lower levels of risk-taking behavior during their casino visit, expressed through lower average wagers. This study thus provides field evidence against the house money effect. Moreover, as a result of lower levels of risk seeking, endowed customers yield better economic results in the form of smaller own-money losses when leaving the casino. 相似文献
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This article provides a simple model that explains the choice between permanent and temporary jobs. This model, which incorporates important features of actual employment protection legislations neglected by the economic literature so far, reproduces the main stylized facts about entries into permanent and temporary jobs observed in Continental European countries. We find that job protection has very small effects on total employment but induces large substitution of temporary jobs for permanent jobs, which significantly reduces aggregate production. 相似文献
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Franck Galtier Fran?ois Bousquet Martine Antona Pierre Bommel 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2012,22(1):161-201
As the information relative to endowments, costs and preferences is dispersed among many agents, the quality of resource allocation
depends on the ability of markets to communicate information inside the economic system. Because information is transferred
through negotiation and transaction behaviors, the network of trading relations defines the channels through which it flows.
In the present study, we use new computational tools to analyze the performance of two wholesale trade institutions widely
used around the world: network trading and marketplace trading. Whilst network trading and marketplace trading disseminate
far fewer bits of information than a perfectly transparent benchmark market, they often manage to generate an allocation of
resources that is almost as good. In many cases, network trading proves more effective than marketplace trading (contrary
to a common preconception). This surprising performance of network trading is linked to a form of indirect arbitrage induced
by connections between networks. Implications for market design and public policy making are presented, along with prospects
for further research. 相似文献
6.
For the last half century, trade theorists, development economists, and development practitioners have been calculating what
was claimed to be the shadow price of scarce foreign exchange. In fact, what they have been calculating is the social value
of the receipt of a unit of a numeraire good from abroad, typically obtained from real models. In our paper, we explicitly
deal with a model of a monetized economy, and we develop formulas for the social value of a unit of foreign currency, which,
in general, differ from the traditional formulas. 相似文献
7.
Some economists use an export tax, which alters the domestic relative price of exports, to model a voluntary export restraint,
which is a restriction on the quantity of exports with restriction-induced rents accruing to the exporting country. Implicit
in this approach is the presumption that the two policies are equivalent. In a very general model that allows for a finite
number of goods and factors and intermediated goods and joint production, we demonstrate that, in general, this is, in fact,
not the case. Specifically, from the exporting country’s perspective, the real income effects of the two policies are nonequivalent. 相似文献
8.
This article assesses the reasons that led a majority of French voters to reject the 29 October 2004 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Their reasons are less connected with the Treaty itself than with a fear of loss of national sovereignty, immigration, and relocation of firms to European countries where the workforce is cheaper. 相似文献
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Taking climate change as an example, this paper provides new insights on the optimal provision of a long-term public good
within and across generations. We write the Bowen–Lindhal–Samuelson (BLS) conditions for the optimal provision of the public
good in a world divided into N countries, with two periods, present and future, and we simultaneously determine the optimal response in the first and second
periods for a given rate of pure time preference. However, the Negishi weights at second period cannot be determined unambiguously,
even under a “no redistribution constraint” within each generation, because they depend on non-observable future incomes;
and thus on the answers to two often-overlooked ethical questions: (i) Do rich countries agree on deals which recognize that
developing countries may catch up with developed countries in the long run, or do they use their negotiating powers to preserve
the current balance of power? And (ii) does each country consider only the welfare of its own future citizens (dynastic solidarity)
or does it extend its concern to all future human beings (universal solidarity)? Answers to (i) and (ii)—critical in the debate
about how to correct the market failures causing global warming—define four sets of Negishi weights and intertemporal welfare
functions, which we interpret as four mandates that countries could give to the Chair of an international negotiation on climate
change to find an optimal solution. We find that in all mandates, public good provision expenditures are decreasing functions
of income at first period. But each mandate leads to a different allocation of expenditures at second period and to different
optimal levels of public good provision at both first and second periods. Finally, we show that only one of these four mandates
defines a space for viable compromises. 相似文献