The market reaction to corporate governance regulation

This paper investigates the market reaction to recent legislative and regulatory actions pertaining to corporate governance. The managerial power view of governance suggests that executive pay, the existing process of proxy access, and various governance provisions [e.g., staggered boards and Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-chairman duality] are associated with managerial rent extraction. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that reduce executive pay, increase proxy access, and ban such governance provisions are value-enhancing. In contrast, another view of governance suggests that observed governance choices are the result of value-maximizing contracts between shareholders and management. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that regulate such governance choices are value destroying. Consistent with the latter view, we find that the abnormal returns to recent events relating to corporate governance regulations are, on average, decreasing in CEO pay, decreasing in the number of large blockholders, decreasing in the ease by which small institutional investors can access the proxy process, and decreasing in the presence of a staggered board.     

Environmental Management Evolution: Empirical Evidence from Spain and Italy

This research is focused on a survey conducted among Spanish and Italian companies in order to define the environmental management evolution within firms. Through this survey, a number of maturity stages were defined and validated, and the identification of the relevant factors for each of the maturity stages was made. Survey results show that companies start with environmental management issues due to legislation requirements. Afterwards, firms go through a training phase, continuing with the systematization stage, then look for economic benefits through ecological improvements (ECO² stage) and finish with the eco‐innovation and leading green company stages. The survey has shown that the maturity stages have application in all types of industrial sector. These are useful for those firms that want to make progress in environmental matters, as it helps them to identify at which maturity stage they are and what are the factors that they need to take into account to move forward. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives

Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm?s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk.     

The Informational Effects of Tightening Oil and Gas Disclosure Rules

We exploit two regulatory shocks to examine the informational effects of tightening preexisting mandatory disclosure rules. Canadian National Instrument 51-101 in 2003 and the U.S. rule “Modernization of Oil and Gas Reporting” in 2009 introduced quasi-identical amendments which effectively tightened the rules governing oil and gas reserve disclosures in both countries. We document significant changes in firms' reporting outcomes when the new regulations are introduced. We also find that the reserve disclosures filed under the new regulations are more closely associated with stock price changes and with decreases in bid-ask spreads. Our findings are robust to controlling for other confounding factors such as time trends, other information disclosed simultaneously, financial reporting incentives, mispricing, and monitoring efforts.     

The Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility in Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics *

The goal of this paper is to clarify the content of the Marshallian Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility. The paper is divided into seven sections. In the first one, I present the eight formulations of the Law that I record in the Principles and the foundation that Marshall provides for it. In the second and third sections, I present a couple of objections raised by Marshall himself against the universal validity of the Law; in my opinion, his answer to them is not sound. I contrast my interpretation with those of the other authors. In the fourth section, The Law of Utility is distinguised from the Law of Demand. In section five, l present the two meanings in which Marshall employs the term ‘utility’: as pleasure, and as a formal notion. In section six, I attempt to build an explanatory framework for the encountered difficulties. Finally, the seventh section is devoted to conclusions.     

The effect of enforcement transparency: Evidence from SEC comment-letter reviews

Review of Accounting Studies - This paper studies the effect of the public disclosure of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment-letter reviews (CLs) on firms’ financial...