Note on the applicability of the VCG mechanism to capacitated assignment problems and extensions

For the allocation of heterogeneous items, it is known that the buyers-are-substitutes condition is necessary and sufficient to ensure that a pricing equilibrium can yield the same allocation and payments as the VCG mechanism. Furthermore, concavity of the corresponding transferable utility TU-game guarantees that this VCG outcome can also be achieved by an ascending price auction. We show that concavity, and hence the buyers-are-substitutes condition, holds for the TU-game of the assignment problem with general capacities. Therefore, the VCG mechanism is supported by a pricing equilibrium which can also be achieved by an ascending auction. We also show that the buyers-are-substitutes condition, and hence concavity, does not hold anymore for very natural and straightforward extensions of this problem. This shows that the necessity of the substitutes property is a considerable restriction on the applicability of the VCG mechanism.     

GOAL PROGRAMMING AND MULTIPLE CRITERIA DECISION-MAKING IN FARM PLANNING: AN EXPOSITORY ANALYSIS

Several paradigms can be used to analyse multiple-criteria decision-making problems. Of these goal programming is probably the most widely used one, at least in management science. Goal programming seems to offer considerable potential for application to multiple-criteria problems in farm planning. However, its applications in agricultural economics have been few and far between. Even these attempts seem to suffer from some serious misconceptions. In this paper an effort is made to explain the structure of a goal programming model by deriving it from the familiar paradigm of linear programming. This is done to put the potential usefulness of goal programming and its relationship to linear programming in perspective, and to encourage further applications to multiple-criteria decision-making in farm planning.     

Does expenditure in public governance guarantee less corruption? Non-linearities and complementarities of the rule of law

Corruption is an endemic societal problem with profound implications in the development of nations. In combating this issue, cross-national evidence supporting the effectiveness of the rule of law seems at odds with poorly realized outcomes from reforms inspired in the academic literature. This paper provides an explanation for such contradiction. By building a computational approach, we develop three methodological novelties into the empirical study of corruption: (1) modeling government expenditure as a more adequate intervention variable than traditional indicators, (2) generating large within-country variation by means of bottom-up simulations (instead of cross-national data pooling), and (2) accounting for all possible interactions between covariates through a spillover network. Our estimates suggest that, the least developed a country is, the more difficult it is to find the right combination of policies that lead to reductions in corruption. We characterize this difficulty through a rugged landscape that governments navigate when changing the total budget size and the relative expenditure towards the rule of law. Importantly our method helps identifying the—country-specific—policy issues that complement the rule of law in the fight against corruption.

     

Tournament Winner Proportion and its Effect on Effort: An Investigation of the Underlying Psychological Mechanisms

This study investigates the effects of the psychological mechanisms activated by different proportions of tournament winners on effort. Using a real-effort experiment that allows the evolution of social comparison, which is central to our theory, we show that firms can increase employee effort (and performance) by increasing the proportion of winners. Based on a causal model, we generate evidence for our theory that this effect is driven by relative performance concerns and bonus concerns, both of which depend on the proportion of tournament winners. In addition, we find that, over time, the change in effort is more negative the lower the proportion of winners. This effect is driven by the different behaviors of winners and losers in a previous tournament.     

Conditional forecasts on SVAR models using the Kalman filter

This note shows how conditional forecasts from identified VAR models can be computed using Kalman filtering techniques. These techniques are nowadays routine for applied macroeconomists, and hence the computation of conditional forecasts using these methods are simple to implement.     

What circumstances lead a government to promote brain drain?

This paper aims to complement the existing theoretical brain drain literature, focusing on the interaction between education, skilled emigration and government intervention in a small open economy. This article first characterises different emigration patterns that may arise in equilibrium, then seeks the conditions that lead a government to promote brain-drain. The model shows that the government may promote skilled emigration among workers with intermediate skills even though the resulting brain drain decreases per capita income. Emigrants remittances outweigh the income they would produce if they did not emigrate. Therefore, the government makes less severe the fall in per capita income that follows the brain drain by encouraging emigration among those skilled workers who are more productive abroad.     

The role of permanent and transitory components in the fluctuations of Latin–American real exchange rates

Following the approach suggested by Engel and Kim (1999 Engel, C. 1999. Accounting for U.S. real exchange rates changes. Journal of Political Economy, 107: 507–38. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), we estimate the permanent and transitory components of the real exchange rates in four Latin–American countries for the period 1957:01 to 2002:04. Results suggest that transitory component is the driving force of the real exchange rates in Argentina and Mexico. A principal role of the permanent component is observed in the real exchange rates of Brazil and Chile. Estimates probabilities of the high-variance regime allow to identify the principal events happened in these countries. This information is closely related to nominal shocks and therefore, it explains the significant role of this component in these countries.     

Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

Do Extrinsic Incentives Undermine Social Norms? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Energy Conservation

Policymakers use both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives to induce consumers to change behavior. This paper investigates whether the use of extrinsic financial incentives is complementary to intrinsic incentives, or whether financial incentives undermine the effect of intrinsic incentives. We conduct a randomized controlled trial that uses information interventions to residential electricity customers to test this question. We find that adding economic incentives to normative messages not only does not strengthen the effect of the latter but may reduce it. These results are consistent with recent theoretical work that suggests a tension between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives.     

Fiscal harmonization in the European Union with public inputs

Fiscal harmonization among the European Union member states is a goal involving major difficulties for its implementation. Each country faces a particular trade-off between fiscal revenues generated by taxation and the productive efficiency loss induced by their respective tax code. This paper provides a quantitative analysis of these trade-offs for a number of the European Union (EU-15) member states using a dynamic general equilibrium model with public inputs. Calibration of the model for the EU-15 member states provides the following results: i) the maximum tax revenue level is relatively far from the current tax levels for most countries; ii) the cases of Sweden, Denmark and Finland are anomalous, as productive efficiency can be gained by lowering tax rates without affecting fiscal revenues; iii) in general, countries would obtain efficiency gains without changing fiscal revenues by reducing the capital tax and increasing the labor tax; and iv) capital tax harmonization to the average capital tax rate can be done with quite small changes in both fiscal revenues and output for most countries.