When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions?

We study the decisions of a politician who maximizes his probability of being re-elected, which depends on the enactment of legislative instruments defined ‘scandalous’ because of their highly redistributive content. The agents are a politician and the voters; the legislative instruments available to the legislator are ordinary and executive laws, which differ according to their visibility. The theoretical model predicts that ‘scandalous’ legislation tends to be passed at the beginning of the legislature, while ‘non scandalous’, broader legislation, is approved mostly at the end of the legislation. Scandalous decisions, moreover, tend to be implemented by means of less visible executive legislation, while ordinary acts are mainly used to implement non scandalous decisions. This explanation of the genesis of legislation cycles is consistent with the findings of the empirical literature.     

On the Regulation of a Vertically Differentiated Market

The aim of this paper is to investigate a vertically differentiated market served either by a multiproduct monopolist or by duopolists, in which a public authority aiming at increasing the welfare level can choose among two instruments, namely, quality taxation/subsidisation, and minimum quality standard. In the monopoly case they are equivalent as to the social welfare level, in that both allow the regulator to achieve the second best level of social welfare he would attain if he were to set qualities under the monopoly pricing rule, while they are not equivalent in terms of the distribution of surplus. In the duopoly regime, we show that there exists a taxation/subsidisation scheme inducing firms to produce the socially optimal qualites.     

Does the Eco‐Management and Audit Scheme Foster Innovation in European Firms?

This paper studies whether environmental management systems can spur eco‐innovation, analyzing EMAS (Eco‐Management and Audit Scheme) adoption and patented innovations (at the European Patent Office) at firm level. It uses an original panel database of 30 439 European firms belonging to all sectors from 2003 to 2012. An original instrumental variable is implemented to control for potential endogeneity. The analysis reveals that EMAS adoption is conducive to more innovation at the firm level. The results vary across countries and sectors. In particular, EMAS is positively related to green patents for medium and low technology manufacturing. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

When Blame-Giving Crisis Communications are Persuasive: A Dual-Influence Model and Its Boundary Conditions

Journal of Business Ethics - Companies faced with a crisis sometimes blame others in their communications, when they feel that responsibility for the negative event lies elsewhere. Research has...     

How the sender’s positioning and the target’s CSR record influence the effectiveness of scapegoating crisis communications

Past research on scapegoating argues that this crisis communication strategy is often ineffective because it can be perceived as an unfair attempt at shifting blame. In contrast, a few studies have shown that scapegoating can be effective by increasing the perceived ethicality of the sender relative to the target that is presented as responsible for wrongdoing. Reconciling these inconsistent findings, we show that the relative effectiveness of scapegoating depends on the perceptions of the sender and of the target. Our findings show that both the positioning of the sender as an underdog or a top dog and the positive or negative CSR record of the target contribute to explaining the effectiveness of scapegoating. Following a crisis, scapegoating appears to be most effective when the sender is an underdog and the target has a negative CSR record. The effectiveness of scapegoating for an underdog is however reduced when the target has a positive CSR record. At the opposite end, scapegoating might backfire when the sender is a top dog that attacks a target with a positive CSR record. Finally, when a top dog attacks a target with a negative CSR record, scapegoating reduces negative word of mouth even though this effect does not appear to be mediated by perceived ethicality. The study contributes to research on scapegoating communications and on the consequences of an underdog positioning and a positive CSR record for companies trying to manage the negative fallout from an ethical crisis.

     

Market Share and Price in Dutch Home Care: Market Power or Quality?

The paper uses unique data on contracts concluded by providers of home care to evaluate the effect of provider market power on prices of home care services in the Netherlands. Since, at least in some regions, one or two providers dominate the market, there are concerns about the effect of providers’ market power on the pricing of home care services. Using data on contracted prices and quantities for 2004–2006, we find that providers with a larger market share are able to contract at a higher price. The effect remains after controlling for quality.