全文获取类型
收费全文 | 1424篇 |
免费 | 52篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 195篇 |
工业经济 | 67篇 |
计划管理 | 174篇 |
经济学 | 374篇 |
综合类 | 8篇 |
运输经济 | 4篇 |
旅游经济 | 19篇 |
贸易经济 | 394篇 |
农业经济 | 44篇 |
经济概况 | 122篇 |
邮电经济 | 75篇 |
出版年
2021年 | 16篇 |
2020年 | 21篇 |
2019年 | 26篇 |
2018年 | 38篇 |
2017年 | 38篇 |
2016年 | 41篇 |
2015年 | 41篇 |
2014年 | 50篇 |
2013年 | 123篇 |
2012年 | 58篇 |
2011年 | 52篇 |
2010年 | 50篇 |
2009年 | 60篇 |
2008年 | 62篇 |
2007年 | 60篇 |
2006年 | 56篇 |
2005年 | 47篇 |
2004年 | 36篇 |
2003年 | 52篇 |
2002年 | 40篇 |
2001年 | 33篇 |
2000年 | 39篇 |
1999年 | 25篇 |
1998年 | 13篇 |
1997年 | 17篇 |
1996年 | 17篇 |
1995年 | 14篇 |
1994年 | 14篇 |
1993年 | 16篇 |
1992年 | 9篇 |
1991年 | 11篇 |
1990年 | 13篇 |
1989年 | 15篇 |
1988年 | 7篇 |
1986年 | 13篇 |
1985年 | 13篇 |
1984年 | 12篇 |
1983年 | 11篇 |
1982年 | 16篇 |
1981年 | 24篇 |
1980年 | 15篇 |
1979年 | 11篇 |
1978年 | 14篇 |
1977年 | 18篇 |
1976年 | 15篇 |
1975年 | 13篇 |
1974年 | 14篇 |
1972年 | 13篇 |
1970年 | 7篇 |
1968年 | 8篇 |
排序方式: 共有1476条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
We characterize the individual's attitude towards risk, prudence and temperance in the gain and loss domains. We analyze the links between the three features of preferences for a given domain and between domains for each feature of preferences. Consequently, the reflection effect, the mixed risk aversion and the risk apportionment, are key concepts of our study. We also display some determinants for risk aversion, prudence and temperance in each domain. To do this, we conducted a lab experiment with students eliciting risk aversion, prudence and temperance in the two domains, and collected information about each subject's characteristics. 相似文献
2.
Alex Coad Jacob Rubæk Holm Jackie Krafft Francesco Quatraro 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2018,28(1):1-11
Amid increasing interest in firm age and its effects on firm performance, this special issue offers an exhaustive review of the literature and a novel collection of evidence on the effects of firm age on performance, including a special focus of interest on innovation performance, financial performance, exports, survival and growth. This editorial positions the theme in the extant literature, and provides key definitions and challenges ahead in the field of evolutionary economics. It introduces the collection of articles composing the special issue. The papers offer a diversity of country contexts, as well as analytical approaches and methods. They include an exhaustive review of the literature on age and firms’ performance, and present original empirical studies focusing on the effects of age on firms’ economic outcomes on the one hand, and on innovation outcomes on the other hand. While most of the papers use econometric analysis, the level of analysis ranges from firm to individual. 相似文献
3.
4.
5.
This paper addresses the optimal design of risk sharing arrangements in reinsurance contracts with asymmetric information concerning the primary insurer’s behavior. The latter usually has significant unobservable discretions, for instance with respect to risk selection, implying a moral hazard problem. We show that the existence of moral hazard strongly affects the characteristics of the reinsurance indemnification rule, i. e. the connection between the level of losses and the indemnity, which is specified in the contract. For this analysis, a standard model framework from the theory of optimal reinsurance with perfect information is modified by the assumption that the primary insurer has unobservable control of the probability distribution of the extent of losses. In particular, the solution indicates that for this situation, a Pareto-optimal indemnity rule is less steep, and therefore the primary insurer’s share in a marginal increase of the loss is greater, compared to the case of complete information. A deductible, however, turns out not to be a suitable approach in this context. 相似文献
6.
An Experimental Bribery Game 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
Abbink Klaus; Irlenbusch Bernd; Renner Elke 《Jnl. of Law, Economics, and Organization》2002,18(2):428-454
Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated. 相似文献
7.
8.
Jacob De Rooy 《Business Economics》2006,41(4):29-38
Management fees of mutual funds are more costly to
investors than is often realized. Moreover, research indicates
that in many cases, the fees are not related to performance,
contrary to what might be expected from an efficient market. This study uses sample data to illustrate
the consequences of inefficiency to an individual investor.
It then turns to an empirical examination of the determinants
of the ratio of management fees to total assets
(MER), investigating market concentration, fund performance,
and non-performance characteristics as
explanatory variables. All of these classes of variables
contributed to the variation of MERs .
JEL Classification G23 相似文献
9.
The Leviathan hypothesis remains a cornerstone of constitutional tax theory. Following Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) seminal contribution, the power to tax is often likened to a monopoly, and its use by a revenue-maximising government is said to obey the rules of optimal taxation theory. We revisit, and refine, this position, explaining its underpinnings and discussing the Leviathan solution in several well-known optimal taxation models. It turns out that the power to tax is not a perfect analogue of ordinary monopoly power and that the similarity between Leviathan and optimal taxation solutions hinges on the irrelevance of distributional weights. 相似文献
10.
Faced with a record level of unemployment, the present debate in Germany is to extend the weekly hours of work. In this paper the employment effects of an economy-wide increase in weekly hours are quantified on the basis of a computable general equilibrium model for different specifications of the wage setting rule and the use of additional policy-induced public income. The simulation results back the argument of the opponents of longer working time that not more jobs will be created. However, when the higher tax revenues from GDP growth are used to reduce social security contributions, then the claim of the proponents that more jobs will be created can be supported. 相似文献