Blocked-Error-R 2: A Conceptually Improved Definition of the Proportion of Explained Variance in Models Containing Loops or Correlated Residuals

Bentler and Raykov (2000, Journal of Applied Psychology 85: 125–131), and Jöreskog (1999a, http://www.ssicentral.com/lisrel/column3.htm, 1999b http://www.ssicentral. com/lisrel/column5.htm) proposed procedures for calculating R ² for dependent variables involved in loops or possessing correlated errors. This article demonstrates that Bentler and Raykov’s procedure can not be routinely interpreted as a “proportion” of explained variance, while Jöreskog’s reduced-form calculation is unnecessarily restrictive. The new blocked-error-R ² (beR ²) uses a minimal hypothetical causal intervention to resolve the variance-partitioning ambiguities created by loops and correlated errors. Hayduk (1996) discussed how stabilising feedback models – models capable of counteracting external perturbations – can result in an acceptable error variance which exceeds the variance of the dependent variable to which that error is attached. For variables included within loops, whether stabilising or not, beR ² provides the same value as Hayduk’s (1996) loop-adjusted-R ². For variables not involved in loops and not displaying correlated residuals, beR ² reports the same value as the traditional regression R ². Thus, beR ² provides a conceptualisation of the proportion of explained variance that spans both recursive and nonrecursive structural equation models. A procedure for calculating beR ² in any SEM program is provided.     

The Effects of Outside Directors and Board Shareholdings on the Relation Between Chief Executive Compensation and Firm Performance

Critics of corporate governance have suggested that improvements in board monitoring will arise from more independent boards consisting of outside directors and from increased stock ownership by directors. Presumably these changes should result in more rational, more defensible compensation decisions in which pay is clearly tied to results. In this paper, we test the premise that boards with a relatively higher proportion of outsiders and boards with significant shareholdings maintain a closer link between corporate performance and executive pay than do boards with fewer outsiders and boards holding little stock. The results of the study, based on a sample of 268 large corporations, are mixed. As expected, boards with significant shareholdings maintain a stronger linkage between compensation and firm-level performance. This finding persists even after controls are included for CEO and outsider shareholdings. Contrary to expectations, however, evidence was not found that firms with a higher proportion of outsiders on the board of directors relate compensation more strongly to firm results.     

Setting multinational industrial marketing strategies

Nations of the world are striking out, from various starting points, along a variety of new development paths, reflecting a widespread repudiation of the conventional economic model of development based on a common, predetermined roadway to progress. Marketers who are bound by tradition may perceive the alternative development approaches as threats to standardized marketing strategies. Innovative marketers will view them as important keys to expanded market opportunities throughout the world.