The habit of eating rice in four countries: Japan,China, Spain and France

To determine differences in rice-eating habits in Japan, China (Shandong), Spain (Catalonia) and France (Alsace), the frequency of eating rice, the volume eaten per meal and the varieties of rice dishes were compared. A total of 486 housewives were surveyed: 125 Japanese, 99 Chinese, 141 Spanish and 121 French. Rice was eaten, on average, 12·1 and 8·2 times a week in Japan and China respectively, but only 0·9 times a week in Spain and France. In Japan, China and Spain, more than 50 g (raw rice) per meal was normally eaten. French subjects ate almost the same amount in only 30% of the total time for eating. In all four countries, rice cooked at home was predominant. In Japan, plain rice was an everyday dish, whereas ‘sushi’ was eaten only once every 2 weeks. Chinese everyday rice dishes were plain rice and rice porridge. In Spain, ‘paella’ and ‘boiled rice with tomato sauce’ were popular. Rice was used both as a main ingredient and as a supplementary ingredient in Spain. In France, boiled rice and ‘Creole-style rice’ were eaten as a supplement to main dishes. In these two countries, most rice dishes were seasoned with salt and flavoured with butter or olive oil. Interesting differences in the manner of eating rice and the culinary characteristics of each country are described in this study.     

Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions

We study the effects of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) on the takeover probability, the takeover premium, and target selection. Voting to remove an ATP increases both the takeover probability and the takeover premium, that is, there is no evidence of a trade-off between premiums and takeover probabilities. We provide causal estimates based on shareholder proposals to remove ATPs and address the endogenous selection of targets through bounding techniques. The positive premium effect in less protected firms is driven by better bidder-target matching and merger synergies.     

Wage expectations in northern and southern Italian regions: An interpretation based on psychological and social factors

Individual wage expectations of Italian unemployed are studied. The analysis is carried out separately for the North‐Central and southern Italian regions using semiparametric additive models. Results show a marked difference in expectations formation across regions. We argue that as far as the labour market information in the South is less diffuse and more ambiguous than in the North, the divergence between the econometric model based on a utility‐maximisation mainstream theory and the actual wage expectation mechanism may be large. A tentative explanation based on psychological and social factors is offered.     

Will Consumers Pay a Premium for Eco-labeled Apples?

Farmers and other producers are responding to consumer concerns about pesticides by creating new marketing opportunities for products grown with environmentally sound practices. The eco-label analyzed in this study is certified by The Food Alliance (TFA), a non-profit third-party certifying organization based in Portland, Oregon. We assess the mean willingness to pay (WTP) for eco-labeled apples using a double-bounded logit model. We conclude that female respondents with children, and strong environmental and food safety concerns are more likely to pay a premium for eco-labeled apples. However, the estimated premium is small (about 5 cents per pound over an initial price of 99 cents), reflecting the overall difficulty with garnering a premium based on “environmentally sound”practices.     

Enhancing Loan Quality Through Transparency: Evidence from the European Central Bank Loan Level Reporting Initiative

We explore whether transparency in banks’ securitization activities enhances loan quality. We take advantage of a novel disclosure initiative introduced by the European Central Bank, which requires, as of January 2013, banks that use their asset‐backed securities as collateral for repo financing to report securitized loan characteristics and performance in a standardized format. We find that securitized loans originated under the transparency regime are of better quality with a lower default probability, a lower delinquent amount, fewer days in delinquency, and lower losses upon default. Additionally, banks with more intensive loan level information collection and those operating under stronger market discipline experience greater improvement in their loan quality under the new reporting standards. Overall, we demonstrate that greater transparency has real effects by incentivizing banks to improve their credit practices.     

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.     

The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value

This paper investigates whether improvements in the firm's internal corporate governance create value for shareholders. We analyze the market reaction to governance proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes in annual meetings. This provides a clean causal estimate that deals with the endogeneity of internal governance rules. We find that passing a proposal leads to significant positive abnormal returns. Adopting one governance proposal increases shareholder value by 2.8%. The market reaction is larger in firms with more antitakeover provisions, higher institutional ownership, and stronger investor activism for proposals sponsored by institutions. In addition, we find that acquisitions and capital expenditures decline and long‐term performance improves.