Filter Tests of U.K. Share Prices

The purpose of this paper is to develop and test a model of the promotional expenditure decision for a firm operating under conditions of combined uncertainty and oligopoly. The uncertainty is assumed to exist in respect of the impact of any particular level of promotional expenditure upon the demand conditions facing the firm.

The analysis forms part of a wider study of advertising by confectionery manufacturers and arose largely as a result of conversations with advertising executives in the confectionery market. In the course of these discussions it became clear that the existing body of theory concerning the promotional expenditure decision is almost completely incapable of accommodating the extensive uncertainty which is an integral part of the promotional decision in a market such as that under consideration. It also became clear (at least in the case of the confectionery market) (a) that decision makers regard the pricing and promotional expenditure decisions as being largely independent and (b) that in a large number of cases decision makers think in terms of a minimum or ‘threshold’ level of promotional expenditure. While these factors are predominantly in the nature of impressionistic informal observations and therefore of doubtful validity as bases for a scientific enquiry, it was nonetheless felt worthwhile to attempt to develop a theoretical framework capable of accommodating them.

While exhibiting considerable indeterminacy, the model developed below at least takes explicit cognisance of risk and uncertainty. It is also formulated in such a way that the promotional and pricing decisions are independent. It is rather remarkable and most encouraging that the analysis appears to predict something closely akin to minimum ‘threshold’ levels of advertising expenditure. Our theoretical exercise might therefore be afforded the minimal justification of providing a framework capable of accommodating the various results of introspection and conversational empiricism.     

Strategic Inter–Regional Transfers

We derive the equilibrium level of redistribution from one mobile factor (say, the rich or capital) to another possibly mobile factor (say, the poor or labour) when regions choose both their inter–regional transfers and redistributive policies non–cooperatively. It is shown that inter–regional transfers are always desirable (to mitigate the fiscal competition), but cannot be sustained (as a Nash equilibrium) when chosen simultaneoulsy with the redistributive policy. On the other hand, if regions can pre–commit to inter–regional transfers before setting their redistributive policy, their strategic effect makes efficient inter–regional transfers sustainable. However, there are also equilibria with inefficiently small inter–regional transfers or no transfers at all. The effects of regional asymmetries and additional regions on these results are also analyzed.     

Income Distribution, Taxation, and the Private Provision of Public Goods

This article investigates the role of taxation when public goods are privately provided. Externalities between consumers via the public good are shown to cause kinks in social indifference curves. As a result, a government restricted to income taxation should engineer enough inequality to ensure there are some non-contributors to the public good. Whether commodity taxation changes this conclusion depends on the extent to which consumers "see through" the government budget constraint. If they can, inequality should still be sought. When they cannot, in contrast to the case of an economy with only private goods, commodity taxation can be used in conjunction with income transfers to achieve the first-best.     

Economic Mismeasurement and the Bias in Policy Choice

The level of economic activity is never measured perfectly because of problems of definition, inaccuracies in data collection, and the existence of the hidden economy. Such mismeasurement implies that government policies based on official statistics can be optimal only by chance. The analysis formalizes this observation in a two-sector economy and attempts to quantify the direction and extent of the bias introduced into policy by the failure to account for the true size of the economy. It is shown that short-term reform (which need not balance the government budget) can be detrimental. When a budget constraint is imposed, this ensures that reforms will be beneficial no matter how bad is the mismeasurement.     

Marketing charitable bequests to lawyers

There is scant literature about the role of the lawyer in influencing the likelihood of a charitable bequest being made in a will. Charities regularly advertise in legal journals and supply bequest materials to lawyers, but the effectiveness of these strategies for influencing lawyers appears not to have been measured in the literature or in practice. Our exploratory research indicates that specialist estate lawyers report that they pay little or no attention to traditional marketing of charitable bequests to them and that lawyers' specific information needs from charities about bequests are not being satisfied appropriately. Our study reveals that lawyers do seek information from charities in order to write a will's bequest clause, once a bequest has been considered by the client. Lawyers indicated frustration with obtaining this information from charities, and we recommend some actions for charities to rectify this situation. Recommendations for enhanced bequest solicitation are made together with suggestions for pathways for future bequest research involving lawyers. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bergstrom,Blume, and Varian: Voluntary contributions and neutrality

Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian provided a neutrality result for the private provision of public goods that has inspired a considerable literature. The result has significant implications for income redistribution and broader policy interventions. This paper reviews the basic result and its applications, and discusses extensions to general private provision economies.     

Transaction Costs and Cattle Marketing: The Information Content of Seller-Provided Presale Data at Bull Auctions

At sales of breeding bulls, prospective buyers have strong incentives to undertake presale measurement activities. To reduce these transaction costs, sellers often provide information on sale bulls. We examine the information content of two measures of the expected performance of the bulls and find that within a given herd, older, simpler measures of performance contain more information about prices (from buyers' perspectives) than newer, more sophisticated measures known as expected progeny differences, or EPDs. We also find, however, that buyers appear to pay considerable attention to annual changes in herd-average EPD values when comparing animals from different sellers.     

Competition‐driven repositioning

We study competition as an impetus for firms to reposition—to abandon their current positioning strategy and adopt a new one. We predict that as a strong firm moves closer, competition erodes the profitability of situated firms and prompts them to reposition. We expect this effect is pronounced the greater difference in competitive strength. However, we expect that countervailing forces exist such that the viability of alternative positions and the opportunity cost of abandoning a current position mitigate this effect. Evidence from a natural experiment in China's satellite television industry supports our hypotheses. This research adds to the existing literature on repositioning, which emphasizes the phenomenon as opportunity‐driven, and to the competitive interaction literature, which typically does not distinguish between noncounterattack strategies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Structure of the optimal income tax in the quasi-linear model

Existing numerical characterizations of the optimal income tax have been based on a limited number of model specifications. As a result, they do not reveal which properties are general. We determine the optimal tax in the quasi-linear model under weaker assumptions than have previously been used; in particular, we remove the assumption of a lower bound on the utility of zero consumption and the need to permit negative labor incomes. A Monte Carlo analysis is then conducted in which economies are selected at random and the optimal tax function constructed. The results show that in a significant proportion of economies the marginal tax rate rises at low skills and falls at high. The average tax rate is equally likely to rise or fall with skill at low skill levels, rises in the majority of cases in the centre of the skill range, and falls at high skills. These results are consistent across all the specifications we test. We then extend the analysis to show that these results also hold for Cobb-Douglas utility.