Models for which the MLE and the conditional MLE coincide

The MLE, CMLE and MMLE coincide in a linear regression model with fixed individual effects. In this case, there is no incidental parameters problem and the MLE is consistent. The equivalence of these estimators is important because CMLE=MLE implies both the consistency of the MLE and the efficiency of the CMLE. In general, we cannot expect to find a CMLE or MMLE, since there may be no fixed-dimension sufficient statistic for the effects, nor an appropriate transformation of the data whose distribution does not depend on the effects. However, we show that the MLE, CMLE and MMLE do coincide in systems of seemingly unrelated regressions and in systems of simultaneous equations. We establish this result for systems in which (exogenous) variables in addition to (or other than) the intercept may have coefficients which vary over individuals, provided that the set of such variables is the same in every equation.The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Exchange Rate Volatility, Nominal Rigidities, and Persistent Deviations from PPP

It is shown how nominal exchange rate volatility can cause persistent deviations in the real exchange rate. The key to nominal rigidities is a capital market imperfection implying that agents cannot hedge perfectly against consumption risks. As a consequence, nominal changes have real effects by both affecting the ex post real purchasing power of savings and by affecting the ex ante incentives in savings and labor supply. The consequences of exogenous changes in the nominal exchange rate are considered in an OLG version of a two sector small open economy with competitive product and labor markets.J. Japan. Int. Econ.,December 1997,11(4), pp. 584–609. Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark.     

Linear cumulative prospect theory with applications to portfolio selection and insurance demand

Abstract The present paper combines loss attitudes and linear utility by providing an axiomatic analysis of corresponding preferences in a cumulative prospect theory (CPT) framework. In a sense we derive a two-sided variant of Yaari’s dual theory, i.e., nonlinear probability weights in the presence of linear utility. The first important difference is that utility may have a kink at the status quo, which allows for the exhibition of loss aversion. Also, we may have different probability weighting functions for gains than for losses. We apply the model to both portfolio selection and insurance demand. Our results show that CPT with linear utility has more realistic implications than the dual theory since it implies only a weakened variant of plunging. Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91B08, 91B28, 91B30 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D81, G11, G22     

Nach der Wahl: Was sind die wichtigsten wirtschaftspolitischen Herausforderungen?

Even though Germany’s economy is currently going strong, the country still faces enormous challenges if it wants to maintain and increase this prosperity. The new government should take this opportunity to set the course for the future by encouraging the digitalisation of the economy and the society as well as by ensuring that the ongoing energy transition is sustainable and efficient. Other challenges include the adverse effects of globalisation on parts of society and the uneven distribution of income and wealth. But the actual magnitude of the government’s room to manoeuver is up for debate. The new government’s fiscal space might be more limited than it seems, since an automatic adjustment of the income tax to inflation and growth is required to end the bracket creep. Given that transfer programmes are being phased out, the federal income tax surcharge to finance German unification also needs to be abolished. Further budget pressure stems from the pension system and from demands by state and local as well as European governments. The new German government should use the next governing period to initiate fundamental reforms of economic and fiscal policy that will provide adequate answers to long-run challenges.     

Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers

A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. We demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with large probability, even as friction becomes negligible. We investigate the relationship between the use of Nash and sequential bargaining. Nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.     

What shapes player performance in soccer? Empirical findings from a panel analysis

In this article, we investigate the pay–performance relationship of soccer players using individual data from eight seasons of the German soccer league Bundesliga. We find a nonlinear pay–performance relationship, indicating that salary does indeed affect individual performance. The results further show that player performance is affected not only by absolute income level but also by relative income position. An additional analysis of the performance impact of team effects provides evidence of a direct impact of team-mate attributes on individual player performance.     

Taxation of capital income in overlapping generations economies

Whether capital income should be taxed in overlapping generations economies is vividly discussed. It is shown that intergenerational lump‐sum taxes cannot implement the Golden Rule allocation when agents have private information on their earnings potential. Hence, the seminal Atkinson–Stiglitz result that optimal income taxation pre‐empts any role for indirect taxation cannot be interpreted to imply that capital income taxation (affecting intertemporal relative prices) should not be taxed. Specifically, capital income should unambiguously be taxed in small open economies, and the optimal tax rate depends inversely on the elasticity of total savings to disposable income and the after‐tax rate of return.