Conditional Persistence of Earnings Components and Accounting Anomalies

We suggest that the failure of investors to distinguish between an earnings component's autocorrelation coefficient (unconditional persistence) and the marginal contribution of that component's persistence to the persistence of earnings (conditional persistence) provides a partial explanation of post‐earnings‐announcement drift, post‐revenue‐announcement drift, and the accrual anomaly. When the conditional persistence of revenue surprises is high (low) relative to its unconditional persistence, both the post‐earnings‐announcement drift and the post‐revenue‐announcement drift are high (low), because investors’ under‐reaction to revenues and earnings is stronger when the persistence of revenue surprises is more strongly associated with the persistence of earnings surprises. Also, the mispricing of accruals decreases substantially when the conditional persistence of accruals is high relative to its unconditional persistence, because investors’ over‐reaction to accruals is mitigated when the persistence of accruals is indeed more strongly associated with the persistence of earnings. Our findings also suggest that financial analysts’ failure to distinguish between unconditional and conditional persistence of revenues and accruals results in more biased revenue and earnings predictions.     

Dynamic lot sizing problem with continuous-time Markovian production cost

This paper develops a polynomial algorithm for obtaining dynamic economic lot sizes in a single product multiperiod production system with the objective of minimizing total production and inventory costs over T periods. It is assumed that production costs are linear, inventory costs are concave, setup costs are zero and backlogging is not permitted in all periods. Moreover, the unit production cost is a stochastic variable, which is evolved according to a continuous-time Markov process over the planning horizon. The model is formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming (DP) optimization with the state variable being unit production cost. Then, it is solved using the backward dynamic programming approach. To justify the application of the proposed model, two practical cases are presented.     

The moderating effect of innovation on the relationship between environmental and financial performance: Evidence from high emitters in Australia

This study examines whether environmental-related innovation moderates the association between environmental and financial performance measured respectively as carbon emissions and return on assets (ROA). The sample comprises 119 companies subject to Australia's National Greenhouse Energy Reporting Act (NGER) for the period 2009–2017. The results show that environmental innovation positively moderates the relationship between environmental performance and financial performance. The findings also imply that the impact of environmental innovation in improving environmental performance is observable with a 1-year lag. The results are robust to the alternative financial performance measures of Tobin's Q and Altman's Z score. The findings have important implications for company managers and policymakers and provide useful information on innovation's role in enhancing environmental and financial performance.     

Overnight Covered Interest Parity:Theory and Practice

This study shows, both theoretically and empirically, that in a world where capital as well as exchange markets are imperfect it is incorrect to employ mid-market rates to estimate CIP relationships. Developing and using the correct specification, we estimated covered interest parity relationships between the overnight U.S. Euro-dollar and Canadian interbank markets, for the 1986-1992 period. It was found that covered interest parity holds for both directions. However, the speed and pattern of adjustments with which potential arbitrage profits are eliminated are not symmetric between U.S. Euro-dollar and Canadian interbank markets. [GI51     

Cooperation vs. competition in R&D: The role of stability of equilibrium

We consider a model in which firms first choose process R&D expenditures and then compete in an output market. We show the symmetric equilibrium under R&D competition is sometimes unstable, in which case two asymmetric equilibria must also exist. For the latter, we find, in contrast to the literature that total profits are sometimes higher with R&D competition than with research joint venture cartelization (due to the cost asymmetry of the resulting duopoly in the noncooperative case). Furthermore, these equilibria provide another instance of R&D-induced firm heterogeneity.     

The effect of market orientation and its components on innovation consequences: a meta-analysis

While there is a rich body of research on market orientation’s effect on business performance, much little attention has been given to its effect on innovation consequences. This is the first meta-analytic effort to study the independent effects of market orientation components (customer orientation, competitor orientation, interfunctional coordination) on innovation consequences. Also, it is the first meta-analysis to study the impact of contextual characteristics on the way market orientation affects innovation consequences. The study finds that market orientation components positively affect innovation consequences but that competitor orientation’s effect depends on a minimum level of customer orientation. The study also suggests that the relationship between market orientation and innovation consequences is stronger in highly competitive environments but weaker in technology turbulent ones. Finally, findings suggest that the relationship is stronger in large firms, service companies, and in countries characterized by high individualism and high power distance national cultures.

Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions

We consider a discounted stochastic game of common-property capital accumulation with nonsymmetric players, bounded one-period extraction capacities, and a transition law satisfying a general strong convexity condition. We show that the infinite-horizon problem has a Markov-stationary (subgame-perfect) equilibrium and that every finite-horizon truncation has auniqueMarkovian equilibrium, both in consumption functions which arecontinuous and nondecreasingand have all slopes bounded above by 1. Unlike previous results in strategic dynamic models, these properties are reminiscent of the corresponding optimal growth model.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Codes: C73, O41, Q20.     

On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly

Summary. For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single (counter-)example that: (i) A new monotone transformation of the firms' profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations both fail to do so, and (ii) Topkis's notion of critical sufficient condition for monotonicity of a Bertrand firm's best-reply correspondence cannot be extended to rely only on positive unit costs. Received: January 16, 2001; revised version: March 20, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This work was completed while the first author was visiting the Institute for Industrial Economics at the University of Copenhagen during Spring 2000. Their financial support and stimulating research environment are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the European Commission. Correspondence to: R. Amir     

On Environmental Regulation of Oligopoly Markets: Emission versus Performance Standards

By specializing Montero’s (J Environ Econ Manag 44:23–44, 2002) model of environmental regulation under Cournot competition to an oligopoly with linear demand and quadratic abatement costs, we extend his comparison of firms incentives to invest in R&D under emission and performance standards by solving for a closed form solution of the underlying two-stage game. This allows for a full comparison of the two instruments in terms of their resulting propensity for R&D and equilibrium industry output. In addition, we incorporate an equilibrium welfare analysis. Finally, we investigate a three-stage game wherein a welfare-maximizing regulator sets a socially optimal emission cap under each policy instrument. For the latter game, while closed-form solutions for the subgame-perfect equilibrium are not possible, we establish numerically that the resulting welfare is always larger under a performance standard.     

Are sponsorship announcements good news for the shareholders? Evidence from international stock exchanges

The objective of this study is to analyse investors’ perceptions of sponsorship’s ability to increase brand equity, through the impact of sponsorship announcement on stock market value. An event study method, based on a unique sample of 293 worldwide sponsorship announcements from 2010, shows substantial negative abnormal returns following announcement dates. In addition, a cross-sectional regression analysis reveals the influence of several featured factors. Philanthropic sponsorships and sponsorships of events with distinctive values are less negatively perceived by investors, but US companies exhibit more negative returns in shareholder value than other firms. This study offers no support for varying impacts of event audience, renewal agreement, property sponsorship and title sponsorship on abnormal returns though.