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We investigate whether the regulatory improvements made in the aftermath of the global financial crisis have been effective in limiting bank downward window dressing by means of repos in the United States. We find that a strict application of the Basel III regulation wipes out incentives to engage in window dressing to bolster the level of leverage Tier 1 ratio at quarter-end. We also show that the persistency of window dressing is related to the computation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assessment base, which motivates banks to engage in window dressing to reduce the deposit insurance premium. 相似文献
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Altunbaş Yener Polizzi Salvatore Scannella Enzo Thornton John 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2022,58(2):649-683
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper provides evidence on the impact of European Banking Union (BU) and the associated Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on the risk... 相似文献
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