TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY IN PRODUCTION IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BRAZILIAN PLASTICS AND STEEL INDUSTRIES

This paper estimates firm specific indexes of technical efficiencyfor the Brazilian plastics and steel industries. Two differentindexes are employed for the empirical estimates—the Farrellindex and an index developed from a linear programming approximationof a nonstochastic frontier production function specified inthe Cobb-Douglas functional form. Evidence of substantial relativetechnical inefficiency is revealed. In both industries onlya very small proportion of all the observed firms were producingamounts of output greater than 80 percent of that technicallypossible on the estimated frontier. Relative efficiency of thefirms in the two industries was not seen to be significantlyrelated to ownership (foreign or government), but tests didsuggest a tendency for larger firms, possessing larger marketshares, to be closer to the frontier than smaller firms.     

Ex‐Dividend Profitability and Institutional Trading Skill

We use institutional trading data to examine whether skilled institutions exploit positive abnormal ex‐dividend returns. Results show that institutions concentrate trading around certain ex‐dates, and earn higher profits around these events. Dividend capture trades represent 6% of all institutional buy trades but contribute 15% of overall abnormal returns. Institutional dividend capture trading is persistent. Institutional ex‐day profitability is also strongly cross‐sectionally related to trade execution skill. The relation between execution skill and profits disappears around placebo non‐ex‐days. Results suggest that skilled institutions target certain opportunities rather than benefiting uniformly over time. Furthermore, only skilled institutions can profit from dividend capture.     

The Delisting Bias in CRSP Data

I document a delisting bias in the stock return data base maintained by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I find that delists for bankruptcy and other negative reasons are generally surprises and that correct delisting returns are not available for most of the stocks that have been delisted for negative reasons since 1962. Using over-the-counter price data, I show that the omitted delisting returns are large. Implications of the bias are discussed.     

Volatility‐Managed Portfolios

Managed portfolios that take less risk when volatility is high produce large alphas, increase Sharpe ratios, and produce large utility gains for mean‐variance investors. We document this for the market, value, momentum, profitability, return on equity, investment, and betting‐against‐beta factors, as well as the currency carry trade. Volatility timing increases Sharpe ratios because changes in volatility are not offset by proportional changes in expected returns. Our strategy is contrary to conventional wisdom because it takes relatively less risk in recessions. This rules out typical risk‐based explanations and is a challenge to structural models of time‐varying expected returns.     

Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices?

This paper documents strong evidence for behavioral biases among Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders and investigates the effect these biases have on prices. Our traders appear highly loss‐averse, regularly assuming above‐average afternoon risk to recover from morning losses. This behavior has important short‐term consequences for afternoon prices, as losing traders actively purchase contracts at higher prices and sell contracts at lower prices than those that prevailed previously. However, the market appears to distinguish these risk‐seeking trades from informed trading. Prices set by loss‐averse traders are reversed significantly more quickly than those set by unbiased traders.     

The Demise of the Mutual Organizational Form: An Investigation of the Life Insurance Industry

We investigate the role of organizational structure in financial services markets by examining the U.S. life insurance industry. Traditionally, stock and mutual life insurers were equally represented, but now the industry is mainly composed of stock firms. We find operational efficiency, access to capital, and tax savings are important determinants for this shift. The incentive to demutualize differs by the type of conversion: full demutualization is chosen for efficiency and access to capital reasons and partial conversion, using a mutual holding company, is chosen for tax savings. Firm operational efficiency improves after conversion. We also find the efficiency of the stock organizational form dominates that of the mutual structure during our sample period, 1995 to 2004.     

Political Cost Incentives for Managing the Property-Liability Insurer Loss Reserve

This paper examines the effect of rate regulation on the management of the property-liability insurer loss reserve. The political cost hypothesis predicts that managers make accounting choices to reduce wealth transfers resulting from the regulatory process. Managers may under-state reserves to justify lower rates to regulators. Alternatively, managers may have an incentive to report loss inflating discretionary reserves to reduce the cost of regulatory rate suppression. We find insurers over-state reserves in the presence of stringent rate regulation. Investigating the impact along the conditional reserve error distribution, we discover that a majority of the response occurs from under-reserving firms under-reserving less because of stringent rate regulation.