LBOs,Reversions and Implicit Contracts

The conventional view of going-private transactions is that they are designed to enhance the efficiency of the firm (for example, Jensen (1986) ). A starkly different view is that these and other control transactions are motivated to effect transfers from other stakeholders in the firm to equity holders ( Shleifer and Summers (1988) ). This study exploits data describing pension terminations as a way to test these theories. We conclude that the efficiency theory can plausibly explain a substantial number of LBO-related terminations, but not enough to undermine the transfer theory. More specific predictions from the efflciency theory are needed to structure more exacting tests.     

Investment Spending in Australia: Further Study and Interpretation*

Recent work in macro theory suggests that aggregate 'demand' policies have direct supply-side effects in the short run, if Lucas's standard specification of the nonlinear adjustment costs for capital is generalized In this paper, we estimate an investment equation (involving Tobin's valuation ratio and Australian data) which nests three hypotheses: Lucas's standard specification of adjustment costs, a simple generalization which permits labour to be involved in the installation of capital and a model which allows for liquidity constraints. The results support the suggested alternative formulation of the q-theory     

Risk Aversion,Uncertain Information,and Market Efficiency

Abstract. We reexamine and extend tests of the uncertain information hypothesis (UIH) proposed by Brown, Harlow, and Tinic (1988, 1993). We find that their empirical results are sensitive to the sampling procedure employed and that their particular methodology does not sufficiently distinguish between event and nonevent periods. When the sampling procedure is modified to identify only relatively large, isolated events, the test results generally do not support the UIH. Instead, significant price shocks are consistently followed by short-lived price reversals. We observe this behavior following positive and negative events regardless of whether the event is classified as risk increasing or risk decreasing.     

Capital Commitment and Illiquidity in Corporate Bonds

We study trading costs and dealer behavior in U.S. corporate bond markets from 2006 to 2016. Despite a temporary spike during the financial crisis, average trade execution costs have not increased notably over time. However, dealer capital commitment, turnover, block trade frequency, and average trade size decreased during the financial crisis and thereafter. These declines are attributable to bank‐affiliated dealers, as nonbank dealers have increased their market commitment. Our evidence indicates that liquidity provision in the corporate bond markets is evolving away from the commitment of bank‐affiliated dealer capital to absorb customer imbalances, and that postcrisis banking regulations likely contribute.     

THE PECULIAR ECONOMICS OF HOUSING BUBBLES

Home values increase rapidly during housing bubbles generating large capital gains. High loan‐to‐value (LTV) mortgages secured by expected future home values are one way to take advantage of these capital gains. In this article, we use a simple partial equilibrium consumer theory model to explore the implications of high LTV borrowing. We find that sufficiently large expected house price growth leads to an upward‐sloping budget line when households can obtain high LTV mortgages. In this environment, the demand for housing fits neither the conventional theories of consumer goods nor that of investment goods. In fact, increases in the expected future price of housing may reduce current housing demand, whereas decreases in the effective (current) price may lead to households buying smaller homes. Moreover, high LTV loans reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy, but raise the volatility of aggregate demand. Tighter borrowing standards may help lower demand volatility at the expense of shrinking the economy. (JEL E21, R21, E52)     

A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE COMPETITIVE POSITIONS AND ENTRY PATHS OF EUROPEAN FIRMS IN THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET

This paper combines the statistical insights of dynamic strategic group analysis with the qualitative richness of historical analysis to explore the modes of entry, expansion paths, and competitive postures of European firms in the U.S. pharmaceutical market. Patterns of entry and market development over a 20-year period are analyzed. The roles of strategic assets and competencies in determining both the entry strategy and the final competitive posture of these firms in the U.S. market are discussed.