An Analysis of Divestiture Effects Resulting from Deregulation

Capital market data were used to examine the divestiture effects pertaining to deregulation, the dropping of antitrust charges, and the reversing of the co-insurance effect associated with the recent breakup of AT&T. The empirical results of the study indicate that significant economic events took place during the breakup process, which led to transfers of wealth from various parties to the securityholders of AT&T. The results also indicate that the buffering effect of regulation was reduced as AT&T went through the total deregulation process. This is in accordance with Peltzman's prediction.     

Financial Protectionism? First Evidence

We examine large public interventions in the financial sector, such as bank nationalizations and search for “financial protectionism,” a decrease in the quantity and/or an increase in the price of loans that banks from one country make to borrowers resident in another. We use a bank‐level panel data set spanning all U.K.‐resident banks between 1997Q3 and 2010Q1. After nationalization, foreign banks reduced their fraction of British loans by about 11% and increased their effective interest rates by about 70 basis points. In contrast, nationalized British banks did not significantly change either their loan mix or effective interest rates.     

The underground economy and its macroeconomic consequences

This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.     

How Do Firms Respond to Political Uncertainty? Evidence from U.S. Gubernatorial Elections

We examine the joint response to political uncertainty along two margins: changes in real activity and voluntary disclosure. We focus on within-firm variation in exposure to ex ante competitive U.S. gubernatorial elections using data on preelection poll margins and firms’ state exposures. Despite real activity falling in the years leading up to a close election, we find that voluntary disclosure increases both in frequency and content, including mentions of risk in filings that reference states holding elections. Our tests use a decomposition of 8-K filings into real activity and voluntary disclosure to address the endogenous complementarity between these two responses. These results hold when using alternative ex ante measures of political uncertainty based on term-limited incumbents, historically competitive offices, or state legislature gridlock. Both effects of political uncertainty are stronger for firms in highly regulated industries and weaker for those least exposed to the local market, linking the real activity and disclosure responses to uncertainty.     

Model Comparison with Transaction Costs

Failing to account for transaction costs materially impacts inferences drawn when evaluating asset pricing models, biasing tests in favor of those employing high-cost factors. Ignoring transaction costs, Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015, Review of Financial Studies, 28, 650–705) q-factor model and Barillas and Shanken (2018, The Journal of Finance, 73, 715–754) six-factor models have high maximum squared Sharpe ratios and small alphas across 205 anomalies. They do not, however, come close to spanning the achievable mean-variance efficient frontier. Accounting for transaction costs, the Fama and French (2015, Journal of Financial Economics, 116, 1–22; 2018, Journal of Financial Economics, 128, 234–252) five-factor model has a significantly higher squared Sharpe ratio than either of these alternative models, while variations employing cash profitability perform better still.