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ALISON TINSLEY MICHAEL BYRNE ANNE FRITZ 《International Journal of Consumer Studies》1991,15(3):223-229
The effect of detergent products on fabric handle was investigated by means of consumer responses. The use of a semantic differential grid enabled responses to be compared to an ‘Ideal’ handle. Differences were obtained between the products and evidence was obtained which suggests that the judgements on the semantic differential grid provide a valid estimate of the way people make judgements about the overall handle of towels. 相似文献
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This study analyzes the interaction between the optimal level of investment and debt financing. For this purpose, a model is structured in which a firm, facing an uncertain price, has to decide on its optimal level of investment and debt. The amount of investment sets a limit on output whose optimal level is determined after price is realized. The debt involved is risky (there exists a possibility of bankruptcy). The analysis proves that investment and its optimal financing have to be simultaneously determined and that a negative relationship exists between operating and financial leverage. We also demonstrate that as the tax rate increases, optimal capacity decreases and optimal leverage increases. An analysis of the impact of changes in the expected price shows that under some conditions, an increase in expected price would lead to an increase in optimal investment (firm size) and a decrease in optimal debt. 相似文献
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ABRAHAM L. WICKELGREN 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2007,9(2):221-229
When the government bargains with a private firm, the firm cares about only its own profits, but the firm's profits may also enter into the government's utility function. As a result, the government will not bargain as aggressively for a low price. This can lead the government to “over pay” for quality. In contrast to the standard holdup problem, this reverse‐holdup problem can give the firm an incentive to overinvest in non‐contractible quality. The paper also discusses some examples where the reverse‐holdup problem may explain excessive quality in government procurement. 相似文献
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We construct a market‐based mechanism that induces players in a noncooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problem of “The Tragedy of the Commons.” 相似文献
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Chris Warhurst DENNIS NICKSON ANNE WITZ ANNE MARIE CULLEN 《The Service Industries Journal》2013,33(3):1-18
Criticisms of management consultants are increasingly common, but are also frequently based on simplistic assertions that powerful consultants exploit uncertain or ignorant clients. We argue that considerable insight to the tensions between consultants and clients can be gained by focusing on the boundary relationship between them. Using the work of Granovetter, we explore how organisational boundaries vary in their permeability. Consultant roles vary from that of ‘outsider’, based on simple market exchange of payment for advice or service, to ‘insider’, in which a web of social ties develops in what are often long-lasting relationships. Although criticisms of consultants are sometimes based merely on misunderstanding the nature of these roles, we argue that tensions frequently arise through the activities of both consultants and clients in terms of their boundary relationships. 相似文献
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