Estimating household demand for housing attributes in rent-controlled markets

We estimate the household’s marginal willingness to pay for housing attributes in the rent-controlled sector, so where rents are not freely market determined. The application of hedonic price approaches to obtain estimates of the household’s value of housing characteristics is then invalid. We apply an alternative estimation approach based on residential mobility. In our application, we focus on the households’ willingness to pay for number of rooms as well as the willingness to pay to avoid a long commuting distance. Our estimates appear plausible. For example, for households in the rent-controlled sector are willing to pay about 7% of their household income for an additional room. The implied marginal costs of commuting are about €0.17–€0.23 per (one-way) kilometre.     

Union growth in The Netherlands 1961–1989

An empirical analysis is presented of union growth in The Netherlands over the past decades. The analysis shows that the effect of changes in the industrial structure is very small. It appears that union growth is influenced by wage growth and by unemployment. If real wages increase more than labour productivity or if unemployment declines union membership increases.     

Can fat taxes and package size restrictions stimulate healthy food choices?

Consumers prefer bonus packs, as opposed to price discounts, for healthy foods, but they want a price discount rather than a bonus pack for indulgent foods (Mishra & Mishra, 2011). This study conceptually replicates and extends this finding to show that consumers are more responsive to changes in price than to changes in package size for indulgent food options, whereas they are more responsive to changes in package size than to changes in price for healthy food options.     

Partisanship and the effectiveness of oversight

We examine the welfare effects of partisanship in a model of checks and balances. An executive makes a policy proposal and an overseer then decides whether or not to veto the executive's proposal. Both the executive and the overseer have private information as to the correct policy to pursue, and both are motivated by the desire to appear competent. A partisan overseer is one who, in addition to seeking to promote her own reputation, cares how her decision will impact the executive's reputation. Our main result is that partisanship can improve the efficacy of an oversight regime, as the distortions caused by a partisan overseer's desire to affect the executive's reputation can offset the distortions caused by her desire to enhance her own. Our results provide a new rationale for divided government, as partisan considerations are often necessary to prevent the overseer from rubber stamping all executive proposals.     

Car ownership as a mediating variable in car travel behaviour research using a structural equation modelling approach to identify its dual relationship

Car ownership is generally considered an important variable in car travel behaviour research, but its specific role is often not well understood. Certain empirical studies consider car ownership as the dependent variable explained by the built environment, whereas other studies deem it to be one of the independent variables explaining car travel behaviour. This paper takes note of the dual influence car ownership has in explaining car travel behaviour by assuming that car ownership mediates the relationship between the built environment and car use. The relationship is estimated using a structural equation model since it accounts for mediating variables. This approach confirms the intermediary nature of car ownership.     

On the unique features of post-disaster humanitarian logistics

Logistic activity can be thought of as a socio-technical process whereby a social network of individuals orchestrates a series of technical activities using supporting systems such as transportation and communications. To understand the functioning of the entire system requires proper consideration of all its components. We identify seven key components: the objectives being pursued, the origin of the commodity flows to be transported, knowledge of demand, the decision-making structure, periodicity and volume of logistic activities, and the state of the social networks and supporting systems. Based on our analysis of the differences between commercial and humanitarian logistics, we pinpoint research gaps that need to be filled to enhance both the efficiency of humanitarian logistics and the realism of the mathematical models designed to support it.We argue that humanitarian logistics is too broad a field to fit neatly into a single definition of operational conditions. At one end of the spectrum we find humanitarian logistic efforts of the kind conducted in long-term disaster recovery and humanitarian assistance, where operational efficiency – akin to commercial logistics – is a prime consideration. At the other, post-disaster humanitarian logistic operations involved in disaster response and short-term recovery activities represent a vastly different operational environment, often in chaotic settings where urgent needs, life-or-death decisions and scarce resources are the norm. The huge contrast between these operational environments requires that they be treated separately.     

Too close for comfort? Distinguishing between team intimacy and team cohesion

The authors examine theory and research on team intimacy and team cohesion, and argue that the two have often been confused, merged, and used interchangeably in recent theoretical, empirical, and applied work on team effectiveness. The authors propose distinct definitions to clarify and distinguish between team intimacy and team cohesion, and suggest areas that will aid research and application. Their examination provides a framework for understanding the inconsistent findings in team effectiveness and team building research and thus helps to improve human resource management (HRM) interventions.     

Should the Good and the Selfish be Taxed Differently?*

In this paper, we consider an environment where individual actions have externalities and two types of agents exist: agents with social preferences (the good) and selfish agents. Selfish agents have pay‐off functions that do not take into account social welfare. The pay‐off of an agent is a linear combination of social welfare and the pay‐off of a selfish agent. We demonstrate that the corrective tax rates that maximize social welfare do not depend on the degree of social preferences. Hence, the good and the selfish should not be taxed differently.