An Empirical Analysis of the Pricing of Collateralized Debt Obligations

We use the information in collateralized debt obligations (CDO) prices to study market expectations about how corporate defaults cluster. A three‐factor portfolio credit model explains virtually all of the time‐series and cross‐sectional variation in an extensive data set of CDX index tranche prices. Tranches are priced as if losses of 0.4%, 6%, and 35% of the portfolio occur with expected frequencies of 1.2, 41.5, and 763 years, respectively. On average, 65% of the CDX spread is due to firm‐specific default risk, 27% to clustered industry or sector default risk, and 8% to catastrophic or systemic default risk.     

Measuring Liquidity Mismatch in the Banking Sector

This paper constructs a liquidity mismatch index (LMI) to gauge the mismatch between the market liquidity of assets and the funding liquidity of liabilities, for 2,882 bank holding companies over 2002 to 2014. The aggregate LMI decreases from +$4 trillion precrisis to ?$6 trillion in 2008. We conduct an LMI stress test revealing the fragility of the banking system in early 2007. Moreover, LMI predicts a bank's stock market crash probability and borrowing decisions from the government during the financial crisis. The LMI is therefore informative about both individual bank liquidity and the liquidity risk of the entire banking system.     

Subjective Performance Indicators and Discretionary Bonus Pools

Key indicators of managerial performance are frequently subjective, that is, they are difficult to specify and/or verify for contracting purposes. When a principal must rely on subjective information to create incentives for a group of agents, discretionary bonus pools are shown to be optimal mechanisms. Despite their optimality, however, discretionary bonus pools entail an additional agency cost relative to the benchmark of optimal contracts based on objective and verifiable information. Our analysis identifies circumstances under which this additional agency cost is small, for example, the subjective information signals are precise, or the number of agents participating in the bonus pool increases. When incentive schemes can be based on both objective and subjective performance indicators, the relative weights to be placed on alternative signals are shown to differ from the ones predicted by models with objective signals only. We also demonstrate that correlation in measurement errors has a different impact on the structure of optimal incentive schemes when the performance indicators are merely subjective.     

Sizing Up Repo

To understand which short‐term debt markets experienced “runs” during the financial crisis, we analyze a novel data set of repurchase agreements (repo), that is, loans between nonbank cash lenders and dealer banks collateralized with securities. Consistent with a run, repo volume backed by private asset‐backed securities falls to near zero in the crisis. However, the reduction is only $182 billion, which is small relative to the stock of private asset‐backed securities as well as the contraction in asset‐backed commercial paper. While the repo contraction is small in aggregate, it disproportionately affected a few dealer banks.