Copyright Damages and Statistics

This paper discusses the statistical issues that arise in conducting an economic damages analysis in the context of a litigation matter involving copyrights. Calculating damages in copyright cases turns out to be a natural application for econometric modelling methods. Surprisingly, elementary statistical issues can be a source of significant debate between the experts in such matters. In this paper, we present a case study and illustrate how issues such as interpretation of p -values and what "rejection of the null hypothesis" really "means" in such matters.     

Improved estimation of portfolio value‐at‐risk under copula models with mixed marginals

Portfolio value‐at‐risk (PVAR) is widely used in practice, but recent criticisms have focused on risks arising from biased PVAR estimates due to model specification errors and other problems. The PVAR estimation method proposed in this article combines generalized Pareto distribution tails with the empirical density function to model the marginal distributions for each asset in the portfolio, and a copula model is used to form a joint distribution from the fitted marginals. The copula–mixed distribution (CMX) approach converges in probability to the true marginal return distribution but is based on weaker assumptions that may be appropriate for the returns data found in practice. CMX is used to estimate the joint distribution of log returns for the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) index and the associated futures contracts on SGX and TAIFEX. The PVAR estimates for various hedge portfolios are computed from the fitted CMX model, and backtesting diagnostics indicate that CMX outperforms the alternative PVAR estimators. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:997–1018, 2006     

Permanent magnets: a technological analysis

Abstract
Technology analysis is a new technomanagerial discipline that provides common frameworks for analysing individual technologies and their relationships to each other. It is used here to probe the development of a particular technology, namely that of permanent magnets.
The paper traces the development of permanent magnets over the past decade and explores possible future improvements in performance parameters. The strength of magnets (i.e. energy product as expressed in kilo Joules per cubic metre) has increased from approximately 40 in the 1930s to approximately 400 at present.
Future developments will be constrained by a barrier which seems to exist at approximately 525 kilo Joules per cubic metre. However this is viewed as a barrier that can be transcended and not as an immutable limit. It therefore signifies a possible breakthrough zone.
S-curve theory leads analysts to speculate about a possible breakthrough during the five year period leading up to 1995. At that date magnetic strengths of 600+ kilo Joules per cubic metre could be aimed for.
Increased magnetic strength will improve the performance parameters of all technologies utilising magnets, unleash new magnetic based technologies and threaten many traditional areas in the fields of matter processing, transporting and storing, energy processing, and information processing and storing.
These effects will cascade through the entire technological landscape creating new markets and destroying others. The article gives an overview of these impacts on the technological landscape.     

Regulatory Monitoring and the Impact of Bank Holding Company Dividend Changes on Equity Returns

This paper examines the impact of announcements of dividend changes by bank holding companies (BHCs) on equity returns. Many empirical studies of dividend behavior reveal positive market responses to dividend increases, which have been interpreted as confirmation of the signalling theory of dividend behavior. These studies typically focus on “large” changes, however. We argue that BHCs allow for a stronger test of signalling theory because regulatory monitors, in effect, “certify” dividend signals. Consequently, even “small” dividend increases should result in positive abnormal equity returns. Using the event study methodology, our results generally confirm this hypothesis for a sample covering the period 1973–1987.     

PRINCIPAL AND AGENCY TRADES BY STOCKBROKERS ARE COMPLEMENTARY: THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF DEREGULATING AGENCY TRADING AND BANNING PRINCIPAL TRADES

This paper models the demand for stockbrokers' services in Australia, consisting of two related services, agency trades and principal trades. The relationship between agency and principal trades is estimated. The results indicate that the two services are complements rather than substitutes. Using unique accounting information, a model of agency and principal trading activities is estimated to determine the welfare effects of (i) deregulating brokerage commissions and (ii) a ban on principal trading by brokers. The results show a sizeable welfare gain to investors (amounting to about 60% of the gross revenue of brokers) stemming from deregulation of the minimum charge for agency trades. The loss in profitability by brokers due to deregulation is also computed and shown to be negligible. The results also show that due to complementarity, a ban on principal trading, even with deregulation of agency trading, can impose an arbitrarily high cost on investors which could, in principle, offset the gains from agency deregulation.     

Capital Investment under Alternative Marketing Scenarios in the Hog Industry: A Real Option Approach

This paper uses a real option approach to analyze the impact of alternative marketing contracts on the decision to invest in a cooperatively owned hog facility. For the numerical analysis of the impact, this paper uses a simulation method that incorporates early exercise, multiple‐state variables, multi‐choice decisions and temporal optimality. The results show that the option values that stem from the value of waiting to invest and choosing between alternative marketing methods amounts to 20–36% of the initial investment. Further, having an option to choose an alternative marketing method with different risk structure does add to the value of waiting to invest. Having an option to enter a 15‐year marketing contract increases the value of waiting by as much as $117,097 for the pork production example in this paper. Finally, the value of the option to wait is unilaterally lower under a risk‐reducing contract scenario than under a spot market alternative. This could explain the explosion in hog production facility investment during the 1990s when prevalence of contract production increased. Les auteurs ont recouru à l'approche du choix véritable pour analyser l'impact d'autres solutions de mise en marché sur la capacité d'investir ou pas dans un élevage de porcs exploitéà la manière d'une coopérative. Aux fins de l'analyse, on s'est servi d'une méthode de simulation intégrant une brève campagne, de multiples variables d'État, des décisions à choix multiple et des conditions optimales dans le temps. Les résultats indiquent que l'existence d'un choix réel permettant à l'exploitant d'attendre avant d'investir et de sélectionner entre plusieurs méthodes de mise en marché représente 20 à 36 pour cent de l'investissement initial. Par ailleurs, le fait d'avoir accès à une autre méthode de mise en marché, à structure de risque différente, ne donne pas plus de valeur à la capacité d'attendre avant de procéder aux investissements. La possibilité de signer une entente de commercialisation de quinze ans accroît la valeur de l'attente de jusqu'à 117,097 $ pour le type d'élevage porcin retenu comme exemple. Enfin, l'existence d'une entente de commercialisation atténuant les risques réduit unilatéralement la valeur de l'option « attente », comparativement à ce qui se produit quand l'éleveur n'a d'autre choix qu'écouler ses bêtes sur le marché au comptant. Ces résultats pourraient expliquer l'explosion des investissements observée dans le secteur du porc au cours des années 90, où la production sous contrat avait sensiblement augmenté.     

Technology Transfer and Learning

Despite the fact that international technology transfer has been widely studied its management still encounters many difficulties. To fully understand the issues that are relevant to the process of transferring production technology, it is necessary to determine the important factors that influence this process. Learning curves are often used as a means of determining the time required to become familiar with a transferred technology. The cases discussed in this paper have all employed learning curves, which were established at the outset of the transfer process and which turned out to be incorrect. As a consequence the envisaged efficiencies were not obtained. This phenomenon is partly due to the fact that when technology is transferred to a relatively inexperienced 'destination company', the curve is established based on the circumstances of the 'source company'. The case study findings lead to the conclusion that to establish a realistic curve a more comprehensive method is required than simply basing anticipated performance on that achieved at the source company.     

A Cross‐national Comparison of R&D Expenditure Decisions: Tax Incentives and Financial Constraints*

We provide evidence on the impact of tax incentives and financial constraints on corporate R&D expenditure decisions. We contribute to extant research by comparing R&D expenditures in the United States and Canada, thereby exploiting the differences in the two countries' R&D tax credit mechanisms and generally accepted accounting principles. The two tax incentive mechanism designs are consistent with differing views of the degree of financial constraints faced by firms in these economies. Our sample also allows us to explore the effects of capitalizing R&D on Canadian firms. Employing a matched design, we document relations between tax credit incentives and R&D spending consistent with both Canadian and U.S. public companies responding as though they are not financially constrained. We estimate that the Canadian credit system induces, on average, $1.30 of additional R&D spending per dollar of taxes forgone while the U.S. system induces, on average, $2.96 of additional spending. We also find that firms that capitalize R&D costs in Canada spend, on average, 18 percent more on R&D. Collectively, this evidence is important to the ongoing debates in both countries concerning the appropriate design of incentives for R&D and is consistent with the assumptions found in the U.S. tax credit system, but not those found in the Canadian system.