Search theory,competitive equilibrium,and the Nash bargaining solution

We investigate a canonical search-theoretic model without entry. Two agents are randomly matched with a long side being rationed. The matched agents face a pair of randomly drawn non-transferable payoffs, and then choose whether or not to form a partnership subject to a small probability of exogenous break down. As this probability and friction vanish, the Nash bargaining solution emerges as the unique undominated strategy equilibrium outcome if the mass of each party is the same. If the size of one party is larger than the other, the short side extracts the entire surplus, a sharp contrast to Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) [16].     

Trade and Global Pollution in Dynamic Oligopoly with Corporate Environmentalism

This paper examines the effects of international trade in the presence of dynamic oligopolistic competition where the stock of global pollution has a negative welfare effect and the oligopolists' objectives may include society's pollution damage as well as private profits. In a symmetric case where the number of firms, emission coefficient, and firms' environmental consciousness are the same in two countries, an opening of trade unambiguously improves each country's welfare in the short run. In the long run, however, trade increases the stock of global pollution and hence, whether opening of trade is beneficial depends on the parameters of the economy. If there are asymmetries between countries, the short‐run gains from trade in both countries are not necessarily guaranteed, because trade liberalization may increase output in one country and reduce it in the other. Moreover, free trade may result in lower pollution stock than under autarky.     

Deregulation and governance: plight of Japanese banks in the 1990s

The governance structure of public corporations is determined by the agency relationship between shareholders and managers, and the agency theory predicts that deregulation of an industry leads to governance adaptation. Deregulation of the Japanese banking business in the 1980s offers an interesting case study in this framework, as Japanese banks fell into serious solvency problems in the post-deregulation 1990s. This paper investigates whether ineffective governance was responsible for the plight of Japanese banks. The sample is 384 corporations that were listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1983 and 1990, which includes 59 banks. One of the findings is that bank shareholders allowed more diffuse ownership structure after deregulation, which demonstrates that the agency theory did not hold for shareholders of Japanese banks.     

The impact of risk aversion on information transmission between firms

This paper investigates whether and to what extent the presence of risk aversion affects the welfare implications of information transmission in one of the most fundamental oligopoly models—a Cournot duopoly model with common demand uncertainty. It aims to make a bridge between the literature dealing with information sharing in oligopoly and the one discussing the firm under uncertainty. We can show that the average output level of each firm is quite sensitive to the type and amount of information, and that the presence of risk aversion has an effect of decreasing the welfare of firms, whence information transmission may sometimes be harmful rather than beneficial to risk averse firms. These results have some policy implications.We are indebted to Hirofumi Uzawa, Masao Fukuoka, Ryuzo Sato, Koichi Hamada, Michihiro Ohyama, Kunio Kawamata, Yasunori Ishii, Noboru Sakashita, Koji Okuguchi, and Masamichi Kawano for useful comments and discussions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Japan Association of Economic Theory and Econometrics, University of Tsukuba, October 1989, and at the Keio Conference on Market Mechanism and Industrial Organization, Hakone, November 1989. Any errors which may remain are our sole responsibility. Partial financial help from the Tokyo Council for Economic Research, New York University, and the Ministry of Education, Grant C-01530001 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Indeterminacy and Pollution Haven Hypothesis in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

This paper develops a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which production activities are accompanied by pollution emissions that have a negative effect on welfare. It is shown that the dynamic equilibrium may display indeterminacy (i.e., continuum of dynamic equilibrium paths converging to a common steady state), depending on (i) the relationship between capital intensity and pollution intensity, (ii) the property of households’ discount rate as a function of total pollution, and (iii) the pollution-consumption relationship in instantaneous utility. In addition, the effect of environmental policy on the economy’s comparative advantage and its relation to indeterminacy are examined.     

The Role of Cross-Border Networks of Skilled Labor in Offshore Outsourcing: Empirical Evidence Based on the Network Theory

This study investigates the determinant role of the cross-border movement of skilled labor in the expansion of service trade between the US, and both developed and developing countries. For this purpose, we employ the key concepts of network theory as an analytical framework and conduct panel data analysis and graphical modeling analysis for 31 countries from 1999 to 2008. In this decade, offshore outsourcing in the service trade took off worldwide. We use data for each country’s service exports to the US, number of H-1B visas issued, GNI per-capita, network readiness index, and an English dummy for the official language. We illustrate the trajectory and interactions between these factors. These analyses yield three observations. First, service trade with the US is more intensive among higher income countries. Second, the number of H-1B visas issued has a positive effect on service exports to the US. Third, individuals in lower income countries tend to desire H-1B visas and create intensive skilled labor networks with the US, the path through which developing countries such as India expanded their service exports to the US.     

Disability and Economy: A Game Theoretic Approach

This paper takes a game theoretic approach to disability‐related issues by constructing a model that studies the case of hereditary deafness on Martha's Vineyard Island, USA from the seventeenth century to the early years of twentieth, where the island community adjusted itself to the hereditary deafness so that it was not treated as a disability. The model of the present paper has two stages. First of all, there are two types of continua of agents, the deaf and the non‐deaf. In the first stage, the non‐deaf agents become either bilinguals or monolinguals. In the second stage, agents are classified into deaf people, bilinguals and monolinguals. They are then randomly matched to form a trio to play a three‐person bargaining game with infinite horizon, random proposers and language constraints. Two bargaining games are considered. The first one is a majority bargaining game where only two out of three can agree to implement a bargaining outcome. The second one is a unanimity bargaining game where all three agents are required to reach an agreement. The majority game exhibits strategic complementarity, while the unanimity game exhibits strategic substitutability. This paper also takes an inductive approach to examine how prejudice against people with disability may emerge.     

Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties

We develop a spatial model of competition between two policy-motivated parties. The parties know which policies are desirable for voters, while voters do not. The announced positions of the parties serve as signals to the voters concerning the parties' private information. In all separating equilibria, when the left-wing party attains power, the policies it implements are to the right of the policies implemented by the right-wing party when it attains power. Intuitively, when right-wing policies become more attractive, the left party moves toward the right in order to be assured of winning, while the right-wing party stays put in a radical stance.     

Perturbative Expansion Technique for Non-linear FBSDEs with Interacting Particle Method

In this paper, we propose an efficient Monte Carlo implementation of a non-linear FBSDE as a system of interacting particles inspired by the idea of the branching diffusion method of McKean. It will be particularly useful to investigate large and complex systems, and hence it is a good complement of our previous work presenting an analytical perturbation procedure for generic non-linear FBSDEs. There appear multiple species of particles, where the first one follows the diffusion of the original underlying state, and the others the Malliavin derivatives with a grading structure. The number of branching points are capped by the order of perturbation, which is expected to make the scheme less numerically intensive. The proposed method can be applied to semi-linear problems, such as American options, credit and funding value adjustments, and even fully non-linear issues, such as the optimal portfolio problems in incomplete and/or constrained markets.