The Efficiency Principle in Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining

Applying the non-cooperative theory of coalitional bargaining, I examine a widely held view in economic literature that an efficient outcome can be agreed on in voluntary bargaining among rational agents in the absence of transaction costs. While this view is not always true, owing to the strategic formation of subcoalitions, I show that it can hold under the possibility of successive renegotiations of agreements. Renegotiation may, however, motivate bargainers to form a subcoalition first and to exploit the first-mover rent. This strategic behaviour in the process of renegotiation may distort the equity of an agreement.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D23, D61, D63.     

Considerations on Inequality,Corporate Governance,and Financialization

Abstract

Disjunctures between corporate governance, increasingly dominated by financial considerations, and social inequality have been among the motor forces of current world-wide “populist” voter revolts. This article looks for clues for the relation between economic inequality, corporate governance, and financialization by re-examining the work of Karl Marx and of Adolphe Berle and Gardiner Means. Marx is widely considered, in Japan, to have pointed out that the division of profit into the wages of management and the profit of enterprise is considered as a path to the association. However, this general interpretation in Japan may not be sufficient for capturing capitalism’s contemporary reality. This presentation develops an alternative interpretation of this chapter by combining Marx’s explanation with the theory of the separation of ownership and management proposed by Berle and Means. We then explore causal relations among income inequality, corporate governance, and financialization.     

Lerner symmetry and trilateral relations in international monetary economics

The classical Lerner symmetry theorem concerning the equivalence of import and export tariffs is extended to a monetary economy under flexible exchange rates. Under fixed exchange rates, this should be replaced by the trilateral-relation theorem. The Meade theorem is also extended.     

Pricing average options under time-changed Lévy processes

This paper presents an approximate formula for pricing average options when the underlying asset price is driven by time-changed Lévy processes. Time-changed Lévy processes are attractive to use for a driving factor of underlying prices because the processes provide a flexible framework for generating jumps, capturing stochastic volatility as the random time change, and introducing the leverage effect. There have been very few studies dealing with pricing problems of exotic derivatives on time-changed Lévy processes in contrast to standard European derivatives. Our pricing formula is based on the Gram–Charlier expansion and the key of the formula is to find analytic treatments for computing the moments of the normalized average asset price. In numerical examples, we demonstrate that our formula give accurate values of average call options when adopting Heston’s stochastic volatility model, VG-CIR, and NIG-CIR models.     

Inflation or monetary overhang?: Planners' preferences in china

Two models, based on utility maximization of economic planners, are developed to explain the stock of households' money holdings and rate of open inflation in China for the period 1954–85. Planners' preferences are found to be biased in favour of monetary overhang. This bias was reinforced when the bargaining strength of planners vis-a-vis households was weakened and during the post-Mao reform period. This could help to explain the increase in the value of rents and level of corruption during the reform period.     

Capital Tax Competition and Cooperation with Endogenous Capital Formation

Incorporating consumption–savings choices under a general concave utility function and hence an endogenous capital supply into a model of capital tax competition, we re‐investigate Nash equilibrium and compare it with the optimum under cooperative tax policy. In contrast to the case of fixed capital supply, it is shown that if savings sufficiently increase with the interest rate, a Nash equilibrium may be more efficient than a cooperative tax policy. Therefore, the distortionary effects of capital supply are important to issues of tax policy coordination.