Robustness to the unavailability of data in block designs

We present general results for finding or boundingt _maxB , the maximum number of arbitrary whole blocks of observations which can be removed from a block design, and still leave all of the elementary treatment contrasts estimable. The block sizes may be larger than the number of treatments. The results are applied to BBDs, reinforced BIBDs and BBDs, BTIBDs, and a series of variance balanced incomplete block designs with two block sizes. Also given for most of these designs, are results fort _max, the maximum number of arbitrary, scattered observations that can become unavailable, and still leave all of the elementary treatment contrasts estimable.The work was undertaken while Dr. Whittinghill was visiting Ohio State University, and supported by a grant from the Natural Sciences Division, Colby College, Waterville, Maine.     

Some properties of the length of the shortest half

This paper discusses some properties of the length of the shortest half proposed by Rousseeuw and Leroy (1988) as a robust scale estimator.     

Testing equality of variances in the analysis of repeated measurements

The problem of comparing the precisions of two instruments using repeated measurements can be cast as an extension of the Pitman-Morgan problem of testing equality of variances of a bivariate normal distribution. Hawkins (1981) decomposes the hypothesis of equal variances in this model into two subhypotheses for which simple tests exist. For the overall hypothesis he proposes to combine the tests of the subhypotheses using Fisher's method and empirically compares the component tests and their combination with the likelihood ratio test. In this paper an attempt is made to resolve some discrepancies and puzzling conclusions in Hawkins's study and to propose simple modifications.
The new tests are compared to the tests discussed by Hawkins and to each other both in terms of the finite sample power (estimated by Monte Carlo simulation) and theoretically in terms of asymptotic relative efficiencies.     

The ARCO decision: Inroads into the per se rule under Section 1 of the Sherman Act

In this study, the author analyzes the 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision inAtlantic Richfield Company vs. USA Petroleum Company approving Atlantic Richfield’s maximum pricing plan improsed on its distributors (despite the Court’s recognition that theper se rule forbade such schemes). Theper se rule had been one of the last substantial measures of effective antitrust policy administered by enforcement authorities and the courts, perhaps even more fundamental than scrutiny of proposed mergers and predatory practices. That principle has been weakened by the ARCO decision. The author addresses some of the likely consequences of the ascendancy of the Chicago School and the NeoClassical theory generally in antitrust interpretation.     

The transformational management of conflict: A perspective from the early Christian church

An understanding of transformational leadership has been developed for many spheres of management, but not previously for organizational conflict. This paper analyzes a successful conflict mediation attempt in the early Christian church and draws from it elements of a model of the transformational management of conflict that can be applied by managers in many contemporary work organizations. The elements include (a) reframing the conflict, (b) a focus on a shared organizational vision, (c) the placement of responsibility for dispute resolution in the hands of organizational members directly and indirectly involved in conflict, and (d) the use of communication devices consistent with the desired outcome. The paper suggests skills necessary for managers to implement the model and implications for research on it.     

Locational efficiency in a federal system

A number of recent studies have concluded that differing local government tax and expenditure packages necessarily create incentives for households to locate in a non-optimal fashion. This paper shows, on the contrary, that the locational equilibrium may be optimal. For example, if migration produces no congestion costs, then as long as localities tax the locationally-fixed commodity, land, the equilibrium will be optimal. In fact, there are only two reasons why non-optimality may result: local taxes may be distortionary (by taxing the mobile rather than immobile factor), or there may be non-internalized externalities.