IS IT IS OR IS IT AIN'T MY OBLIGATION? REGIONAL DEBT IN A FISCAL FEDERATION*

This article studies the repayment of regional debt in a multiregion economy with a central authority: Who pays the obligation issued by a region? With commitment, the central government will use its economy‐wide taxation power in support of its objective to smooth distortionary taxes and consumption across regions. Absent commitment, this tool of the central government may be exploited to induce it to bail out regional government deficits. We characterize the conditions under which bailouts occur and their welfare implications. In particular, we show when the gains from a federation may outweigh the welfare costs of a bailout. We use these insights to comment on actual fiscal relations in three quite different federations: the United States, the European Union, and Argentina.     

Wealth inequality and collective action

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.     

DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY: ROBUST RULES IN MONETARY POLICY

We argue that in seeking to insure against model uncertainty, monetary policy makers are often ready to trade ex post performance for greater certainty in the outcome. They thus look for rules that although not optimal ex post, have certain properties that qualify them as robust. We apply first, Gul's approach of ‘disappointment’ aversion to describe policy makers' aversion to uncertainty and then define the properties the notion of ‘robustness’ entails. With these two tools we then link the desirability of such robust rules to the degree of policy makers' aversion to uncertainty. We thus show that provided such robust rules exist, a larger degree of disappointment aversion leads to a greater emphasis on robustness in policy implementation.     

Gross substitutes and complements: A simple generalization

We extend the gross substitutes and complements framework (Sun and Yang, 2006). Competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods exists under significantly weaker, intuitive and interpretable conditions. A generalized dynamic double-track procedure (Sun and Yang, 2008, 2009) finds the competitive equilibrium outcome.     

Sustainability-oriented tax-based own resources for the European Union: a European carbon-based flight ticket tax

The failed attempts of several European countries to introduce a flight ticket tax and the pressure on those European Union Member States still levying such a tax clearly demonstrate the limits of national aviation taxation. Assigning a carbon-based flight ticket tax to the EU level would reduce the tax enforcement problems inherent to mobile tax bases and put a stop to harmful tax competition between EU Member States. By replacing a part of national contributions to the EU budget a flight ticket tax can strengthen sustainability-orientation of the EU system of own resources. Using a new data set, which assigns to approximately 75 to 90% of the respective intra and extra EU routes flown in the year 2014 the corresponding carbon emissions per passenger, the paper estimates the expected revenue from implementing a carbon-based flight ticket tax at the EU level for carbon tax levels between 25 and 35€ per ton of carbon emissions.     

Monetary integration vs. real disintegration: single currency and productivity divergence in the euro area #

Productivity slowdown plays a prominent role in the build-up of the euro area crisis. This phenomenon affected member countries asymmetrically, causing divergence in their productivity trends. Recent research traces this divergence back to monetary integration. After reviewing the arguments that link real “disintegration” of the euro area to its monetary integration, we assess them empirically by modelling the evolution of labour productivity using a panel of sectorial data. The results indicate that monetary unification may actually have fostered divergence in productivity trends, and suggest some economic policy measures that could prevent further divergence.     

Non-grant microfinance,incentives and efficiency

I show that charging interest on funds provided by donors or investors to microfinance institutions (MFIs) can increase efficiency, the total number of loans and borrower welfare, compared to grant or concessionary funding. In a setting in which MFIs supply costly non-contractible effort, putting a price or raising the price of loanable funds strengthens the MFIs’ incentives to put effort in credit administration or monitoring, to extend more loans, and/or reduce overhead costs. This theoretical result is robust to several variations of the benchmark model allowing for an endogenous lending rate, motivated MFIs and endogenous overhead costs.     

Autocracies and regional integration: the Eurasian case

The establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010, succeeded by the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, constituted an important discontinuity in the development of post-Soviet regionalism: while the preceding organisations remained cases of ‘ink-on-paper’ regional integration, in the case of the Customs Union the members actually implemented their commitments. This creates an important theoretical challenge: the literature (which the previous experience of Eurasian regionalism was very much in line with) conjectures that authoritarian states are unable to successfully implement an economic regional integration agreement (RIA). The aim of the article is to explore the conditions under which implementation of economic RIAs by autocracies happens. We argue that the implementation is influenced by the extent of economic, social and political ties between member states, and suggest that, unlike democratic states, which are more likely to implement a RIA where there are strong economic ties, non-democracies are more likely to do so in the case of intermediate economic dependence.     

Methodological individualism: True and false

I apply Hayek’s distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ individualism to methodological individualism. Hayek traced ‘false’ individualism to Cartesian rationalism; Hayek’s rejection of Mises’ praxeology was due to its rationalist underpinnings. The first half of this paper identifies praxeology’s foundational philosophical concepts, emphasising their Cartesian nature, and illustrates how together they constitute a case for methodological individualism: intuition and deduction; reductionism; judgement; dualism. In the second half of this paper, I draw upon philosophy and cognitive science to articulate ‘Hayekian’ (N.B. not Hayek’s) alternatives to these Cartesian concepts. The Hayekian alternative allows a ‘gestalt switch’ from the individual- to the system-level perspective. I therefore suggest that methodological individualism is both true and false: true, in that economic phenomena are grounded in the actions of individuals; false, in that certain problems might be reconceived/discovered at the system-level. I finish by suggesting three avenues of research at system-level: optimisation; stigmergy; computational complexity.