Optimal internal control regulation: Standards,penalties, and leniency in enforcement

To protect investors, regulators increasingly rely on regulating firms’ internal controls over financial reporting, but they punish noncompliance only if an internal control weakness enabled accounting manipulation. In other words, enforcement is manipulation-contingent. We develop an economic model with a manager who sequentially chooses internal control quality and manipulative effort, and a welfare-maximizing regulator who determines an internal control standard, the penalty size for internal control weaknesses, and when to invoke such a penalty. Internal control regulation under manipulation-contingent enforcement not only provides incentives to invest in internal controls, but also improves manipulation deterrence when there are internal control weaknesses. The optimal regulation takes advantage of this additional deterrence effect by using a very strict internal control standard and an intermediate penalty that is only levied in the event of accounting manipulation. Overall, we rationalize why the commitment to lenient enforcement of internal control regulation is optimal.     

Employee proactivity in hotels undergoing organizational change and development

ABSTRACT

Drawing from self-regulation and goal-regulation theories, this study focuses on employee proactivity in the context of a hotel that is undergoing change and development. Two hundred twenty eight employees from a hotel undergoing restructuring in Australia took part in this study. A survey instrument was developed and the data obtained from the survey were analyzed. Results show that employee proactive envisioning, employee proactive planning, and employee proactive enacting are positively and significantly interrelated. In addition, results show that organizational climate for innovation and leader vision are positively and significantly related to employee proactive envisioning and serve as situational correlates of employee proactivity. Implications for human resource management, particularly in the hotel industry, are discussed.     

Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model with Productive Government Spending

The goal of this paper is to analyse the effects of fiscal policy upon the long-run balanced growth rate in an endogenous growth model in which sustained per capita growth is the result of productive government spending. Assuming that labour is supplied inelastically, it is shown that increases in non-productive government spending, i.e. public consumption or lump-sum transfers, always reduce the balanced growth rate, whereas there exists a growth-maximizing investment subsidy rate and income tax rate. Moreover, a rise in a tax on consumption increases economic growth if it raises public investment. If labour supply is elastic the elasticity of labour supply crucially determines the growth-maximizing income tax rate and an increase in the tax on consumption may raise or lower economic growth.     

Divestitures,wealth effects and corporate governance

We analyse the market reaction to divestiture decisions and determine the impact of corporate governance practices. We find the market reaction is significant and can be determined using internal governance mechanisms. We evaluate the determinants of the decision to sell using a control sample of firms displaying characteristics often associated with divestitures indicating that these firms may face the same incentives to divest but elect not to restructure in this manner. Our results suggest that a combination of strong internal and external governance may force managers to act in a manner that is incompatible with their personal desires.     

Too Much of a Good Thing? The Boomerang Effect of Firms’ Investments on Corporate Social Responsibility during Product Recalls

Prior research shows that a good record of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has an insurance-like effect on shareholder value in negative events. We posit and provide empirical evidence that excessive CSR activities can also cause a boomerang effect during negative events. In the setting of product recalls, we show that overinvestment in CSR has a boomerang effect on shareholder value when a company with excessive CSR activities announces a recall. Further analysis shows that the boomerang effect is exacerbated when institutional ownership is low or when customer awareness is high. Our study adds to the literature new insights on how CSR affects shareholder value during a reputation crisis.