Management of quality, capacity, and productivity at Merck.

Merck is one of the largest manufacturers of drugs in the world. With emphasis on research and development and quality, it invents, develops, and markets a wide variety of human and animal health products. Merck-Medco is the industry leader in managed pharmaceutical care. Merck's productivity increases are largely attributed to procurement, inventory policies, capacity initiatives, and strategic alliances.     

Vertical Integration in International Telecommunication System

The process of liberalization and privatization is drastically altering the links among international telecommunications carriers. The model presented in this paper analyses the international telecommunications market illustrating the effects of vertical mergers, under symbiotic production conditions, when vertically integrated and unintegrated carriers coexist. The effect of competition is analysed both in the final market and in the intermediate one where carriers compete over tariffs to get an appropriate distribution of profits. In particular, the results show the relations between final market prices, intermediate tariffs and market dimensions and their implications on profits.     

Local Market Structure and Strategic Organizational Form Choices: Evidence from Gasoline Stations

An extensive literature shows that agency issues and transaction costs impact vertical integration decisions. Another mature literature indicates that market structure influences competitive behavior. Less consideration has been given to how vertical integration and market structure may interact. I address this gap by focusing on the potential for moral hazard arising from intra-firm competition. Focusing on retail gasoline sales, I argue that when multiple stations share a common brand in a market, a vertically separated station has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative strategy that the brand-owning refiner would prefer. I empirically test this prediction using rich data, and find evidence of both such moral hazard and the desire to avoid it.     

Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions

We analyze the value of being better informed than one's rival in a two bidder, second price common value auction. Standard models of these auctions do not pin down relative bidding postures, but we show that by adding small amounts of private value information, a unique equilibrium can be restored. Additional common value information affects a bidder's payoff both directly, by increasing his information rent, and indirectly, by shifting the relative bidding posture of his opponent. Although the latter effect need not be positive, we establish broad conditions under which bidders with more information do better than their rivals. We turn to information acquisition and release and show that the desire to influence relative bidding postures can lead sellers to create new information rents (by releasing information privately to only one bidder) and bidders to forego information rents (instead choosing to gather information that a rival already has).     

Conceptualizing executive hubris: the role of (hyper‐)core self‐evaluations in strategic decision‐making

Researchers have long been interested in how an executive's self‐concept affects his or her behaviors, but have lacked a theoretically grounded, validated construct for conducting systematic inquires. The concept of ‘core self‐evaluation’ (CSE), which has been recently validated in the psychology literature, concisely encompasses and consolidates the common, overlapping portions of four previously unconnected personality dimensions: self‐esteem, self‐efficacy, locus of control, and emotional stability. CSE has great potential to provide substantial leverage for research on executive self‐concept. We review and reconcile prior research on related constructs in executive settings (including narcissism, hubris, and overconfidence) and argue that CSE should be adopted as a robust, well‐validated umbrella construct for research on executive self‐concept. Indeed, a very high level of CSE, or hyper‐CSE, aligns closely with what is often colloquially called ‘hubris.’ We anticipate that hyper‐CSE executives—who possess supreme levels of self‐confidence, self‐potency, and conviction that they will prevail—will manifest this trait in their job behaviors. We develop a set of integrated propositions that describe the implications of CSE for strategic decision processes, strategic choices, and organizational performance. Finally, we propose additional avenues for research. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Wealth Effects of Private Stock Placements under Regulation D

This paper examines the wealth effects associated with unregistered private common stock placements under the Regulation D exemption by a sample of exchange listed and over the counter firms. Unlike the negative abnormal returns associated with public equity offerings, private placements of common stocks under Regulation D are initially associated with significantly positive abnormal returns. However, these firms experience significant negative price effects in the two years following the private placements.     

Retail investors and financial advisors: New evidence on trust and advice taking heuristics

This paper investigates factors that influence trust and advice taking among retail investors when consulting with financial advisors and making real-world portfolio decisions. The data reveal that non-expert retail investors trust their advisors a lot. Trust formation appears to be well described by a simple heuristic that relies substantially on the advisor's communication style when deciding how much to trust and delegate investment decisions. Portfolio decisions appear to depend more on investors' perceptions about the investor–advisor relationship than on the risk and return characteristics of investments comprising the portfolio choice set. This evidence supports Pentland's (2008) “honest signals” as a more powerful mechanism underlying investor trust than standard metrics based on past performance. Trust and advice-taking heuristics can be interpreted as well adapted to the environment of the non-profit bank cooperatives in which they are observed, implying that trusting based on simple honest signals, although vulnerable to exploitation, can be interpreted as ecologically rational. Features of the investor's environment typical of non-profit cooperative banks imply that the heuristics investors use can perform rather well without requiring investment experience or financial sophistication, which most investors in our sample are well aware they lack.