Rigidity in SME export commencement decisions

In an increasingly globalised world, firms generally have become more internationalised utilising a range of different modes of operation. In the case of small-medium sized enterprises (SMEs), exporting is the favoured mode of international market entry, at least in the early stages of internationalisation, and many governments have supported SME exports through export promotion policies because of the importance of SMEs in employment creation. However, in spite of this policy focus, in most countries, the proportional involvement of SMEs in exporting remains low, which raises an important question as to what factors are inhibiting firms that are successful domestically from exporting. In addressing this question, much scholarly research has focused on the broad concept of ‘export barriers’. These barriers, for example, tariffs, quotas and administrative obstacles, are seen as a primary source of export reluctance. This paper takes a different approach to previous studies and proposes that a firm's resistance to exporting can be better understood through an analysis of the behavioural decision process of firms in line with the Uppsala internationalisation model. We propose ‘lateral rigidity’, first introduced in the literature in the 1970s, as an important concept in export commencement. By applying factor analysis to a survey of Australian SMEs, we provide a measurement model for lateral rigidity, revealing its important factors and thus strengthening understanding of firms' export commencement decisions. We conclude by drawing implications for internationalisation theory, practice and public policy and suggesting ways to extend this work through future research.     

Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods

In a market in which each trader's initial endowment is one unit of an indivisible good, there exists an incentive compatible procedure for reaching a competitive allocation. This contrasts with some recent results for similar problems.     

Unraveling yields inefficient matchings: evidence from post‐season college football bowls

Many markets have “unraveled” and experienced inefficient, early, dispersed transactions, and subsequently developed institutions to delay transaction timing. It has previously proved difficult, however, to measure and identify the resulting efficiency gains. Prior to 1992, college football teams were matched for post‐season play up to several weeks before the end of the regular season. Since 1992, the market has reorganized to postpone this matching. We show that the matching of teams affects efficiency as measured by the resulting television viewership, and that the reorganization promoted more efficient matching, chiefly as a result of the increased ability of later matching to produce “championship” games.