The Effect of Windfall Gains on the Sunk-Cost Effect

Prior research has extensively documented the sunk-cost effect – an irrational attention to irrecoverable past costs while making pending investment or consumption decisions. In a series of experiments, we show that the sunk-cost effect weakens and sometimes disappears when consumers receive a windfall (unexpected) income at the time of making a decision. This unbudgeted income allows consumers to write off their past losses, thereby eliminating the pressure to consume in order to satisfactorily close the account. We further show that the similarity between the nature of the windfall income and the past sunk-cost moderates this relationship. More generally, we argue that mental accounts can be flexible and consumers may have discretion in moving money between different mental accounts.     

专题：医改之后品牌与高毛利的终端传播难题如何解决：医药传播不需要枯燥乏味

在全球范围内,医药传播的独特属性已经得到了充分的关注。国内已经涌现不少专业从事医药传播的广告与策划公司。医改之后,新政给医药品牌的传播带来了一系列新问题,也创造了新的机遇。     

Separation of Ownership from Control and Acquiring Firm Performance: The Case of Family Ownership in Canada

Abstract:   This study investigates the relationship between ownership structure and acquiring firm performance. A large proportion of Canadian public companies have controlling shareholders (families) that often exercise control over voting rights while holding a small fraction of the cash flow rights. This is achieved through the concurrent use of dual class voting shares and stock pyramids. Many suggest that these ownership structures involve larger agency costs than those imposed by dispersed ownership structures and that they distort corporate decisions with respect to investment choices such as acquisitions. We find that average acquiring firm announcement period abnormal returns for our sample of 327 Canadian transactions are positive over the 1998–2002 period. Cash deals, acquisitions of unlisted targets and cross‐border deals have a positive impact on value creation. Governance mechanisms (outside block‐holders, unrelated directors and small board size) also have a positive influence on the acquiring firm performance. Further, the positive abnormal returns are greater for family firms. We do not find that separation of ownership and control has a negative impact on performance. These results suggest that, contrary to other jurisdictions offering poor minority shareholder protection or poor corporate governance, separation of control and ownership is not viewed as leading to value destroying mergers and acquisitions, i.e., market participants do not perceive families as using M&A to obtain private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. We do find a non‐monotonic relationship between ownership level and acquiring firm abnormal returns. Ownership of a majority of the cash flow rights has a negative impact on announcement returns. This is consistent with the view that large shareholders may undertake less risky projects as their wealth invested in the firm increases.     

Economics, Psychology, and Social Dynamics of Consumer Bidding in Auctions

With increasing numbers of consumers in auction marketplaces, we highlight some recent approaches that bring additional economic, social, and psychological factors to bear on existing economic theory to better understand and explain consumers' behavior in auctions. We also highlight specific research streams that could contribute towards enriching existing economic models of bidding behavior in emerging market mechanisms. This paper is based on the special session at the 6th Triennial Invitational Choice Symposium, University of Colorado Boulder, June 2004 (co-chaired by the first two authors).     

Enhancing Security Value by Ownership Restrictions: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

We present new evidence from a natural experiment to show circumstances in which ownership restrictions can enhance value. Our evidence is based on multiple restricted bond issues by an emerging market issuer at 150 basis points lower than comparable bonds, resulting in a billion dollars saving. This is intriguing: how can an emerging market issuer with junk bond ratings obtain such low yields? We argue ownership restrictions enhance value since they enable an issuer to precommit to renegotiate efficiently with a favored clientele in the potential default states, thereby circumventing deadweight costs of prolonged negotiations, particularly when the restricted clientele also values the underlying collateral higher than other investors. Ownership restrictions can also result in a transfer of value from holders of unrestricted bonds to holders of restricted bonds because of implicit seniority of the latter. We empirically test and find support for both value enhancement and value transfer and show robustness to several alternative explanations. Our evidence suggests that firms can benefit from designing securities with ownership restrictions, by offering new securities exclusively to investors who value them the most.