Customer Satisfaction with E-Retailers: The Role of Product Type in the Relative Importance of Attributes

It is of strategic importance for e-retailers to allocate their resources to various service attributes according to their relative importance. How does one determine the relative importance of different service attributes? Does the relative importance of different service attributes remain the same across different product categories? These questions must be addressed by researchers and e-retailers. Since customer ratings for service attributes are highly correlated, modeling methods other than traditional regression models should be used to analyze the relative importance of service attributes to overall customer satisfaction. As such, this article utilizes neural networks in order to study the relative importance of e-retailer service attributes. Importantly, this article shows that the relative importance of e-retailer service attributes varies across different product categories (i.e., convenience, shopping, and specialty goods).     

Cumulative Discrete Choice

We present a discrete choice model in which a consumer's impression of each alternative is based on her memory of past experience with this choice, and is stochastically updated whenever the alternative is chosen. The consumer remembers a cumulative utility index per alternative, and, when an alternative is chosen, the index is updated by the addition of a random variable, interpreted as instantaneous utility. We prove that the frequencies of choice converge, with probability 1, to limit frequencies, which can be computed from the model's parameters.     

On the Systemic Fragility of Finance‐Led Growth

The paper sets up a model of economic crisis by investigating the role played by movement in asset price as a driver of the dynamic interaction between the real and the financial sectors. Such movement influences income determination in the real economy in the short period through aggregate demand leading to the emergence of two macroeconomic regimes. A short period flow model, underpinned by the stock flow consistent accounting framework, is developed to formalize the dynamics of interaction between real and financial sectors mediated by movement in asset price, generates bistability, abrupt crashes, and systemic fragility in the macroeconomic regimes.     

Allocating a hybrid retailer's assortment across retail stores: Bricks-and-mortar vs online

This paper develops an IP model to determine item allocation for a hybrid retailer's store network, comprising bricks-and-mortar and online stores. Products with low carrying costs are distributed between the bricks-and-mortar stores and the online store. Products with high carrying costs can be withdrawn from the bricks-and-mortar stores and made available exclusively at the online store where the inventory carrying costs are comparatively lower. This strategy assists the hybrid retailer to not only improve the profitability of its bricks- and-mortar stores but also to retain the custom of the market segment that is loyal to the items withdrawn from the traditional stores. In this framework, the online channel complements rather than competes with traditional channels. This model is used to conduct an extensive simulation study to analyze the impact of important business factors on system profitability.     

Strategic trade and delegated competition

Strategic trade theory has been criticized on the grounds that its predictions are overly sensitive to modeling assumptions. Applying recent results in duopoly theory, this paper considers three-stage games in which governments choose subsidies, firms' owners choose incentive schemes for their managers, and then the managers compete in the product market. We show that if firms' owners have sufficient control over their managers' behavior, then the optimal strategic trade policy does not depend on the mode of product-market competition, i.e., whether firms compete by setting prices or quantities.     

Epistemic communities and the global alliance against tobacco marketing

The World Health Organization's (WHO's) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is a major blow to the worldwide expansion strategies and marketing practices of transnational tobacco companies. As expected, the industry vehemently opposed the treaty, lobbying instead for voluntary agreements and regulation by the market. However, in spite of bitter and persistent opposition by the tobacco industry, the FCTC was adopted by WHO. If the tobacco industry “lost” its battle to prevent FCTC from being institutionalized, who “won” and how? Our research suggests that the efforts of the epistemic community—a like‐minded network of professionals whose authoritative claim to consensual knowledge provides them with a unique source of power in public policy decision making—won the battle by being able to better convince the decision makers as to the needs of the FCTC by relying on, and successfully disseminating, its knowledge, expertise, and ideas. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

International Evidence on the Stability of the Optimizing IS Equation*

We provide international evidence on the issue of whether the optimizing IS equation is more stable than a backward‐looking alternative. This evidence consists of estimates of IS equations on quarterly data for the UK and Australia, both for the full sample of the last 40 years and for the period following major monetary policy shifts in 1979–80. Results suggest the parameters in the optimizing IS equations are more empirically stable than those of the backward‐looking alternative. The use of dynamic general equilibrium modelling in empirical work does deliver material benefits, in the form of equations more suitable for policy analysis.     

How do family ownership,control and management affect firm value?

Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994–2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms.     

Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence

This paper investigates the role of venture capitalists. We view their “raison d’être” as their ability to reduce the cost of informational asymmetries. Our theoretical framework focuses on two major forms of asymmetric information: “hidden information” (leading to adverse selection) and “hidden action” (leading to moral hazard). Our theoretical analysis suggests four empirical predictions.1. Venture capitalists operate in environments where their relative efficiency in selecting and monitoring investments gives them a comparative advantage over other investors. This suggests strong industry effects in venture capital investments. Venture capitalists should be prominent in industries where informational concerns are important, such as biotechnology, computer software, etc., rather than in “routine” start-ups such as restaurants, retail outlets, etc. The latter are risky, in that returns show high variance, but they are relatively easy to monitor by conventional financial intermediaries.2. Within the class of projects where venture capitalists have an advantage, they will still prefer projects where monitoring and selection costs are relatively low or where the costs of informational asymmetry are less severe. Thus, within a given industry where venture capitalists would be expected to focus, we would also expect venture capitalists to favor firms with some track records over pure start-ups. To clarify the distinction between point 1 and point 2, note that point 1 states that if we look across investors, we will see that venture capitalists will be more concentrated in areas characterized by significant informational asymmetry. Point 2 says that if we look across investment opportunities, venture capitalists will still favor those situations which provide better information (as will all other investors). Thus venture capitalists perceive informational asymmetries as costly, but they perceive them as less costly than do other investors.3. If informational asymmetries are important, then the ability of the venture capitalist to “exit” may be significantly affected. Ideally, venture capitalists will sell off their share in the venture after it “goes public” on a stock exchange. If, however, venture investments are made in situations where informational asymmetries are important, it may be difficult to sell shares in a public market where most investors are relatively uninformed. This concern invokes two natural reactions. One is that many “exits” would take place through sales to informed investors, such as to other firms in the same industry or to the venture’s own management or owners. A second reaction is that venture capitalists might try to acquire reputations for presenting good quality ventures in public offerings. Therefore, we might expect that the exits that occur in initial public offerings would be drawn from the better-performing ventures.4. Finally, informational asymmetries suggest that owner-managers will perform best when they have a large stake in the venture. Therefore, we can expect entrepreneurial firms in which venture capitalists own a large share to perform less well than other ventures. This is moral hazard problem, as higher values of a venture capitalist’s share reduce the incentives of the entrepreneur to provide effort. Nevertheless, it might still be best in a given situation for the venture capitalist to take on a high ownership share, since this might be the only way of getting sufficient financial capital into the firm. However, we would still expect a negative correlation between the venture capital ownership share and firm performance.Our empirical examination of Canadian venture capital shows that these predictions are consistent with the data. In particular, there are significant industry effects in the data, with venture capitalists having disproportionate representation in industries that are thought to have high levels of informational asymmetry. Secondly, venture capitalists favor later stage investment to start-up investment. Third, most exit is through “insider” sales, particularly management buyouts, acquisitions by third parties, rather than IPOs. However, IPOs have higher returns than other forms of exit. In addition, the data exhibit the negative relationship between the extent of venture capital ownership and firm performance predicted by our analysis.