‘Sweet deals’: State-owned enterprises,corruption and repeated contracts in public procurement

We show how a price analysis of stable relations between customer and supplier in the public procurement of homogeneous goods can help differentiate opportunistic from honest behaviour among economic agents. We consider two types of stable relations: repeated procurements and connections based on the state ownership of suppliers. On the basis of a large dataset on the procurement of granulated sugar in Russia from 2011 to 2013, we find that for private suppliers, prices of repeated contracts were lower compared to one-time deals when procured through more transparent procedures and higher when procured through non-transparent procedures. For non-transparent procedures, we observe significant overpricing of contracts with state-owned suppliers compared to private suppliers, especially in the case of repeated contracts, whereas for competitive e-auctions, there is only a small difference between the contract prices of state-owned suppliers and private suppliers.     

Why does democracy need education?

Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting and organizing. In the battle between democracy and dictatorship, democracy has a wide potential base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders. Dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower base. As education raises the benefits of civic engagement, it raises participation in support of a broad-based regime (democracy) relative to that in support of a narrow-based regime (dictatorship). This increases the likelihood of successful democratic revolutions against dictatorships, and reduces that of successful anti-democratic coups.     

Power laws in firm size and openness to trade: Measurement and implications

Existing estimates of power laws in firm size typically ignore the impact of international trade. Using a simple theoretical framework, we show that international trade systematically affects the distribution of firm size: the power law exponent among exporting firms should be strictly lower in absolute value than the power law exponent among non-exporting firms. We use a dataset of French firms to demonstrate that this prediction is strongly supported by the data, both for the economy as a whole and at the industry level. Furthermore, the differences between power law coefficients for exporters and non-exporters are larger in sectors that are more open to trade. While estimates of power law exponents have been used to pin down parameters in theoretical and quantitative models, our analysis implies that the existing estimates are systematically lower than the true values. We propose two simple ways of estimating power law parameters that take explicit account of exporting behavior.     

Evolution of corporate governance in Russia: government policy vs. real incentives of economic agents

This article is devoted to analysing the evolution of corporate governance mechanisms in Russia. Special attention is paid to the causes of dramatic discrepancies between the expected outputs of institutional reforms implemented by the Russian government with World Bank and IMF support and the actual behaviour of Russian companies. Why was the model of interaction between enterprises and investors, owners and managers, which had been successful in other countries, rejected by Russian business in the 1990s? And how can we evaluate certain positive changes that have occurred recently in corporate policies of major Russian companies? These questions are answered on the bases of analysis of economic agents' motivation at different stages of development of corporate structures in Russia. The article argues that the need for comprehensive organisational and technological restructuring of enterprises led to the need for a concentrated ownership structure. The formation of such a structure in the late 1990s (which occurred, in fact, contrary to the government's activities) created preconditions for extending the time horizon of dominant owners and managers and for positive qualitative changes in the relations between major Russian companies and their shareholders and investors.