制胜多边平台

正一般来说,参与方越多越好。不过,更多方的参与者也会带来"最小公分母"的问题——协调更多方不同的述求,会在一定程度上制约多边平台实现开拓性创新多多边平台(Multisided platforms,MSPs)通过技术、产品或服务为两个及以上的客户群体提供直接互动,并由此创造价值。典型例子有阿里巴巴、易趣、淘宝、日本乐天(服务采购买卖双方)、空中食宿Airbnb(住宅业主与租客)、Uber打车App(专业司机与乘客)、脸谱网(用户、广告商、第三方游戏或内容开发商以及附属的第三方网站)、苹果的iOS(应用程序开发商和用户)、     

The status of workers and platforms in the sharing economy

We consider whether workers who provide their services through online platforms, such as Handy and Uber, should be classified as independent contractors or employees. Using a formal economic model, we show how being too strict or too liberal in classifying workers as independent contractors (relative to the actual degree of control workers have) can be detrimental, not just to firms and welfare, but sometimes to the workers themselves. We also use the model to explore the extent to which an intermediate classification of workers between employees and independent contractors may lead to better outcomes. The intermediate classification is meant to apply to firms that retain control of some actions while their workers control others, as is the case for many online platforms.     

Pricing and commitment by two‐sided platforms

I study pricing and commitment by platforms in two‐sided markets with the following characteristics: (i) platforms are essential bottleneck inputs for buyers and sellers transacting with each other; (ii) sellers arrive before buyers; and (iii) platforms can charge both fixed fees and variable fees (royalties). I show that a monopoly platform may prefer not to commit to the price it will charge buyers at the same time it announces its seller price if it faces unfavorable seller expectations. With competing platforms, commitment makes the existence of an exclusive equilibrium (in which sellers register with only one platform) less likely, but it has no impact on multi‐homing equilibria (in which sellers support both platforms) whenever these exist.     

Context effects: A representation of choices from categories

This paper studies a model of reference-dependent choice from sets of options grouped into categories. The proposed model is consistent with experimental evidence documenting context effects in a variety of choice situations. In our model, the reference point for any given category is subjective, and corresponds to the least preferred element in the category under consideration. Every object in a category is evaluated relative to the corresponding reference point; this may distort the objective ranking of options across different categories, and thus possibly give rise to a context-effects bias. The resulting representation is essentially unique. We also provide an economic application of the preferences that we axiomatize to principal-agent models. We show how sellers facing consumers exhibiting the context-effects bias can increase their profits by exploiting their bounded rationality.     

Risk processes analyzed as fluid queues

This paper presents the Laplace transform of the time until ruin for a fairly general risk model. The model includes both the classical and most Sparre-Andersen risk models with phase-distributed claim amounts as special cases. It also allows for correlated arrival processes, and claim sizes that depend upon environmental factors such as periods of contagion. The paper exploits the relationship between the surplus process and fluid queues, where a number of recent developments have provided the basis for our analysis.     

Alliances and corporate governance

We study the link between a firm's quality of governance and its alliance activity. We consider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company’ Chief Executive Officer overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex ante motivate division managers. We show that well-governed firms are more likely to avail themselves of this technology to anticipate ex post commitment problems and resolve them. The role of governance is particularly important when the commitment problems are more acute, such as for significantly risky/long-horizon projects (“longshots”) or firms more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources (conglomerates), as well as in the absence of alternative disciplining devices (e.g., low product market competition). Governance also mitigates agency issues between alliance partners; dominant alliance partners agree to a more equal split of power with junior partners that are better governed. An “experiment” that induces cross-sectional variation in the cost of the alliance commitment technology provides evidence of a causal link between governance and alliances.     

The rocky road to modernity: 20 years of the Russian capital market

From a modest start almost 20 years ago, the Russian financial market has emerged as a major force in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This article offers a retrospective account of the two decades of development of the financial sector in Russia, with an emphasis on the securities market; outlines the main stages in its development; and proposes an assessment of the capital market in comparison to other international markets. We conclude with an overview of the market's performance during the current financial crisis. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Barter in the Russian Economy: Classifications and Implications (Evidence from Case Study Analyses)

This article addresses Russia's barter economy. Using interview data, it examines the mechanics of barter settlements and classifies the main types of non-monetary transactions. The major reason for barter is lack of a competitive monetary system. In the 1990s barter represented a specific vehicle to perform settlements. Barter itself is not a way to evade taxes or to defraud enterprises of assets. But barter changed the motivation of enterprises and led to systematic distortion of accounting data. The low transparency of the barter economy creates barriers for investment and restructuring. The barter economy is an insider's economy. The lack of affiliated entity regulation and mechanisms for disclosure of transactions with related parties stimulates insiders to criminal application of barter and monetary surrogates. Barter has become a profitable business for a number of important economic agents including financial intermediaries affiliated with top managers of the biggest privatised enterprises and government agencies.