Book Reviews

Indonesia: The Transmigration Program in Perspective, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1988, pp. 227 + xlii. Paper: US$17.00.

William Segers, Changing Economy in Indonesia, Vol. 8, Manufacturing Industry 1870–1942, Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1988, pp. 224. Dfl. 48.00.

Leslie Castle and Christopher Findlay (Eds), Pacific Trade in Services, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1988, pp. 294 + Xiv. Paper: 24.95; Cloth: $39.95.     

A Citation Analysis of Management and Organization Research in the Chinese Context: 1984–1999

Since modern China was closed to the outside world until 1979, research on management issues within organizations operating in the Chinese context is a relatively recent phenomenon. In this study, we analyzed this body of research by performing a citation analysis on 226 research articles on this topic published in 20 leading English language academic journals over the past 16 years (1984–1999). The citation impact analysis identified the 52 most cited articles and the academic journals as well as the most influential authors on this research. We examined the issues or topics in these 52 influential articles and suggest some directions for future research.     

Do lack of transparency and enforcement undermine international risk-sharing?

This paper studies the extent to which poor institutions compromise risk-sharing. We model a multilateral organization as a social contract that provides insurance to members. Countries privately observe the realization of a performance variable with a verification cost that differs across countries, reflecting the “transparency” of institutions. When the level of transparency is exogenous, the optimal contract provides complete expected risk sharing across countries and states. Poor transparency and enforcement reduce consumption and result in insurance rationing. When a country can increase transparency endogenously, this generates an externality and moral hazard. We first characterize the outcome when the multilateral agency can influence members’ institutions by choosing the countries’ level of effort. Next we derive a tax/subsidy scheme that can induce countries to choose the socially optimal level. JEL Classification Numbers D8, F3 We are grateful to Biung-Ghi Ju, Ted Juhl, Donald Lien, Joseph Sicilian and Jianbo Zhang for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to an anonymous referee for comments that improved the paper substantially.     

Antecedents and Consequences of Goal Incongruity on New Product Development in Five Countries: A Marketing View

This article examines an important challenge to effective cross-functional integration: goal incongruity among marketing, research and development (R&D), and manufacturing in new product development. We examine the effect of this incongruity as perceived by the marketing function on three components of cross-functional integration: the harmony of cross-functional relationships, the quality of cross-functional information, and the level of cross-functional involvement. We also examine how two types of managerially controllable variables affect goal incongruity: (1) factors that motivate functions to develop common goals; and (2) factors that facilitate the formation of such goals. We give special attention to the effect of national culture on the formation of common goals. Data collected from marketing managers in 1,083 firms in five culturally distinct areas—-the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Hong Kong (a special administrative region of China), and mainland China—are used to test the hypothesized relationships. Our results underscore the importance of people-side issues, and of national culture, in cross-functional integration. Perceived goal incongruity among marketing, R&D, and manufacturing impairs all three components of cross-functional integration. In United States and British firms, goal incongruity generally is attributed to motivational factors and in Japan and Hong Kong to facilitative factors. Finally, our results show that the two types of managerially controllable variables interact. For example, joint rewards and job rotation strengthen each other's tendency to reduce goal incongruity in all five samples. This suggests that job rotation promotes the development of joint goals more effectively when it is accompanied by a joint reward system.     

Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

This paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness. I show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group. But, group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare. Not publishing individuals' votes, raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare. If the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers, the incentive to build a reputation is greater, but expected social welfare may be higher or lower.     

Reshaping internal labour markets in the National Health Service: new prospects for pay and training for lower skilled service workers?

This article considers how two new strategies for improving pay and skills development have been used in the UK National Health Service (NHS) to develop labour capacity and capability by stimulating the development of relatively coherent internal labour markets for workers at the lower end of the occupational hierarchy. Drawing on data from 13 NHS trusts, we scrutinise the implications of the new national pay system, Agenda for Change, for healthcare assistants and cleaners and find substantial one‐off improvements in pay for these groups as a direct result of the new national pay framework. However, the detailed case‐study data reveal there is considerable uncertainty regarding the extent, depth and durability of pay improvements. In particular, opportunities for pay progression in reward for acquisition of new skills and qualifications were more variable as a result of the stronger role of management choice and strategy at the organisational level in implementing the new national strategy for skills development, the Skills Escalator. Moreover, management strategy shaped the demand for, and distribution of, intermediate‐level skills (through new job design, for example), which was critical to the effectiveness of trusts in pulling lower grade employees up through an internal career trajectory.     

Quit behavior and the role of job protection

Job protection reduces job turnover by changing firms' hiring and firing decisions. Yet the effect of job protection on workers' quit decisions and post-quit outcomes is still unknown. We present the first evidence using individual panel data from 12 European countries, which differ both in worker turnover rates and in the level of job protection. We find that workers are less likely to quit their job in countries with more job protection, and those workers who quit receive higher wages compared to stayers. This evidence can be explained by increased mobility costs associated with higher expected risk of post-quit layoff and job mismatch.