Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms

This paper reports the results of over 130 auctions conducted under controlled conditions to examine the robustness of several auction mechanisms to allocate multiple objects. The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction over a variety of demand conditions. In test environments created to check only the minimum competency of the procedures, the simultaneous discrete auction process produces highly efficient allocations, approaching levels similar to those found with a continuous form of the auction, and it outperforms a sequential auction. However, in environments created to stress test the procedures, a combinatorial auction outperforms the simultaneous discrete auction.     

Pareto optimality in continuous-time OLG economies

The aim of this paper is the achievement of a complete characterization of the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria for deterministic, pure exchange, continuous-time economies with a countable number of overlapping generations, where each consumer’s life-span consists in a bounded interval of time. For such an environment, we obtain separate sufficient and necessary conditions for Pareto optimality in the form of the Cass’ criterion, that is, in terms of the equilibrium prices. However, these conditions are not equivalent in general. Therefore, in order to get that equivalence we are compelled to impose certain restrictions, either on consumers’ lifetimes, assuming that all of them have the same longevity, or on the dynamic behaviour of relative intertemporal equilibrium prices. In both cases, we are able to derive a single condition that is sufficient and necessary for efficiency, thus achieving full characterizations.     

Multidimensionality and Renegotiation: Evidence from Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions in Latin America

Multidimensional auctions are a natural, practical solution when governments pursue more than one objective in their public-private-partnership transactions. However, multi-criteria auctions seem difficult to implement and vulnerable to corruption and opportunistic behavior of both parties involved. Using data from road and railway concessions in Latin America, the paper examines the probability of renegotiation in connection with the selected award criteria. It shows that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional format when the need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment, is high. But more renegotiations would likely happen when the multidimensional format is used. Good governance, particularly regulatory quality and anti-corruption policies, can mitigate the renegotiation problem.     

Explaining Differences in Milk Quota Values: The Role of Economic Efficiency

This article explores the relationship between milk quota values and economic efficiency in order to analyze government interventions in quota allocations among producers. For this purpose, we estimate quota values using a panel of Spanish dairy farms. Quota values are then decomposed into economic efficiency, price, and scale effects in order to assess the relative influence of these factors. We find that efficiency is important in explaining quota values but is uncorrelated with observable farm characteristics. This casts doubts on the government's ability to allocate quotas to efficient farms.     

The fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.     

Dealing with demand forecasting games in transport privatization

Privatization has increased the number of players in the decision-making process for major transport investment decisions. The main argument of this paper is that this fragmentation is creating opportunities for strategic decision-making by each actor and that this is particularly obvious in the context of demand forecasting. This paper explores some of the specific causes and consequences of this new situation, including the perverse incentives, linked to the diversity of the objectives across the actors and to the risk allocation induced by the regulatory regime. It illustrates the issues and possible solutions from a wide range of modal and country experiences. In particular, it discusses the role of the newly independent sector regulators in reconciling these diverse goals and their limitations in view of the major information asymmetries problems they face.     

现代各种不同的维修管理

介绍当代各种不同的维修管理方法,以及在现代生产系统中造成维修管理复杂性的因素及其特征。对维修管理的方法及其框架这两个概念加以定义。详细说明维修活动的过程是由企业活动水平来划分,并提出一个结构,保证正确支持当前的管理人员,根据应用于维修的信息技术,现代维修工程的作用,以及根据维修方面公关能力的需求,对所需要的功能进行分类。     

Organizational structure and earnings quality of private and public firms

Review of Accounting Studies - We examine how heterogeneity in organizational structure affects private firm earnings quality in the European Union. Organizational structure refers to whether the...