Does liberalization reduce agency costs? Evidence from the Indian banking sector

On February 16, 2002, the Reserve Bank of India issued a circular that signaled a policy liberalization facilitating acquisition of private sector banks in India by foreign entities. Portfolios of private sector and nationalized banks posted significant value gains in the days surrounding the announcement. The gains by private sector banks were almost double those of nationalized banks. We further analyze the firm specific abnormal returns using cross-sectional regressions and find a significant relation between firm-specific abnormal returns and factors typically associated with a bank’s potential for takeover. These results provide the first empirical support for Stulz’s hypothesis that one cause of the valuation gains associated with liberalization is the expected gain from a reduction of agency costs.     

The Impact of Capital Expenditures on Property Performance in Commercial Real Estate

Using a sample of 47,260 annual and 12,276 unique property observations during 2000–2011 we analyze the relationship between capital expenditures and performance by employing 2SLS models, in which capital expenditures are modeled as a function of property characteristics (age, square footage, occupancy rate, leverage, leasing commissions, lagged returns and property type), market conditions (interest rates, credit spread and standard deviation of cap rates) and property fixed effects. Our results reveal that while capital expenditures are mostly idiosyncratic and related to unique property characteristics, they are a significant determinant of property returns. We find persistently strong positive relationship between capital expenditures and excess NPI returns when controlling for the endogeneity of capital expenditures for industrial, office and retail properties. A further analysis reveals that this relationship is driven by the positive impact of building improvements and building expansions, while returns in all property types do not fully adjust to account for tenant improvements.     

CEO Ownership and Discretionary Investments

Abstract:  This study investigates empirically the relationship between CEO ownership and discretionary investments such as R&D and capital expenditures. We assert that the under-investment problem is high for R&D-intensive projects, while the over-investment problem is high for capital expenditures because of differences in risk between the two types of investments. Building on the linkages between investments and investment-related agency problems, we hypothesize that the relationship between CEO ownership and investments depends on whether increasing ownership mitigates or exacerbates the under- or over-investment problem. We find a non-linear association between CEO stock ownership and R&D investments; R&D investments increase and then decline across increasing levels of ownership. Further, we find that R&D investments and CEO stock options are positively associated at high levels of option holdings. In contrast, capital expenditures do not vary with CEO ownership (stock or options). Finally, consistent with our underlying assumption, we find that the influence of R&D investments on future firm risk is significantly larger than that of capital expenditures. Our findings indicate that managerial risk aversion affects discretionary investments.     

R&D in Indian manufacturing enterprises: what shapes it?

The article examines the factors influencing research and development (R&D) in manufacturing entities. Using data on a large sample of companies for the period 1995–2007, the finding indicates that large companies have a higher probability of pursuing R&D, although with lower intensity. In terms of magnitudes, a 10% increase in firm size raises R&D intensity by roughly 0.6%. Both the intensity and the probability of undertaking R&D initially declines for older firms. Outward orientation, and especially foreign currency earnings, has a significant bearing on R&D efforts. R&D efforts are also found to vary significantly across firm ownership.     

Strategic budgets in sequential elimination contests

We study a sequential elimination contest where contestants (e.g., campaigns) spend resources that are provided by strategic players called backers (e.g., donors). In the unique symmetric equilibrium, backers initially provide small budgets, increasing their contributions only if their contestant wins the preliminary round. If backers are only allowed to provide budgets at the start of the game, as opposed to before each round, spending is higher. When unspent resources are refunded to the backer, total spending is higher than when all resources are sunk costs. We also study an extension of the model with asymmetric players.     

Does Globalisation Affect Crime? Theory and Evidence

Globalisation sceptics argue that trade liberalisation has high social costs, including an increase in expropriative behaviour such as civil conflict, coercion of labour and crime. We show that a theoretical relationship between trade and expropriation exists, but the sign differs for developed and developing economies. We verify this empirically using data on crime rates. Specifically, we find that trade liberalisation, as measured by both higher openness and lower import duty rates, tends to increase burglaries and theft in very labour‐abundant countries. For other countries, however, we find that trade liberalisation has either a small negative effect on crime or no effect, depending on the country's capital abundance.