Towards a synthesis of theories of State failure

This paper examines the three main categories of State intervention. Before approaching the analysis of intervention, I attempt to shed light on the forming of social choices and the decisions of State rulers. I show how market process and property rights solve problems pertaining to social choice, which in turn stems from the application of the majority rule in a democratic society. Along these lines I view how the State fails to regulate externalities, stabilize the economy and redistribute income. For this purpose the following research applies the theory of property rights, the theory of rational expectations and the theory of public choice respectively to each of the above problems. The conclusion points to a synthesis of these theories, offering a highly demonstrative categorical framework of critique against State intervention. The argument claims that independent non-collective institutions work better than State intervention. (JEL: P16, D72, H23)     

Corporate governance in family-controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on performance in publicly traded Taiwanese firms that are controlled by founding families. Results show that when shares are owned by institutional investors, particularly foreign financial institutions, firms perform better. However, where families are the major shareholders, this is not the case. In addition, boards that are independent of the financial interests of the founding family have a positive impact on performance, whether measured by accounting ratios, operating performance or the stock market. (JEL: P52, G32)     

The role of cognitive ability and personality traits for men and women in gift exchange outcomes

We examine the role of cognitive ability and personality traits in a gift exchange experiment. Controlling for cognitive ability and personality characteristics, men offer higher wages than women, and men and women with greater cognitive ability and greater agreeableness on the Big Five personality scale offer higher wages as well. Men provide greater effort than women do, and respond to higher wage rates with greater increases in effort. For both genders, one standard deviation increases in agreeableness and in wages generate similar increases in effort. Serious biases arise from omitting cognitive ability and pooling men and women.     

Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games: experimental evidence on the role of precedents

We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that historical precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two repeated games. We find that a precedent for efficient play in the repeated Stag Hunt game does not carry over to the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game despite the possibility that efficient play can be sustained as an equilibrium of the indefinitely repeated game. Similarly, a precedent for inefficient play in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game does not extend to the repeated Stag Hunt game. We conclude that equilibrium selection between similar repeated games may have less to do with historical precedents and might instead depend more on strategic considerations associated with the different payoffs of these similar repeated games.     

Integrated bio-economic models as tools to support land-use decision making: a review of potential and limitations

Bio-economic modelling has become a useful tool for anticipating the outcomes of policies and technologies before their implementation. Advances in mathematical programming have made it possible to build more comprehensive models. In an overview of recent studies about bio-economic models applied to land-use problems in agriculture and forestry, we evaluated how aspects such as uncertainty, multiple objective functions, system dynamics and time have been incorporated into models. We found that single objective models were more frequently applied at the farm level, while multiple objective modelling has been applied to meet concerns at the landscape level. Among the objectives, social aspects are seldom represented in all models, when being compared to economic and environmental aspects. The integration of uncertainty is occasionally a topic, while stochastic approaches are more frequently applied than non-stochastic robust methods. Most multiple-objective models do not integrate uncertainty or sequential decision making. Static approaches continue to be more recurrent than truly dynamic models. Even though integrating multiple aspects may enhance our understanding of a system; it involves a tradeoff between complexity and robustness of the results obtained. Land-use models have to address this balance between complexity and robustness in order to evolve towards robust multiple-objective spatial optimization as a prerequisite to achieve sustainability goals.     

Interethnic relations,informal trading networks,and social integration: imitation,habits, and social evolution

The ethnically homogeneous middleman groups (EHMGs), which are informal trading networks, are ubiquitous in less-developed economies where the legal infrastructure for contract enforcement is not well developed. This paper develops a formal model of social interaction among members of the EHMG as well as in more general situations in a multi-ethnic or multi-cultural society consisting of identifiable ethnic or linguistic groups. Behavioral patterns are transmitted between generations and altered via imitation in social contacts. The model demonstrates how different discriminatory behavioral patterns can evolve and persist over time. One result is that the trust between such groups can increase due to a higher frequency of inter-group contacts. In concluding the paper, we speculate about how the model can be expanded to include changes in legal structures, especially contract law. This could lead to an increase in the trust between the different groups.     

Balancing Power Markets in Germany: Timing Matters

This paper analyzes timing issues on the German balancing power market. We focus the analysis on the length of the bidding period, i.e. the length of the time period a supplier has to provide balancing power capacities, and the question of how far before the beginning of a bidding period the auction should be carried out. We show that different load levels require different plants for the optimal provision of balancing power. In a longer bidding period, the power plants that have the lowest average cost in the bidding period are unlikely to be efficient in all hours of the bidding period. Hence, shortening bidding periods can increase efficiency. Furthermore, we show that an early commitment on a power plant’s mode of operation (when uncertainty about resulting spot prices is still relatively high) also reduces efficiency. This suggests that the auction should be held relatively close to the beginning of the bidding period. Furthermore, we discuss some advantages of a liquid real time market.     

Mass-Elite Equilibrium of Federal Constitutional Legitimacy

William Riker ((1964) Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little Brown) stressed the problem of the contested nature of federal institutions and argued that federations existed amidst the ongoing challenge to their rules, that federal institutions were being continuously endogenously produced in the interaction of political parties rather than serving as self-enforceable constraints on the political process. As parties changed, so did federalism, and eventually the balance was bound to shift to either one or the other extreme as far as the degree of centralization was concerned. An alternative approach to essentially the same problem of federal instability was to conceptualize the underlying game differently, as a game of coordination, so that institutions would be accepted as constraints and would therefore be self-enforceable because they allow the players to avoid the chaos and successfully converge to an outcome with payoffs exceeding their reservation values (Hardin, 1989, Ordeshook, 1992). The third proposed solution, consociationalism, emphasizes the elite effort to overcome the conflictual nature of the institutional choice (Lijphart, 1977). Here, as in the coordination argument, the hope is that one could create incentives for politicians to view the existing rules as advantageous and to avoid redistribution by means of the institutional revision. Yet, just like the coordination argument, it is based on an implicit assumption that politicians are more easily motivated to act “cooperatively” than are their constituencies. The missing step in the literature is the mechanism by which this more or less “cooperative” behavior of elected politicians could be sustainable in the environment of popular accountability. An essential component in building the theory of institutional design is to show the possibility in a democracy of elected politicians cooperating on institutional matters even when each of their constituencies would prefer to adjust the constitutional terms to its own advantage. Elite “cooperativeness” must be sustainable even in the presence of outside challengers promising to stay closer to the constituent preferences. Here, I present a model of mass-elite equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy, which demonstrates the possibility to motivate the incumbents to sustain the institutional stability while at the same time protecting them from electoral defeat. I also discuss the difficulties and limitations that such a solution faces, in particular, in plural societies. JEL classification: H77, D02 In working on this paper, I have benefited from the discussions with Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook, Charles Kromkowski, Carol Mershon, and from the comments of the participants of the conference on ‘‘Micro-Foundations of Federal Institutional Stability’’ at the MicroIncentives Research Center at Duke University, Durham, NC, April 30–May 1, 2004, and of the Lansing Lee proseminar at the University of Virginia. The responsibility for the many remaining flaws is solely mine.     

International Monetary Policy: A Global Taylor Rule

John Taylors rule for setting interest rates provides a framework for studying the global monetary policy generated by individual countries pursing their own policy goals. The study reflects the global nature of monetary policy by modeling an aggregate short-term interest rate as a function of measures of worldwide inflation and the GDP gap. Multiple specifications are estimated to correspond to past studies of the U.S. relationships between these variables. The authors find that Taylor rule is a useful tool for characterizing the global monetary environment as his equation provides a good fit to the data in every specification explored by the authors. However, the international response to inflation is slightly less robust despite claims of inflation targeting by the bulk of the larger economies in the sample.     

A Survey and a Theoretical Model of Distance Education Programs

In search of a distance education programs crucial success factors, this research was conducted through a designed survey and evaluation instrument, for a predominantly doctoral program at DE University (DEU, an adopted name). Also, the survey has identified some challenging factors along with students most crucial reasons for adopting distance education programs. The author has presented a Testable theoretical model of distance education programs. The top four success factors were revealed to be program quality, general recognition and academic integrity, students satisfaction, and students progress toward the ultimate goal of graduation. Lack of time and worries about the degree recognition by prospective academic and nonacademic employers were the most crucial challenging factors.The 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference Lisbon, Portugal, March 10–14. This research is appreciably funded by a research grant from Walden University.