Executive preferences for governance modes and exchange partners: An information economics perspective

This study investigates how executives address information asymmetry and adverse selection surrounding international joint ventures (IJVs) and acquisitions. We argue that executives can address such exchange hazards not only through their governance decisions, as prior research indicates, but also through their selection of exchange partners. Our experimental design complements prior research on firms' governance choices in three ways: (1) by incorporating multiple potential exchange partners rather than taking a single partner as given for a realized transaction; (2) by accommodating multiple potential entry modes to address interdependencies across governance structures; and (3) by providing direct evidence on executives' assessments of IJVs and acquisitions. We join together organizational governance research and decision‐making research on IJV partner selection, two literatures that have largely developed separately. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The political economy of seigniorage

While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main political and institutional determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960–1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater political stability as a means to reduce the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.     

2022 KLEIN LECTURE PARENTAL EDUCATION AND INVENTION: THE FINNISH ENIGMA

Why is invention strongly positively correlated with parental income not only in the United States but also in Finland, which displays low income inequality and high social mobility? Using data on 1.45 M Finnish individuals and their parents, we find the following: (i) the positive association between parental income and off-spring probability of inventing is greatly reduced when controlling for parental education; (ii) instrumenting for the parents having an MSc degree using distance to nearest university reveals a large causal effect of parental education on offspring probability of inventing; and (iii) the causal effect of parental education has been markedly weakened by the introduction in the early 1970s of a comprehensive schooling reform.