On the Risk of a Sovereign Debt Crisis in Italy

The intention for the Italian government to stimulate business activity via large increases in government spending is not in line with the stabilisation of the public debt ratio. Instead, if such policy were implemented, the risk of a sovereign debt crisis would be high. In this article, we analyse the capacity of the Italian economy to shoulder sovereign debt under different scenarios. We conclude that focusing on growth enhancing structural reforms, would allow for moderate increases in public expenditure.     

Search by committee

We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop is made by a committee and show that a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium exists given a log concave distribution of rewards. We compare search by committee to the corresponding single-agent problem and show that committee members are less picky and more conservative than the single agent. We show how (i) increasing committee size holding the plurality fraction constant and (ii) increasing the plurality rule affect the equilibrium acceptance threshold and expected search duration. Finally, we show that unanimity is optimal if committee members are sufficiently patient.     

Schuldenkrise in der Europäischen Union

Die Krise Griechenlands w?chst sich zu einer Gefahr für den gesamten Euroraum aus. Wie soll die Europ?ische Union darauf reagieren? Sie befindet sich im Dilemma zwischen Bailout und Bestrafung des „Defizitsünders“. Das erste scheint für den Bestand der W?hrungsunion unvermeidlich, das zweite ist erforderlich, um einen Moral Hazard zu vermeiden.     

Price competition under universal service obligations

In industries like telecom, postal services or energy provision, universal service obligations (uniform price and universal coverage) are often imposed on one market participant. Universal service obligations are likely to alter firms' strategic behavior in such competitive markets. In the present paper, we show that, depending on the entrant's market coverage and the degree of product differentiation, the Nash equilibrium in prices involves either pure or mixed strategies. We show that the pure strategy market sharing equilibrium, as identified by Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros (2002), defines a lower bound on the level of equilibrium prices.     

Joint implementation: a promising instrument for climate protection

The first Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change opened the path for a new policy instrument to mitigate anthropogenic climate change. It instituted a pilot phase for international emission offsets, “Joint Implementation”, open for all signatories to the Convention. During the pilot phase, however, emission reductions achieved abroad cannot be credited to domestic emission targets. By 2000, a decision on crediting and the final structure of the Joint Implementation regime must be taken by the Conference of the Parties.     

Rezensionen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Decisions by players of comparable strength

Summary Committees are represented by simple games. The strength of the players is not always ordinally scaled. In ballots the strength of the players is (nearly) cardinally scaled (by the number of votes). The size of the gap between ordinally and cardinally scaled strength is examined. Especially in the ordinal case the constant-sum property has a much weaker meaning than in the cardinal case. Examples are constructed for the crucial points.