Berufsbedingte Dermatosen bei Pflegenden

Ekzeme – eine h?ufig untersch?tzte Gefahr - Untersuchungen zeigen, dass die Lebensqualit?t durch berufsbedingte Hauterkrankungen genauso eingeschr?nkt wird wie durch einen Myokardinfarkt oder Schlaganfall. Das ist für Pflegende deshalb so bedeutsam, weil gerade in Pflegeberufen Kontakt zu potenziell Allergie ausl?senden Stoffen besteht.     

Quality competition and entry deterrence: When to launch a second brand

We study the rationale for an incumbent to launch a second brand when facing potential entry into a market with quality‐differentiated products and a fringe producer. Depending on market size, the cost of a second brand and a potential entrant's setup cost the incumbent might use a second brand both when deterring and when accommodating entry. For low costs of brand proliferation, the high‐quality firm will prevent entry with limit qualities or multiple brands. The high‐quality incumbent will accommodate entry only if it cannot be prevented. Accommodation is always accompanied by an additional brand safeguarding the premium brand.     

Service Delivery Networks and Employment Relations at German Airports: Jeopardizing Industrial Peace on the Ground?

In this article, we ask how organizational restructuring towards a network form of service delivery challenges an established form of employment relations in Germany, that is labour–management collaboration. Building on a theoretical discussion of the marketization hypothesis, we develop a structuration perspective on the relationship between network restructuring and labour–management collaboration, which highlights the political economy of inter-firm networks. Empirically, we focus on two major airport authorities in Germany. Our findings show how these authorities at the core of service delivery networks face a strategic trade-off between short-term labour cost reductions and more adversarial employment relations. Apart from coinciding with a deterioration in working conditions for service workers, the handling of this trade-off depends on managers’ and worker representatives’ commitment to collaboration across the network. While unions and works councils initially continued with social partnership-type practices, the more adversarial management practices for enacting the network restructuring cause a fragmentation on the workers’ side and increase the conflict potential. We conclude that the agency of management and worker representatives in the enactment of inter-firm networks oscillates between more partnership-like and more conflictive practices, which turn the network restructuring into a political process with divergent outcomes for employment relations.     

Foreign Acquisitions,Domestic Multinationals,and R&D

Our aim in this paper is to evaluate the causal effect of foreign acquisition on research and development (R&D) intensity in targeted domestic firms. We are able to distinguish domestic multinational enterprises (MNEs) and non‐MNEs, which allows us to investigate the fear that the change in ownership of domestic MNEs to foreign MNEs leads to a reduction in R&D activity in the country. Overall, our results give no support to the fears that foreign acquisition of domestic firms leads to a relocation of R&D activity in Swedish MNEs. Rather, in this paper, we find robust evidence that foreign acquisitions lead to increasing R&D intensity in acquired domestic MNEs and non‐MNEs.     

MONOPOLISTIC LOCATION CHOICE IN A TWO‐SIDED HOTELLING MODEL

We analyse the optimal location choice of a monopolistic firm that operates two arbitrarily located platforms on a two‐sided market. By extending the traditional Hotelling framework, we show that the optimal platform locations are equivalent to the one‐sided benchmark if both sides are either restricted to single‐ or multi‐homing. In the mixed case (one side single‐homes, the other one multi‐homes), the optimal platform locations are in line with the respective symmetric case. If the monopolist is restricted to choosing the same location on either side of the market, the optimal locations are determined by the relative profitability of the market sides.     

Should countries block foreign takeovers of R&D champions and promote greenfield entry?

Abstract In R&D intensive industries, governments promote greenfield foreign investments, while being sceptical towards foreign acquisitions of domestic high‐quality firms. We develop a theoretical model that shows that foreign acquisitions are conducive to high‐quality targets because of strategic effects on the sales price. However, foreign firms ‘cherry pick’ high‐quality targets to expand R&D rather than to downsize. Otherwise, rivals expand R&D, making the acquisition unprofitable. Thus, our model predicts that acquired affiliates invest more in R&D than greenfield affiliates. Using affiliate data, we find evidence that acquired affiliates have a higher level of sequential R&D intensity than greenfield affiliates.